MERYLAND HARRIS V FORD MOTOR CO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MERYLAND HARRIS,
UNPUBLISHED
February 11, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 210096
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No.
96-646282-CK
FORD MOTOR COMPANY and DIAMOND LINCOLNMERCURY, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Bandstra, C.J., and Holbrook, Jr. and Fitzgerald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the order granting defendants’ motion for directed verdict. See MCR 2.515. We
affirm.
On June 27, 1996, plaintiff purchased a 1996 Mercury Sable from Diamond Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. (Diamond).
Immediately after plaintiff took the car off the lot, plaintiff noticed a “grunting” noise when she turned the car to the
right. Plaintiff notified Diamond and brought the car back the following Monday to have the car repaired. However,
Diamond was unable to repair the noise at that time. Plaintiff returned to Diamond concerning the noise on July 22,
1996, and at that time Diamond ordered parts for the car. On July 30, 1996, Diamond informed plaintiff that Ford
Motor Company, the manufacturer of the Sable, had issued a Technical Service Bulletin concerning the “grunting”
problem and indicated that the noise was an engineering problem that Ford was working to correct. Plaintiff then
began to communicate with Ford concerning the problem. Plaintiff ultimately demanded that Ford replace or buy
back her car because the car was a “lemon.” Plaintiff made several more trips to Diamond concerning the noise
before Diamond replaced the power steering hose on October 11, 1996. However, Diamond’s corrective repair did not
stop the noise.
On November 12, 1996, plaintiff filed an eleven-count complaint against defendants alleging, inter alia,
violations of implied and expressed warranties, revocation of acceptance, violation of the Michigan consumer
protection act (MCPA), MCL 445.901; MSA 19.418(1), and violation of the New Motor Vehicle Warranties Act (lemon
law), MCL 257.1401 et seq.; MSA 9.2705(1) et seq.
In May 1997, plaintiff took the car to Star Lincoln Mercury regarding the noise. Star replaced a leaking
power steering hose, but the repair did not abate the noise. On August 11, 1997, plaintiff returned to Star concerning
the noise. Plaintiff was requested to leave the car or return the next week, plaintiff did neither.
A jury trial commenced on January 26, 1998, at which time plaintiff testified that she worried about her safety
while in the car and that she had lost confidence in the car. Plaintiff also testified that the noise had substantially
impaired the value and use of the car to her. However, she continued to use the car without incident. Plaintiff’s only
other witness, an expert in the field of automobile mechanics, testified that the car made a “grunting” noise and that
the steering column vibrated when it made a right turn greater than ninety degrees, but that the noise did not always
occur. The witness, however, was unable to determine whether the noise and vibration constituted a safety concern.
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Following plaintiff’s case in chief, the trial court granted defendants’ oral motion for directed verdict. With
regard to the lemon law and revocation counts, the court found plaintiff failed to established a substantial impairment
of value or use of the vehicle. With regard to the warranty claims, the court found that the condition was repairable
and that neither Ford nor Diamond violated any warranty. The trial court also dismissed the claim under the
Michigan consumer protection act because plaintiff failed to prevail on the other counts.
This Court reviews the grant or denial of a directed verdict de novo. Meagher v Wayne State Univ, 222
Mich App 700, 708; 565 NW2d 401 (1997). This Court reviews all the evidence presented up to the time of the motion
to determine whether a question of fact exis ted. In doing so, this Court views the evidence in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party and grants him every reasonable inference and resolves any conflict in the evidence in his
favor. Kubczak v Chemical Bank & Trust Co, 456 Mich 653, 663; 575 NW2d 745 (1998); Hatfield v St Mary's
Medical Center, 211 Mich App 321, 325; 535 NW2d 272 (1995).
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred by directing a verdict on the lemon law claim. Under the lemon
law, a manufacturer must repair or replace a new motor vehicle if it “has any defect or condition that impairs the use
or value of the new motor vehicle to the consumer or which prevents the new motor vehicle from conforming to the
manufacturer’s express warranty.” MCL 257.1402; MSA 9.2705(2). Section 3 of the act provides:
1
If a defect or condition which was reported to the manufacturer or new motor vehicle dealer
pursuant to section 2 continues to exist and the new motor vehicle has been subject to a
reasonable number of repairs as determined under subsection (3), the manufacturer shall within 30
days have the option to either replace the new motor vehicle with a comparable replacement motor
vehicle currently in production and acceptable to the consumer or accept return of the vehicle and
refund to the consumer the full purchase price . . . less a reasonable allowance for the consumer’s
use of the vehicle. [MCL 257.1403(1); MSA 9.2707(3)(1) (emphasis added).]
Under subsection (3) of the act, there are two methods of determining what is a reasonable number of repairs. Under
the first method, the method at issue in this case, it is presumed that a reasonable number of attempts have been
made if:
The same defect or condition that substantially impairs the use or value of the new motor vehicle
to the consumer has been subject to repair a total of 4 or more times by the manufacturer or new
motor vehicle dealer and the defect or condition continues to exist. [MCL 257.1403(3)(a); MSA
9.2705(3)(a)(emphasis added).]
Although the term “substantial impairment” has not been interpreted in the context of § 3(a), in Colonial Dodge, Inc,
v Miller, 420 Mich 452; 362 NW2d 704 (1985), the Court interpreted the term “substantial impairment” in MCL
440.2608(1)(b); MSA 19.2608(1)(b) of the Uniform Commercial Code, which governs revocation of acceptance of
nonconforming goods. The Court held that “in order to give effect to the statute, a buyer must show the
nonconformity has a special devaluing effect on him and that the buyer’s assessment of it is factually correct.” Id. at
458. This test has both a subjective and objective element. The subjective element is that the nonconformity has a
“devaluing effect on him,” and the objective element is that the buyer’s belief in the devaluing effect is factually
correct.
Here, plaintiff had a subjective belief that the value of the car was diminished as a result of the noise.
However, plaintiff did not present any evidence that her belief was factually correct. Id. at 458. Plaintiff did not make
any attempt to sell or value the car, nor did she present any evidence that the car’s value was diminished as a result
of the occasional noise. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, plaintiff presented no evidence
that would permit a reasonable jury to conclude that plaintiff’s belief that the noise had a devaluing effect is factually
correct.
Further, plaintiff offered no evidence to support her subjective belief that the use of the car was
substantially impaired. Indeed, on cross-examination, plaintiff admitted that the car was reliable. See Colonial
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Dodge, supra at 458. Unlike Colonial Dodge, where the missing spare tire created a “reasonable” fear of being
stranded on a Detroit highway in the middle of the night, id. at 459, here there was no testimony that established that
the occasional noise was potentially dangerous or unsafe. Plaintiff’s own expert testified that he could not say for
sure that there was a safety concern. Furthermore, the witness did not find enough of a safety concern to warn
plaintiff not to drive the car. Viewing the evidence most favorably to plaintiff, plaintiff failed to present evidence from
which a reasonable jury could conclude that the defective condition of the car substantially impaired plaintiff’s use of
the car. Therefore, the trial court did not err in granting defendants’ motion for directed verdict on the lemon law
claim.
Plaintiff also argues that the court erred by directing a verdict on the revocation of acceptance claim. Under
the Michigan Uniform Commercial Code, a buyer may revoke his acceptance of a nonconforming good if its
nonconformity substantially impairs its value to him if he has accepted it:
(a) on the reasonable assumption that its nonconformity would be cured and it has not been
seasonably cured; or
(b) without discovery of such nonconformity if his acceptance was reasonably induced either by
the difficulty of discovery before acceptance or by the seller's assurances. [MCL 440.2608(1);
MSA 19.2608(1).]
As noted above, plaintiff has failed to present evidence to support her contention that the noise
substantially impaired the value of the car to her.
Plaintiff next asserts that the court erred by directing a verdict on the warranty claims. With plaintiff’s
purchase of the car, she received a three-year/36,000 mile bumper-to-bumper warranty. Plaintiff alleges that both
implied and express warranties were given to her, and that the warranties failed of their essential purpose because
defendants were unable to abate the noise. See MCL 440.2719(2); MSA 19.2719(2); Krupp PM Engineering, Inc v
Honeywell, Inc, 209 Mich App 104, 109; 530 NW2d 146 (1995). We disagree. Defendants continued to attempt to fix
the noise made by the car, and testimony indicates that there is a remedy to the problem that has fixed other 1996
Sable “grunting” noises. Plaintiff has refused to allow defendants to attempt to remedy the problem since her
August 11, 1997, visit to Star. Although plaintiff has suffered with the noise in the car, she has not had a loss of use
of the vehicle nor has there been evidence that the noise creates a safety problem.
Lastly, plaintiff’s argues that the trial court erred by directing a verdict of the Michigan consumer protection
act claim. We disagree. Both parties stipulated that, for plaintiff to succeed on the MCPA act, she would have to
prevail on either the lemon law, revocation of acceptance, and/or warranty claims. Because the trial court properly
granted a directed verdict on each of those claims, the trial court properly dismissed the claim under the MCPA.
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
1
This case was tried before the amendment of §3. See 1998 PA 486, effective January 4, 1999. All statutory
references to § 3 in this opinion are to the former version of the statute.
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