MAHIN KHODABANDEH V PARVIN GHOLIZADEH
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MAHIN KHODABANDEH,
UNPUBLISHED
December 21, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 211948
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 97-8197 CK
PARVIN GHOLIZADEH, M.D.,
Defendant-Appellee.
MAHIN KHODABANDEH and MEHDI
SHADMEHR,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 211987
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 97-8979 CK
PARVIN GHOLIZADEH, M.D.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Neff, P.J., Murphy and J.B.Sullivan*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs Mahin Khodabandeh and her husband, Mehdi Shadmehr, appeal as of right from the
trial court’s grant of summary disposition to defendant Parvin Gholizadeh, M.D., on plaintiff Mahin
Khodabandeh’s complaint for an accounting and on plaintiffs’ subsequent complaint for fraud and
conversion. We reverse.
These appeals arise from a dispute between the parties over the ownership of $100,000 which
was deposited in a bank in Ann Arbor on August 7, 1987, in the name of plaintiff Khodabandeh. The
parties are Iranian citizens whose children were married to each other at that time, but apparently
* Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
-1
separated in 1989 and divorced in 1993. On August 3, 1988, approximately eleven months after the
money was initially deposited, defendant was given power of attorney on the account. According to
plaintiffs, w were then living in Tehran, they gave the money to defendant to deposit in a U.S. bank
ho
for them, and then executed the power of attorney so that defendant could disburse the funds to
plaintiffs’ son, Mohammed, in the event that something happened to plaintiffs as a result of the war
between Iran and Iraq. According to defendant, she placed the money in plaintiff Khodabandeh’s name
initially because she might have to return to Iran, but then, having decided to remain in the U.S., left it in
plaintiff Khodabandeh’s name to gain a tax advantage.
From 1988 through 1991, defendant invested the money in various certificates of deposit and
savings accounts in plaintiff Khodabandeh’s name, but on October 25, 1991, defendant apparently
withdrew the money from the account. On February 7, 1997, plaintiff Khodabandeh filed a complaint
for an accounting (Trial Court No. 97-8197). Defendant filed a response asserting that plaintiff
Khodabandeh was not entitled to an accounting since the money belonged to defendant. Defendant did
not raise latches or the statute of limitations either as an affirmative defense or in subsequent pleadings in
that case. Seven months later, on September 24, 1997, plaintiffs filed a second complaint raising two
causes of action: (1) conversion, for withdrawing the money that belonged to plaintiff, and (2) fraud, for
inducing plaintiffs to execute a power of attorney allowing defendant to withdraw the funds (Trial Court
No. 97-8979). Defendant raised both latches and the statute of limitations as affirmative defenses in her
answer to the second complaint.
Approximately seven months after the filing of the second complaint, defendant filed a motion
for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and MCR 2.116(C)(10), contending that all claims
were barred because the statute of limitations had run and because plaintiffs were guilty of laches.
While defendant placed the file numbers of both cases on her motion and mentioned the accounting
claim in her request for relief, she briefed only plaintiffs’ counts for conversion and fraud. Plaintiffs did
not file a response until the day of the hearing on the motion. At that hearing, held on April 22, 1998, the
court announced that it would grant the motion for summary disposition because plaintiffs had not filed a
timely response, thereby violating a local court rule. The court also noted that defendant would be
entitled to prevail on her motion if considered on the merits:
THE COURT: Well, first of all, the Court is going to grant the motion for summary
disposition. This case has been pending, there was a scheduling order that made it very
clear when the deadline for hearing dispositive motions would be which [sic] has passed
because it was to be April 7, 1998. [Defense counsel] filed his motion timely. It was
not responded to under our local court rule when [sic] there’s a motion for summary
disposition which has no response the Court is allowed to grant the motion. And that’s
what the Court is doing. And furthermore [sic] based on a review of the motion for
summary disposition, it appears that the defendant would have obtained the relief
anyway. So that’s the ruling of the Court.
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court abused its discretion in granting summary disposition to
defendant based on plaintiffs’ failure to file a timely response to defendant’s motion without considering
the merits. We agree. Any response to a motion for summary disposition must be filed and served at
-2
least seven days before the hearing. MCR 2.116(G)(1)(a)(ii). There is no express sanction for failure
to file a timely response to a motion for summary disposition. However, the provisions of MCR 2.119,
dealing with motion practice generally, apply to motions for summary disposition. MCR 2.116(G)(1).
Under MCR 2.119(E), even when no response is filed to a motion, the motion is treated as contested
unless the parties have stipulated to the entry of an order or if the non-moving party has, on the face of a
proposed order, waived notice and hearing on entry of an order. See MCR 2.119(D). The court in
this case said that it was relying on a local court rule in granting the motion based solely on plaintiffs’
failure to file a response. To the extent that Washtenaw County has a local rule allowing a dispositive
motion to be granted without considering the merits, it conflicts with the procedure outlined in MCR
2.119(E), and as a result is invalid. MCR 8.112(A)(1).
The record indicates that on February 6, 1998, the parties stipulated to adjourn both the
mediation which was set for February 25, 1998, and the April 7, 1998 settlement conference (by which
time all dispositive motions were to be heard) for the reason that defense counsel was beginning a trial.
The court signed an order adjourning mediation to March 18, 1998, and adjourning the settlement
conference to April 30, 1998. On March 9, 1998, defense counsel noticed defendant’s motion for
summary disposition, “previously scheduled for April 8, 1998,” for April 22, 1998. Between March
13th and 16th, defense counsel served defendant’s third, fourth, and fifth set of interrogatories on
plaintiffs. Defendant then filed her motion for summary disposition on March 25, 1998. The record
indicates that both parties then filed motions to compel discovery.
On appeal, defendant agrees that MCR 2.116 “does not state a specific sanction for failure to
[timely] respond” to a motion for summary disposition, but argues that this Court should affirm the trial
court’s grant of summary disposition because it is “highly unfair” to counsel and the court to withhold a
timely response. We reject defendant’s claim of unfairness due to the fact that it apparently was
defense counsel’s schedule which necessitated the adjournment of the motion, and it was defendant
who, after renoticing the motion, very shortly thereafter filed voluminous interrogatories to plaintiff.
Moreover, we also reject any claim of latches due to defendant’s admission, both on appeal and in oral
argument, that she placed the $100,000 in plaintiff Khodabandeh’s name in order to avoid taxes. See,
Mudge v Macomb Co, 458 Mich 87, 109 n 23; 580 NW2d 845 (1998) (the “clean hands” maxim
closes the doors of a court of equity to one tainted with inequitableness or bad faith however improper
may have been the behavior of the other party) .
Defendant cites Medbury v Walsh, 190 Mich App 554; 476 NW2d 470 (1991), a case
involving the discretionary imposition of sanctions under MCR 2.312, which governs requests for
admissions. While the procedure invoked by the court in this case is analogous to a sanction, even if
there were a court rule authorizing a sanction such as dismissal, it would not be appropriate in this case.
In addition to the factors mentioned above, the record indicates that, because of defense counsel’s
scheduling conflict, the court adjourned the settlement conference to April 30, 1998, and that, at the
hearing on April 22, 1998, plaintiffs’ counsel indicated on the record that all the interrogatories had been
answered and that he had spoken to defense counsel regarding his “unscheduled vacations” (and also
told the court that he would “gladly approach the bench” to explain off the record the reason for them).
Under all these circumstances, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion in granting summary
-3
disposition due to plaintiffs’ failure to file a timely response to defendant’s motion without considering
the merits of the motion. See Grubor Enterprises Inc v Kortidis, 201 Mich App 625, 629; 506
NW2d 614 (1999); Dean v Tucker, 182 Mich App 27, 32; 451 NW2d 571 (1990).
The court’s comment that “the defendant would have obtained the relief anyway” does not alter
our determination that reversal is required. If the court came to its conclusion based on MCR
2.116(C)(10), no material factual dispute, we conclude that, in addition to the latches defense which we
have rejected, the court erred because both lawsuits involve the disputed issue of the ownership of the
money. Ardt v Titan Ins Co, 233 Mich App 685, 688; 593 NW2d 215 (1999). Similarly, if the court
based its ruling on MCR 2.116(C)( 7), the statute of limitations claim, we also conclude that the court
erred. The question of whether a claim is within the period of limitation is one of law for the court to
decide and is therefore reviewed de novo. Jackson County Hog Producers v Consumers Power
Co, 234 Mich App 72, 77; 592 NW2d 112 (1999). When reviewing a motion for summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), a court must accept as true a plaintiff’s well pleaded factual
allegations, affidavits, or other documentary evidence and construe them in plaintiff’s favor. Id. If no
facts are in dispute and reasonable minds could not differ concerning the legal effects of those facts, the
court decides as a matter of law whether a plaintiff’s claim is barred by the statute of limitations.
However, if a material factual dispute exists in such a manner that factual development could provide a
basis for recovery, summary disposition is inappropriate. Id. This Court may go beyond the issues
raised on appeal and address issues that, in this Court’s opinion, justice requires be considered and
resolved. Frericks v Highland Twp, 228 Mich App 575, 586; 579 NW2d 441 (1998).
Plaintiff Khodabandeh’s complaint for an accounting should not have been dismissed on the
basis of the running of the statute of limitations. Defendant did not raise the affirmative defense of the
statute of limitations until she filed her motion for summary disposition, which occurred more than a year
after the complaint for accounting was filed and only after defendant had filed not only her answer but
also various motions for discovery, protective order and sanctions. The defense is waived as to that
complaint. See, MCR 2.116(D); Hofmann v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 211 Mich App 55, 90; 535
NW2d 529 (1995) (defenses that go beyond rebutting a plaintiff’s prima facie case must be pleaded or
they are waived); MCR 2.111(F). Even if defendant had raised the defense, the statute of limitations
for an accounting generally is six years. See, O’Toole v Hurley, 115 Mich 517, 520; 73 NW 805
(1898) (equity applies the statute of limitations by analogy); Near v Lowe, 49 Mich 482, 483; 13 NW
825 (1882) (where there are no equities to the contrary, the legal analogy of six years applies to an
action for an accounting). The parties allege that defendant withdrew the money from the account on
October 25, 1991, and the complaint for an accounting was filed on February 2, 1997, which is less
than six years later and well within the allowable time for filing the action.
We next address plaintiffs’ complaint for conversion and fraud. Defendant claims that both
counts are subject to the three year period set forth in MCL 600.5805(8); MSA 27A.5805(8) (“the
tort section”) rather than the six year period set forth in MCL 600.5807(8); MSA 27A.5807(8) (“the
contract section”). See, Fries v Holland Hitch Co, 12 Mich App 178, 183; 162 NW2d 672 (1968).
In Stringer v Sparrow Hospital, 62 Mich App 696, 698-699; 233 NW2d 698 (1975), this Court
reviewed “the statutes and the often conflicting case law on the limitations of actions in Michigan,” and
-4
stated that “the cases evidence a willingness by our courts to look beyond procedural labels to see
exactly what a party’s complaint is before deciding whether it should be barred.” Accord, Campos v
General Motors Corp, 71 Mich App 23, 25; 246 NW2d 352 (1976) (in some cases, the initial issue is
not when the acts complained of occurred or when the claim accrued, but rather the nature of the cause
of action stated in the complaint).
In Huhtala v Travelers Ins Co, 401 Mich 118; 257 NW2d 640 (1977), the plaintiff sustained
injuries in an automobile accident. Then, after the statute of limitations for personal injuries had run,
brought suit against the owner’s insurance company for failure to make payments which had been
promised during the negotiations which occurred after the accident. In reversing the trial court’s grant of
summary disposition based on the statute of limitations (and this Court’s subsequent affirmance of that
decision), the Court found that the statute of limitations was six years based on the claim being in the
nature of a promissory estoppel. The Court distinguished between an action to recover damages for
injury to persons or property wherein the nature and origin of the action is “a [non-consensual] duty
imposed by law” and therefore cannot be maintained on a contract theory, and an action such as the
Huhtala case wherein the nature and origin of the action is a consensual obligation which arose
“because [the defendant] chose to promise to do so” and is therefore governed by the six-year statute
of limitations. Id., at 127, 130-132.
In this case, the parties were related by the marriage of their children and they had an agreement
regarding the $100,000. The nature of that agreement is a disputed question of fact, but it nevertheless
was an agreement, was consensual and is therefore governed by the six year statute of limitations. If the
trial court based its ruling on the three year statute of limitations, that decision was error.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Joseph B. Sullivan
-5
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.