PEOPLE OF MI V KENNETH BARNETT
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 10, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 208841
Recorder’s Court
LC No. 96-000196
KENNETH BARNETT,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Bandstra, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr. and Fitzgerald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his conviction in a bench trial of two counts of armed
robbery, MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797, and one count of possession of a firearm during the commission
of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). We affirm.
Defendant contends that the lineup from which he was identified was so impermissibly
suggestive that it violated his right to due process. We disagree. We review the trial court’s decision to
admit identification evidence for clear error. People v Kurylczyk, 443 Mich 289, 303; 505 NW2d
528 (1993). To sustain a challenge to identification testimony, a defendant must show that the pretrial
identification procedure was so suggestive, considering the totality of the circumstances, that it led to a
substantial likelihood of misidentification. Neil v Biggers, 409 US 188, 196; 93 S Ct 375; 34 L Ed 2d
401 (1972). “The fact that there are actual differences in physical characteristics among line-up
participants does not necessarily amount to impermissible suggestiveness. Differences are significant
only to the extent they are apparent to the witness and substantially distinguish defendant from the other
participants in the line-up.” People v James, 184 Mich App 457, 465-466; 458 NW2d 911 (1990),
vacated in part on other grounds, 437 Mich 988 (1991).
One complainant described the masked gunman as a seventeen to twenty-one year old black
male with a light complexion, standing 5’5” to 5’6” tall and weighing approximately 130 pounds. The
other complainant testified that the masked gunman was a light-skinned black male between twenty and
twenty-three years old, standing 5’6” to 5’7” tall, and weighing 150 to 170 pounds. Officer Gary
Deneal testified that, based upon a composite of complainants’ descriptions, he broadcast a description
-1
of the gunman over the radio of a black male with a medium complexion, standing 5’8” tall, wearing a
blue FILA jacket, and armed with a .25 semi-automatic handgun.
Defendant was one of nine people in the lineup. All of the lineup participants were black males
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-eight, without beards, ranging in height from 5’5” to 6’6” tall
and in weight from 130 to 300 pounds. Including defendant, three suspects were part of the lineup.
Defendant was the second shortest and lightest of the participants. Four individuals were within one
inch of defendant’s height and thirty pounds of his weight. Defendant was allowed to choose where he
wished to stand in the lineup. At the suggestion of the lineup attorney, plastic bags were placed over all
of the suspects’ heads to negate the possibility that the suspects might be identified by hair style alone.
Defendant argues that the instant case is analogous to People v Wilson, 20 Mich App 410,
413; 174 NW2d 79 (1969), in which this Court found a lineup impermissibly suggestive where the
defendant was 5’3½” and the four other lineup participants were 5’7” to 5’10” tall. The lineup in this
case, unlike the lineup in Wilson, contained four individuals who were comparable in height and weight
to defendant. Two of these individuals more closely resembled the description of the armed suspect
given to Officer Deneal than did defendant. While the other participants of the lineup were not at all
comparable to defendant, the complainants were given a broad range of individuals from which to
attempt to identify the potential suspects from the robbery. We cannot conclude that the trial court’s
ruling was clearly erroneous.
Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for
a new trial because (1) its findings of fact were logically inconsistent, and (2) the verdict was against the
great weight of the evidence. We disagree. We review the trial court’s decision whether to grant a new
trial for an abuse of discretion. People v Daoust, 228 Mich App 1, 16; 577 NW2d 179 (1998). A
new trial may be granted on a ground which would support reversal on appeal or because the verdict
resulted in a miscarriage of justice. MCR 6.431(B); People v Leonard, 224 Mich App 569, 580; 569
NW2d 663 (1997). A motion for new trial based on the weight of the evidence should be granted only
if the “evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict and a serious miscarriage of justice would
otherwise result.” People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 642; 576 NW2d 129 (1998).
Defendant argues that he should have been granted a new trial because the trial judge’s findings
were logically inconsistent. We disagree. We recognize that a trial court, unlike a jury, has a duty to
make logical, consistent rulings. People v Vaughn, 409 Mich 463, 466; 295 NW2d 354 (1980); see
People v Fairbanks, 165 Mich App 551, 557; 419 NW2d 13 (1987) (facts do not support conviction
for assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct in the second degree, MCL 750.520g(2);
MSA 28.788(7)(2) when court finds insufficient evidence to establish an element of the offense).
However, a trial court’s findings are sufficient as long as it appears that the trial court was aware of the
factual issues and correctly applied the law. People v Wardlaw, 190 Mich App 318, 321; 475 NW2d
387 (1991).
Defendant’s mother’s testimony touched on two issues: (1) she had given defendant and her
brother $400 to $500 each when she received her monthly benefit check; and (2) defendant was at
home with her at the time of the robberies. Presumably, the testimony about the money was material
-2
because it could tend to explain why defendant had a large amount of money when he was arrested.
The judge found defendant’s mother to be a credible witness, saying that he believed her testimony that
she had given defendant and his brother $400 to $500 each when she received her monthly benefit
check. Although he went on to say, “[t]here was nothing that she said that I didn’t believe,” we do not
see this statement as a finding that defendant was with his mother at the time of the robberies. Although
we acknowledge that the trial judge’s findings could have been clearer on this issue, we conclude from
the context in which the judge’s statement was made that he found only that he believed the mother’s
testimony about the money. Even assuming that this statement related to the alibi testimony, we
conclude from the context in which the findings were made that the judge merely found that the mother
believed that defendant was with her at the time of the robberies. Given that defendant had admitted to
being involved in the robberies, that the complainants identified defendant, and that the complainants’
pagers were recovered from defendant and his accomplice, we cannot conclude that the judge’s
offhand remark constituted a fact finding inconsistent with the verdict of guilty.
In addition, defendant argues that a new trial should have been granted because the verdict was
against the great weight of the evidence. His argument is based primarily on the assumption that the
judge’s statement that there was nothing in what defendant’s mother said that he did not believe was
conclusive as to his alibi testimony. As we have already discussed, this evidence did not constitute a
finding that the alibi testimony was true or, even if credible, that it was controlling. The evidence
supporting the verdict was overwhelming; the two complainants identified defendant as the gunman, they
picked him out of a photographic lineup, and defendant admitted being involved in the robberies. The
court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for new trial.
Defendant has filed a pro se brief in which he contends that he was denied effective assistance
of counsel when his attorney moved for an adjournment instead of moving for an outright dismissal when
complainants were late for trial. We disagree. To establish a denial of effective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must demonstrate that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and that the representation so prejudiced the defendant as to deprive him of a fair trial.
People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 309; 521 NW2d 797 (1994); People v Daniel, 207 Mich App 47,
58; 523 NW2d 830 (1994). Furthermore, the defendant must overcome the presumption that the
challenged action is sound trial strategy. Id. Defendant filed a motion with this Court to remand his
case back to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on this issue, but this Court denied defendant’s
motion. Therefore, we must review this issue on the basis of the existing record. People v Barclay,
208 Mich App 670, 672; 528 NW2d 842 (1995).
Defendant’s case was originally set for trial on February 24, 1997. When the case was called
for trial, the prosecutor informed the court that, due to a miscommunication with the officer in charge,
subpoenas for the complaining witnesses were served late and only to other residents of the
complainants’ homes. The complainants were not in court. The trial judge indicated that she would
resume the matter in one-half hour. Thereafter, defense counsel requested an adjournment, saying that
he was in trial in another court on another o defendant’s cases. The court granted the motion to
f
adjourn and reset the case for trial. Later that day, the court dismissed without prejudice the charges
against one of defendant’s accomplices.
-3
This Court will not substitute its judgment for that of defense counsel on matters of trial strategy.
People v Kvam, 160 Mich App 189, 200; 408 NW2d 71 (1987). Action appearing erroneous in
hindsight does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if the action was taken for reasons that
would have appeared at the time to be sound trial strategy to a competent criminal attorney. Pickens,
supra at 344. Defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective for not waiting the extra half-hour
before moving to adjourn. Counsel moved for the adjournment so that he could appear in another of
defendant’s trials. Defense counsel could hardly be deemed ineffective for adjourning one of
defendant’s trials to represent defendant in another trial. This is clearly a matter of trial strategy. Kvam,
supra at 200. We cannot conclude that counsel was ineffective.
We affirm.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
-4
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.