CARRIE LYNN SPEIER SCHAFER V DEPT OF CONSUMER & INDUSTRY

 Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS CARRIE LYNN SPEIER-SCHAFER, UNPUBLISHED February 22, 2000 Plaintiff-Appellant, v DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER & INDUSTRY SERVICES, KATHLEEN M. WILBER, and BOARD OF OSTEOPATHIC MEDICINE, No. 222349 Ingham Circuit Court LC No. 99-090664-CZ Defendants-Appellees. Before: Zahra, P.J., and White and Hoekstra, JJ. PER CURIAM. Plaintiff appeals as of right an order denying her request for a writ of mandamus compelling defendants to issue her a fifth annual renewal of her educational limited license to practice medicine under MCL 333.17512; MSA 14.15(17512). We reverse and remand. The basic issue involved in this case is whether MCL 333.17512(2); MSA 14.15(17512)(2) allows a fifth annual renewal of an educational limited license to practice osteopathic medicine. The trial court concluded that it does not. We disagree. This Court reviews a grant or denial of a writ of mandamus for an abuse of discretion; however, where the central issue in the appeal involves statutory interpretation, which is a question of law, our review is de novo. Rhode v Dep’t of Corrections, 227 Mich App 174, 178; 578 NW2d 320 (1997). When interpreting a statute, this Court’s primary goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. People v Webb, 458 Mich 265, 274; 580 NW2d 884 (1998); Stanton v Battle Creek, 237 Mich App 366, 370; 603 NW2d 285 (1999). When determining the intent of the Legislature, this Court must first look to the specific language of the statute. People v McIntire, 461 Mich 147, 152­ 153; 599 NW2d 102 (1999); Stanton, supra. If the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute’s language is clear, judicial construction is inappropriate. Donajkowski v Alpena Power Co, 460 Mich 243, 248; 596 NW2d 574 (1999); McIntire, supra at 153. When interpreting a statute, this Court gives effect to every phrase, clause, and word, and unless defined in the statute, every word or phrase is accorded its plain and ordinary meaning. Donajkowski, supra at 248-249; McIntire, supra. -1­ Furthermore, “[w]here a statute does not define one of its terms it is customary to look to the dictionary for a definition.” People v Lee, 447 Mich 552, 558; 526 NW2d 882 (1994); Marcelle v Taubman, 224 Mich App 215, 219; 568 NW2d 393 (1997). The statutory language at issue in this case provides: “A limited license for a postgraduate is renewable for not more than 5 years.” MCL 333.17512(2); MSA 14.15(17512)(2). “Renewable” is defined as “able to be renewed.” Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary (2d ed), 1631. “Renew” is defined as “to begin or take up again, . . . to make effective for an additional period, . . . to restore or replenish, . . . to be restored to a former state, . . . .” Id. For a thing to be renewed it must first be in existence. The plain and ordinary meaning of the language at issue is that a limited license may be made effective for an additional period of not more than five years. In total, the statute allows for a limited license for six years – the original annual license plus five annual renewals. Therefore, judicial interpretation of the language at issue is not appropriate and plaintiff is clearly entitled to a fifth annual renewal of her educational limited license. Reversed and remanded for further action consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. /s/ Brian K. Zahra /s/ Helene N. White /s/ Joel P. Hoekstra -2­

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.