CSX TRANSPORTATION INC V ATCHISON TOPEKA SANTA FE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC.,
UNPUBLISHED
April 7, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
v
No. 216522
Saginaw Circuit Court
LC No. 98-022736-CZ
THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE
RAILWAY CO.,
Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Before: Smolenski, P.J., and Markey and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from a judgment for defendant in the amount of $2,135,500 plus
interest and costs, entered in confirmation of an arbitration award. Defendant cross appeals from the
denial of its motion for sanctions. We affirm.
On June 22, 1989, a railroad car owned by defendant derailed on a track owned by plaintiff.
The derailment caused property damage and a fire that required the residents of Freeland, Michigan, to
evacuate for several days. The derailment also resulted in a class action against the parties brought by
Freeland residents, as well as other litigation and clean-up costs. The parties agreed to cooperate in
resolving all litigation arising out of the derailment, and then to arbitrate any disputes between themselves
about their relative degrees of responsibility for the losses incurred. The total losses to the parties were
$5,650,700, of which plaintiff paid $3,515,200 and defendant paid $2,135,500. These amounts are
undisputed.
The parties executed an arbitration agreement, and plaintiff demanded arbitration under the
agreement. Each party chose one arbitrator, and the two arbitrators then chose a neutral arbitrator.
The arbitrators were required to have considerable knowledge and experience in the railroad industry.
The agreement specified that the arbitrators’ decision was final and binding. The arbitrators were
instructed to express the relative degrees of fault between plaintiff and defendant on a percentage basis.
The arbitrators concluded that plaintiff was 100 percent at fault for the derailment and that the causes of
the derailment were uneven track conditions and inadequate side bearing clearances. The arbitrators’
decision and award did not include a specific monetary award.
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Plaintiff moved in circuit court to vacate the arbitration award, arguing that the arbitrators
exceeded their authority by making erroneous decisions of law. Plaintiff also argued that the award
should be vacated because one of the arbitrators did not fully participate in deliberations. Defendant
then moved to confirm the award and enter a money judgment on it. Defendant also moved for
sanctions against plaintiff and for certain deposition testimony to be stricken from plaintiff’s pleadings
because it was not presented to the arbitrators. The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion to vacate the
award, and instead granted defendant’s motion to confirm the award. The court also entered a money
judgment against plaintiff for $2,135,500. However, the court denied defendant’s motion for sanctions
and did not rule on defendant’s motion to strike.
On appeal, plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred by entering a money judgment on the
arbitration award because the award did not provide for money damages. MCR 3.602(L) provides
that a court may render judgment giving effect to an arbitration award. Plaintiff’s argument is that the
court’s judgment does not give effect to the arbitration award because the award did not specify
damages. This issue involves a question of fact—whether the effect of the arbitration award was to
require one party to pay money damages to the other party. We review questions of fact for clear
error. Cipri v Bellingham Frozen Foods, Inc, 235 Mich App 1, 12; 596 NW2d 89 (1999). We find
no clear error.
Although the arbitration award itself did not specify damages, the parties do not dispute what
their respective losses were. The parties instructed the arbitrators to decide their relative fault on a
percentage basis. In fact, plaintiff’s counsel informed the arbitrators that the parties knew what the
damages were and that they would use the percentages of fault as a “multiplier” to apply to the
damages. The trial court found that the parties’ understanding was that the percentage of fault, as
determined by the arbitrators, would determine the share of losses for which each party was
responsible. The record supports the court’s finding. The parties agreed on damages, and they
submitted their dispute over liability to arbitration.
Plaintiff argues that, although it made a demand for arbitration of its claim against defendant for
losses incurred from the derailment, defendant made no accompanying claim against plaintiff for its
losses. Therefore, according to plaintiff, the arbitration award had the effect of denying plaintiff’s claims
against defendant, but did not authorize payment of any claim defendant had against plaintiff. Plaintiff
insists that a money judgment in favor of defendant was inappropriate because defendant never made a
specific claim for damages. Plaintiff relies on Rule 6 of the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the
American Arbitration Association. Under that rule, once a party makes a demand for arbitration, the
other party may make a counterclaim. Plaintiff contends that defendant did not make a counterclaim,
but only defended plaintiff’s claim. However, the arbitration agreement provided that arbitration could
be initiated under either Rule 6 or Rule 7. Rule 7 applies to arbitration initiated under a submission to
arbitrate an existing dispute, while Rule 6 applies to arbitration under a contractual arbitration provision.
Here, the parties agreed to arbitrate an existing dispute, and Rule 7 applies rather than Rule 6. Rule 7
does not mention counterclaims. Therefore, plaintiff’s reliance on Rule 6 is misplaced.
We conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that the parties agreed that the
arbitrators would only determine relative fault on a percentage basis, which would then be used as a
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multiplier to the total amount of losses. The record supports the court’s application of the arbitrator’s
decision to determine the amount of the undisputed losses allocated to each party. Therefore, the court
appropriately entered a money judgment to give effect to the arbitration award under MCR 3.602(L).
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred by confirming the arbitration award because the
arbitrators exceeded their authority by making erroneous legal decisions. An award may be vacated if
the arbitrators exceeded their authority. MCR 3.602(J)(1)(c). Arbitrators exceed their authority
“whenever they act beyond the material terms of the contract from which they primarily draw their
authority, or in contravention of controlling principles of law.” DAIIE v Gavin, 416 Mich 407, 434;
331 NW2d 418 (1982). A court’s review of such a claim “is restricted to cases in which an error of
law appears from the face of the award, or the terms of the contract of submission, or such
documentation as the parties agree will constitute the record.” Dohanyos v Detrex Corp (After
Remand), 217 Mich App 171, 175-176; 550 NW2d 608 (1996). “Where it clearly appears on the
face of the award or in the reasons for the decision . . . that the arbitrators through an error of law have
been led to a wrong conclusion and that, but for such error, a substantially different award must have
been made, the award and decision will be set aside.” Id. at 176.
The arbitrators unanimously concluded that the derailment was caused by track conditions and
inadequate side bearing clearances. The arbitrators also concluded that plaintiff was responsible for
both defects and was therefore 100 percent at fault for the derailment. Plaintiff argues that the
arbitrators’ decision was based on errors of law and must be set aside. Specifically, plaintiff contends
that, because it complied with federal standards regarding track conditions, the track was not defective
as a matter of law. Plaintiff also maintains that the arbitrators erroneously relied on an industry rule to
impose responsibility for the side bearing clearances. We disagree.
A review of the face of the arbitration decision and award clearly demonstrates that the
arbitrators’ decision was based on their evaluation of complex factual evidence. The arbitrators were
chosen for their expertise in the railroad industry, and this Court is neither authorized nor well-suited to
determine whether their factual conclusions were correct. We may not review the arbitration award to
determine whether it was supported by the evidence. Donegan v Michigan Mut Ins Co, 151 Mich
App 540, 549; 391 NW2d 403 (1986).
Plaintiff asserts that its track was in compliance with federal safety standards, as set forth in 49
CFR § 213 et seq., and that therefore its track, as a matter of law, was not defective. However, 49
CFR § 213.1 expressly recognizes that the regulations are only minimum safety standards. Section
213.1 provides that “a combination of track conditions, none of which individually amounts to a
deviation from the [federal regulations], may require remedial action to provide for safe operations over
that track.” Also, the regulations expressly allow a railroad to adopt more stringent standards.
Therefore, the federal regulations recognize that a track may be unsafe although it is in compliance with
the federal minimum standards. Thus, the arbitrators’ finding that the derailment was caused in part by
uneven track conditions on plaintiff’s track was not a clear error of law.
The arbitrators also found that inadequate side bearing clearances were a cause of the
derailment. The arbitrators concluded that, under Interchange Rule 1(a) of the Association of American
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Railroads, plaintiff was responsible for the condition of all cars on its line. Plaintiff argues that reliance
on this rule was an error of law because the arbitrators ignored factual evidence that defendant built
defects into the car when it reconstructed the car and that defendant delivered the car to plaintiff
knowing that it violated plaintiff’s clearance requirements. However, the arbitrators examined the
evidence and determined that the defect was readily discoverable during normal inspection, but that
plaintiff did not discover it. Moreover, the arbitrators were presented with evidence that plaintiff had
performed repair work on the car more recently than had defendant. The decision that plaintiff was at
fault for the derailment was based on the arbitrators’ examination of the evidence in light of their
considerable knowledge and experience in the railroad industry.
The trial court correctly recognized that plaintiff, in effect, was seeking to challenge the merits of
the arbitrators’ decision. “[A]n allegation that the arbitrators have exceeded their powers must be
carefully evaluated in order to assure that this claim is not used as a ruse to induce the court to review
the merits of the arbitrators’ decision.” Gordon Sel-Way, Inc v Spence Bros, Inc, 438 Mich 488,
497; 475 NW2d 704 (1991). An arbitration award may not be vacated on the basis of a review of the
merits of the decision. Dohanyos, supra at 177. Plaintiff’s arguments are essentially objections to the
merits of the arbitrators’ decision. We refuse to review the merits of that decision. The arbitrators were
each very experienced and knowledgeable in the railroad industry, and their decision was rendered after
considering a vast amount of evidence that the parties presented to them. Plaintiff has failed to
demonstrate that the arbitrators acted “in contravention of controlling principles of law.” Gavin, supra
at 434. Therefore, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the arbitrators exceeded their authority, and
the trial court did not err by failing to vacate the arbitrators’ decision and award.
Plaintiff finally argues that the trial court erred by refusing to vacate the decision because one of
the arbitrators was excluded from part of the arbitrators’ deliberations. Plaintiff claims that the
arbitrators exceeded their authority under the arbitration agreement and denied plaintiff due process by
conducting deliberations without one of the arbitrators. We disagree.
The arbitration agreement did not specify where or how deliberations were to be conducted.
After the arbitration hearing, the arbitrators agreed to deliberate in Key West, Florida. However, the
arbitrator selected by plaintiff could not travel to Florida due to an illness in his family. Counsel for both
parties agreed that he could participate in the deliberations by telephone conferences. Plaintiff argues
that its arbitrator did not in fact participate in all the deliberations. As evidence, plaintiff relies on the
bills submitted by the arbitrators. The neutral arbitrator submitted a bill for four days, at eight hours per
day, of deliberations in Florida. However, plaintiff’s arbitrator submitted a bill that only mentioned two
and a half hours of conference calls during the same four-day period. Plaintiff argues that this billing
discrepancy demonstrates that its arbitrator did not participate in all the deliberations.
However, the neutral arbitrator submitted an affidavit to the trial court, in which he explained the
billing discrepancy. He explained that his standard billing practice when traveling for deliberations is to
charge a flat eight-hour rate per day because he is unable to attend to other matters. He also stated that
plaintiff’s arbitrator was not excluded from any deliberations, but participated fully and drafted a
substantial portion of the decision. Moreover, the arbitration decision itself, signed by all three
arbitrators, noted that plaintiff’s arbitrator, although not physically present, was privy to all discussions
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by telephone and facsimile. The decision also noted that counsel for both parties approved of this
process beforehand.
Under these circumstances, the trial court did not err in concluding that all three arbitrators
participated fully in the deliberations. This is a finding of fact that we may reverse only if clearly
erroneous. MCR 2.613(C); Cipri, supra at 8. Clear error exists where we are left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Schadewald v Brulé, 225 Mich App 26, 41; 570
NW2d 788 (1997). Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the court’s finding was clearly erroneous.
Because the arbitrators all participated fully in the deliberations, plaintiff has not demonstrated that the
arbitrators acted outside the scope of their authority, or that plaintiff was denied due process.
Moreover, to constitute misconduct justifying vacating an arbitration award, an arbitrator must be
actually excluded from deliberations. Bradley v Allstate Ins Co, 133 Mich App 116, 120; 348 NW2d
51 (1984). Plaintiff has not demonstrated actual exclusion, and plaintiff agreed to the method employed
by the arbitrators. “This Court is reluctant to become involved in reviewing the methods of deliberations
used by arbitrators in reaching their decisions.” Id. In this case, we find no basis for finding that the
trial court erred by refusing to vacate the arbitration award.
On cross appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by refusing to impose sanctions on
plaintiff under MCR 2.114 for bringing a frivolous claim. “The imposition of a sanction under MCR
2.114 is mandatory upon the finding that a pleading was signed in violation of the court rule or a
frivolous action or defense had been pleaded.” Schadewald, supra at 41. The trial court’s
determination whether a claim is frivolous is reviewed for clear error. Szymanski v Brown, 221 Mich
App 423, 436; 562 NW2d 212 (1997). We conclude that the trial court did not clearly err.
Under MCR 2.114, a signature on a document certifies that a reasonable inquiry into the claim
has been made, that the claim is well grounded in law and fact, and that the claim has not been brought
for any improper purpose. Defendant argues that plaintiff’s motion to vacate the arbitration award was
brought without reasonable inquiry. Specifically, defendant challenges plaintiff’s claim that one of the
arbitrators was excluded from deliberations. Defendant argues that all plaintiff did was to compare the
billing statements of the arbitrators for discrepancies. Defendant asserts that, had plaintiff investigated
further, it would have discovered the neutral arbitrator’s explanation of his billing practices, which
resolves the billing discrepancy. However, even if plaintiff had known of the explanation, its motion to
vacate the award was not frivolous. Whether the arbitrator’s explanation was credible was an arguable
question of fact. Defendant has failed to demonstrate that the trial court clearly erred in finding that
plaintiff’s motion was not frivolous.
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by refusing to impose sanctions on plaintiff for
misconduct. A trial court has inherent authority to impose sanctions for the misconduct of a litigant.
Persichini v William Beaumont Hospital, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket No.
207377, issued 11/30/1999), slip op at 6; Prince v MacDonald, 237 Mich App 186, 189; 602
NW2d 834 (1999). The trial court’s decision whether to exercise that power is reviewed for a clear
abuse of discretion. Persichini, supra, slip op at 7; Carpenter v Consumers Power Co, 230 Mich
App 547, 557; 584 NW2d 375 (1998), lv gtd 461 Mich 880 (1999). We find no clear abuse of
discretion.
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Before the arbitrators’ decision was issued, a risk manager employed by plaintiff contacted the
neutral arbitrator, expressing displeasure at the decision to find plaintiff at fault, imploring the arbitrators
to discuss the matter further, and implying that the decision would destroy the confidence of all railroad
companies in arbitration. Defendant argues that this ex parte communication merits the imposition of a
sanction equal to the amount of the judgment. In other words, defendant seeks a sanction of over two
million dollars.
The trial court refused to impose a sanction, finding that the communication occurred after the
decision was m and merely voiced plaintiff’s objections to the decision. However, the trial court
ade
seemed to ignore that the communication occurred before the arbitrators’ decision was released,
although the contents of the communication clearly demonstrate that plaintiff knew what the decision
was. Therefore, the communication was an improper ex parte communication with an arbitrator. See
Rule 29 of the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association (prohibiting direct
communication between a party and a neutral arbitrator). See also MRPC 3.5 (prohibiting ex parte
communications with a judge, juror, or other official). Although an arbitrator is not a judge, an
arbitrator’s function is quasi-judicial. Boraks v American Arbitration Ass’n, 205 Mich App 149,
151; 517 NW2d 771 (1994); International Union v Greyhound Lines, Inc, 701 F2d 1181, 1185
(CA 6, 1983). Plaintiff’s communication with the neutral arbitrator was improper.
However, the misconduct in this case occurred during arbitration, not during litigation in the trial
court. The court’s inherent power to impose sanctions for litigant misconduct is “based on a court’s
fundamental interest in protecting its integrity and that of the judicial system.” Brenner v Kolk, 226
Mich App 149, 160; 573 NW2d 65 (1997). Here, although the integrity of the arbitration process was
affected, the integrity of the trial court or the judicial system was not. We doubt whether the trial court
even had the authority to impose sanctions for misconduct that occurred before the arbitration panel. In
cases where this Court has affirmed the imposition of sanctions for misconduct, the misconduct
occurred before the trial court. See, e.g., Persichini, supra, slip op at 1-2, 7 (sanction imposed where
attorney’s improper question resulted in a mistrial); Prince, supra at 188, 190-190, 196 (sanction
imposed where bankruptcy petition filed the day before trial in order to interfere with the trial court’s
proceeding). In any event, even if the trial court had the authority to impose sanctions in this case, it
was within its discretion to refuse to do so. Although the communication occurred before the final
decision was released, the deliberations had concluded. Plaintiff had apparently been informed of the
results of those deliberations. The communication did not affect the deliberative process whatsoever.
Under these circumstances, it was not a clear abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse to impose
sanctions.
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by refusing to award attorney fees under
Interchange Rule 120(E) of the Association of American Railroads. The trial court’s decision whether
to award attorney fees is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. First Security Savings Bank v Aitken,
226 Mich App 291, 319; 573 NW2d 307 (1997), overruled in part on other grounds 460 Mich 446,
455 n 2 (1999). We find no abuse of discretion.
Defendant claims that Rule 120(E) was a contractual provision between the parties that would
allow attorney fees to be awarded where litigation is required to enforce the arbitration award.
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Contractual provisions for attorney fees are judicially enforceable. Id.; Central Transport, Inc v
Fruehauf Corp, 139 Mich App 536, 548; 362 NW2d 823 (1984). However, the parties’ arbitration
agreement only provides that the parties agreed to submit their dispute to arbitration under the
Commercial Rules of the AAA. The agreement does not provide that the parties are bound by Rule
120 of the Association of American Railroads.
Defendant argues that the parties agreed at the arbitration hearing to be bound by Rule 120.
However, a review of the transcript of that hearing reveals that the arbitrators were merely attempting to
verify that the parties intended that the arbitrators’ decision would be binding. Plaintiff’s counsel did not
agree that the arbitration was conducted under Rule 120, but did affirm that the decision would be
binding pursuant to the terms of the arbitration agreement. Therefore, defendant’s assertion is not
supported by the record.
Because we conclude that Rule 120(E) was not included in the parties’ agreement, we express
no opinion whether Rule 120(E) would even operate to require an award of attorney fees in this case.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to award attorney fees.
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to rule on its motion to strike certain
deposition testimony from plaintiff’s pleadings. Defendant moved to have any references to the
testimony stricken because the testimony was not presented to the arbitrators. However, defendant has
failed to specify what relief it seeks from this Court, if any. Even assuming that the trial court should
have granted defendant’s motion to strike, any error would be harmless. The disputed testimony
involves an expert opinion regarding the defects that caused the derailment. The trial court specifically
refused to review the merits of the arbitrators’ decision regarding the causes of the derailment. Indeed,
plaintiff’s motion to vacate the award was denied. We discern no relief necessary or available to
defendant on this issue.
Affirmed.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
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