JILL SMITH V HOME DEPOT USA INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JILL SMITH and BARRY SMITH,
UNPUBLISHED
March 7, 2000
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v
No. 207277
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 96-529103-NO
HOME DEPOT U.S.A., INC.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Whitbeck, P.J., and Saad and Hoekstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from an order of judgment in favor of plaintiffs, claiming that the
trial court erred in denying defendant’s motions for summary disposition and directed verdict, entering
judgment in favor of plaintiffs and awarding excessive damages. We disagree and affirm.
In this premises liability case, plaintiff1 filed a lawsuit against defendant to recover damages
related to an injury she sustained to her right ring finger while shopping in defendant’s store.2 Plaintiff
injured her finger when she reached above her head, grasped the plastic binding around a box of
ceramic tile and pulled the box forward to remove it from the shelf, at which time the box fell on her
hand.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(10) and its motion for directed verdict because the risk of harm posed by the box of
ceramic tile was open and obvious, did not pose an unreasonable risk of harm, and plaintiff herself
proximately caused the accident. Here, the box of ceramic tile was an open and obvious danger, but
defendant was not entitled to summary disposition and/or directed verdict because the situation posed
an unreasonable risk of harm and because a question existed as to who proximately caused the injury.
This Court reviews decisions on motions for summary disposition de novo. Spiek v Dep’t of
Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). Motions under MCR 2.116(C)(10)
test the factual support of the plaintiff’s claim. Id. The court considers the affidavits, pleadings,
depositions, admissions, and other evidence submitted to determine whether a genuine issue of any
material fact exists to warrant a trial. Id. Both this Court and the trial court must resolve all reasonable
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inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor. Bertrand v Allan Ford, 449 Mich 606, 617-618; 537
NW2d 185 (1995).
We also review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for a directed verdict. Braun v
York Properties, Inc, 230 Mich App 138, 141; 583 NW2d 503 (1998). We consider the evidence
presented at trial in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party to ascertain whether the plaintiff
established a prima facie case. Id. The court should grant a directed verdict only if reasonable jurors
could not reach different conclusions. Id.
Plaintiff was an invitee on defendant’s premises because she and her companions entered
defendant’s store to conduct business with defendant. Riddle v McLouth Steel Products Corp, 440
Mich 85, 90 n 4; 485 NW2d 676 (1992); Butler v Ramco-Gershenson, Inc, 214 Mich App 521,
532; 542 NW2d 912 (1995). With regard to the duty owed to a business invitee, such as plaintiff, our
Supreme Court has stated:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees
by a condition on the land if, but only if, he (a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable
care would discover the condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable
risk of harm to such invitees, and (b) should expect that they will not discover or realize
the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and (c) fails to exercise
reasonable care to protect them against the danger. [Riddle, supra at 93, quoting 2
Restatement Torts, 2d, § 343.]
In determining the duty owed a business invitee, the Court also stated, “where the dangers are known to
the invitee or are so obvious that the invitee might reasonably be expected to discover them, an invitor
owes no duty to protect or warn the invitee unless he should anticipate the harm despite knowledge of it
on behalf of the invitee.” Riddle, supra at 96. In a later case, our Supreme Court explained:
[I]f the risk of harm remains unreasonable, despite its obviousness or despite
knowledge of it by the invitee, then the circumstances may be such that the invitor is
required to undertake reasonable precautions. The issue then becomes the standard of
care and is for the jury to decide. [Bertrand v Alan Ford, Inc, 449 Mich 606, 611;
537 NW2d 185 (1995); footnote omitted.]
This Court has also addressed the duty owed to a business invitee, noting that a landowner does
not have a duty to warn invitees of open and obvious dangers. Hughes v PMG Building, Inc, 227
Mich App 1, 10; 574 NW2d 691 (1997). “Whether a danger is open and obvious depends upon
whether it is reasonable to expect an average person of ordinary intelligence to discover the danger
upon casual inspection.” Id. Although a land owner is not required to make its premises “foolproof,”
Hottmann v Hottmann, 226 Mich App 171, 176; 572 NW2d 259 (1997); Spagnuolo v Rudds # 2,
Inc, 221 Mich App 358, 362; 561 NW2d 500 (1997), he or she “has a duty to exercise reasonable
care to protect invitees from an unreasonable risk of harm caused by a dangerous condition that the
owner knows or should know the invitees will not discover or protect themselves against.” Hughes,
supra at 9. This Court further observed:
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[E]ven if a danger is open and obvious, a possessor of land may still have a duty
to protect invitees against foreseeably dangerous conditions. . . . [E]ven though there
may not be an absolute obligation to provide a warning [of open and obvious dangers],
this rule does not relieve the invitor from his duty to exercise reasonable care to protect
his invitees against known or discoverable dangerous conditions. The rationale behind
this rule is that liability for injuries incurred on defectively maintained premises should
rest upon the party who is in control or possession of the premises, and, thus, is best
able to prevent the injury. [Id. at 10-11; citations omitted.]
Once the existence of a duty towards the plaintiff is established, the reasonableness of the defendant’s
conduct is a question for the jury. Riddle, supra at 96-97.
Here, plaintiff says that she injured her finger when she reached above her head, grasped the
plastic binding around the box of tile and pulled the box forward to remove it from the shelf, at which
time the box fell on her hand. A box of ceramic tile stacked vertically on a shelf almost six feet from the
floor is an open and obvious danger. Arguably, however, displaying a box of heavy tiles, for self
service sale, on its vertical end at a height of nearly six feet from the floor, creates a condition that may
cause an unreasonable risk of harm to reasonably prudent persons. In a self-serve setting, an invitor
arguably should anticipate the harm or danger that such a condition may pose despite knowledge of it
on behalf of the invitee. If an unreasonable risk exists, the invitor must exercise reasonable care to
protect invitees. Riddle, supra; Hughes, supra. Because whether the condition poses an unreasonable
risk of harm and what constitutes reasonable care are matters for the trier-of-fact, Bertrand, supra at
617; Riddle, supra, the trial court did not err in denying summary disposition and directed verdict.
Further, defendant’s argument that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for
summary disposition because plaintiff proximately caused the box of tiles to fall on her finger is without
merit. To show proximate cause, a plaintiff must prove that the injury was a probable, reasonably
anticipated, and natural result of the defendant's negligence. Allen v Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp,
225 Mich App 397, 401; 571 NW2d 530 (1997). “There may be more than one proximate cause of
an injury. . . . [A] defendant cannot escape liability for its negligent conduct simply because the
negligence of others may also have contributed to the injury s
uffered by a plaintiff.” Id. 401-402.
Generally, proximate cause is a factual issue for the trier of fact to decide; however, if reasonable minds
could not differ with regard to the proximate cause of a plaintiff's injury, the issue is one of law for the
trial court. Transportation Dep’t v Christensen, 229 Mich App 417, 424; 581 NW2d 807 (1998).
Here, plaintiff alleged that the heavy box of ceramic tile, situated in a vertical manner on a shelf
over five feet five inches from the ground, without warning or notice with regard to the weight of the
box, constituted a dangerous and defective condition which proximately caused plaintiff’s broken finger.
Plaintiff set forth sufficient facts for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that defendant’s negligent
conduct was the proximate cause of her injury where it was foreseeable that customers, in this self-serve
setting, would attempt to retrieve a box of tile. Because reasonable minds could differ with regard to
the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for summary
disposition on this basis.
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Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred in awarding excessive damages to plaintiffs.
This Court will not overturn on appeal a trial court’s determination of damages in a bench trial unless the
result is clearly erroneous. In regard Rosati Trust, 177 Mich App 1, 6; 441 NW2d 30 (1989). A
trial court’s decision is clearly erroneous when the reviewing court is left with a firm and definite
conviction that a mistake has been made. Id.
First, defendant asserts that the award was excessive because plaintiff “merely” suffered a
broken finger. Defendant suggests that plaintiff’s damages should be reduced because she did not
immediately seek medical attention, there was not much that the medical profession could do to help
her, she had no surgery or physical therapy, and she missed no work. However, there is ample support
in the record for the trial court’s determination. The record illustrates a well-reasoned assessment of
damages, including: review of plaintiff’s medical records; notation of the permanent nature of plaintiff’s
injury, including deformities, degenerative changes in the finger, and plaintiff’s continued pain; indication
of plaintiff’s difficulties in performing work and with her personal hygiene; and observation of the
disturbance of plaintiff’s recreational habits. Further, the trial court noted plaintiff’s credibility, indicating
that plaintiff did not impress the court as a malingerer or one who tried to take advantage of the
situation. No clear error is present.
Next, defendant argues that the record does not support the trial court’s award of $2,500 to
plaintiff’s husband on his loss of consortium claim. A spouse has the right to recover from a tortfeasor
for loss of consortium as a consequence of the injuries suffered by the other spouse. Rusinek v
Schultz, Snyder & Steele Lumber Co, 411 Mich 502, 504; 309 NW2d 163 (1981). According to
our Supreme Court, consortium includes “society, companionship, service, and all other incidents of the
marriage relationship.” Id., quoting Washington v Jones, 386 Mich 466, 472; 192 NW2d 234
(1971). In the present case, with regard to plaintiff’s husband’s claim for loss of consortium, the trial
court noted the testimony of plaintiff’s husband, which included information about the types of things that
he has had to undertake, the change in his quality of life in terms of having to do personal things for
plaintiff, and the inability to play tennis and other recreational activities in which they had participated.
Again, no clear error is present.
Finally, defendant claims that the percentage of comparative negligence attributed to plaintiff,
i.e., ten percent, is in error because plaintiff admitted that she “lost control of the box.” This Court has
stated that “there is no magical formula for apportioning negligence.” Scott v Allen Bradley Co, 139
Mich App 665, 673; 362 NW2d 734 (1984). Here, plaintiff testified that she did not know how much
boxes of ceramic tile weighed, but estimated about five to ten pounds; that she had never before
touched a ceramic tile and had not planned on using a shopping cart, but planned to carry the tile to the
cash register; and that she attempted to get assistance from a store employee, but failed to locate such
assistance. The trial court apportioned plaintiff’s comparative negligence at ten percent primarily
because, although plaintiff made a reasonable effort to find someone to help, she perhaps could have
made a greater effort. The trial court’s apportionment is supported by the record and is not clearly
erroneous. In summary, because this
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Court is not left with a firm and definite conviction that the trial court erred in assessing damages, no
clear error exists.
Affirmed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
1
Because Barry Smith’s claim is derivative, “plaintiff” only refers to Jill Smith.
2
The injury occurred in a Home Depot store in Arizona, when plaintiff was visiting relatives in that state,
but she received medical treatment for the injury after she returned to Michigan.
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