PEOPLE OF MI V MAURICE I BRADSHAW
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 28, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 207935
Recorder’s Court
LC No. 97-000984
MAURICE I. BRADSHAW,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr. and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his jury trial convictions of felony murder, MCL 750.316;
MSA 28.548, two counts of assault with intent to rob while armed, MCL 750.89; MSA 28.284, three
counts of armed robbery, MCL 750.520; MSA 28.797, and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). The trial court sentenced defendant to
natural life without parole for the felony murder conviction, twenty to forty years’ imprisonment for the
first count of assault with intent to rob while armed, eight to twenty years’ imprisonment for the second
count of assault with intent to rob while armed, eight to twenty years’ imprisonment for each of the
armed robbery convictions, and two years’ imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. We affirm.
I
Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions of felony murder
and assault with intent to rob while armed.1 When ascertaining whether sufficient evidence was
presented at trial to support a conviction, a court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the
prosecution and determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the
crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences
arising therefrom may be sufficient to prove the elements of a crime. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750,
757; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
The elements of felony murder are (1) the killing of a human being; (2) with the intent to kill, to
do great bodily harm, or to create a high risk of death or great bodily harm with knowledge that death
or great bodily harm was the probable result; (3) while committing, attempting to commit, or assisting in
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the commission of any of the felonies specifically enumerated in the statute. Id. at 759. Robbery is one
of the felonies enumerated in MCL 750.316; MSA 28.548. MCL 750.316; MSA 28.548. The
elements of assault with intent to rob while armed are (1) an assault with force and violence; (2) an
intent to rob or steal; and (3) the defendant’s being armed. People v Cotton, 191 Mich App 377,
391; 478 NW2d 681 (1991).
In the instant case, defendant gave a statement to the police indicating that he and his
companions, Sean [Ekford] and Richal [Loggins], were driving around in his father’s car when they
“decided to rob some people to get some money.” Richal had a gun. After robbing first two females,
then two males, the three men approached an “old man,” and Sean pointed the gun at him. After the
man was instructed not to move, he turned around and fired a gun at the trio. Sean dropped the gun,
and it went off.2
Other evidence presented at trial corroborated defendant’s statement. Lougenia Green,
Gordon Wilson, and Maurice Hudson all identified defendant as being involved in the respective
robberies. Eyewitness Bernard Tyler testified that the decedent was attacked by three black men who
were robbing him.3 Adam Berry testified that he inventoried defendant’s property at the hospital;
among the articles were items later identified as having been taken from Chantel Taylor.
Another witness, Brandon Whitfield, testified that he heard five to six shots, then witnessed
three or four people running toward an Intrepid. A few hours after the decedent was shot, Loggins was
arrested in an Intrepid that was registered to defendant’s father.
Viewing the above evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that a
rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of felony murder and assault with intent to rob
while armed were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See Carines, supra. Accordingly, defendant is
not entitled to reversal of his convictions.
II
Defendant next contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motions for
separate trials on the various counts and severance of his trial from the trials of his codefendants. We
disagree.
MCR 6.120(B) provides that the court must sever unrelated offenses for separate trials. Two
offenses are related if they are based on (1) the same conduct or (2) a series of connected acts or acts
constituting part of a single scheme or plan. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s refusal to
sever the various counts. The three robberies occurred within a short period of time and were clearly
part of a single scheme or plan to, as defendant put it, “rob some people to get some money.”
Pursuant to MCL 768.5; MSA 28.1028, and MCR 6.121(D), the decision to sever or join
defendants lies within the discretion of the trial court. Severance is mandated only when a defendant
clearly, affirmatively, and fully demonstrates that his substantial rights will be prejudiced and that
severance is the necessary means of rectifying the potential prejudice. People v Hana, 447 Mich 325,
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346; 524 NW2d 682 (1994). Severance is required where the defenses are mutually exclusive or
irreconcilable. Id. at 349.
Defendant asserts he should have had separate trials because antagonistic, mutually exclusive,
and irreconcilable defense theories were presented before his jury. We disagree. Defendant requested
a separate trial below because he and codefendant Loggins would be implicating each other.
Ultimately, the trial court determined that Loggins would be tried separately due to the small size of the
courtroom. Defendant and codefendant Ekford were tried together, but before separate juries;
accordingly, the risk of prejudice was significantly diminished. See id. at 360. Although defendant
asserts on appeal that “[t]here was evidence throughout this trial that was applicable to one defendant
while not to the other,” he does not specify what this evidence was. Under the circumstances, we find
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for severance.
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
1
Defendant also argues that his felony murder conviction was against the great weight of the evidence.
However, defendant failed to preserve this claim by moving timely for a new trial below. People v
Winters, 225 Mich App 718, 729; 571 NW2d 764 (1997).
2
On appeal, defendant discounts his statement to the police because it was merely initialed and not
signed. However, whether defendant’s confession was genuine was an issue to be determined by the
trier of fact.
3
In his brief on appeal, defendant misrepresents Tyler’s testimony. Contrary to defendant’s assertion,
no one testified at trial that Tyler identified Hudson and Wilson as two of the youths who attacked the
decedent. In fact, Tyler specifically testified that Hudson and Wilson were not among the trio that
robbed the decedent. Moreover, Tyler essentially stated that he did not get a good look at two of the
perpetrators because they “never looked to the window” from which he was watching. Consequently,
the fact that Tyler could not identify defendant as one of the participants does not definitively establish
that defendant was not involved.
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