XAVIER WHITE V ELIZABETH HARTJEN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
XAVIER WHITE,
UNPUBLISHED
December 14, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 209449
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 96-623651 CH
ELIZABETH P. HARTJEN,
Defendant,
and
K.E.Y.S., INC., and BRADY KEYS FOOD, INC.,
a/k/a KEYS ENTERPRISES, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Wilder, P.J., and Bandstra and Cavanagh, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court order awarding defendant K.E.Y.S., Inc.,
(K.E.Y.S.) a money judgment representing the outstanding balance on the parties’ land contract and
further providing that if plaintiff failed to make the payment by January 31, 1998, a receiver would be
appointed to sell the subject property. We affirm.
I
Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by allowing defendants to cross-examine him on
issues other than damages. We review a trial court’s decision concerning the admission of evidence for
an abuse of discretion. Lagalo v Allied Corp (On Remand), 233 Mich App 514, 517; 592 NW2d
786 (1999).
Plaintiff asserts that, because a default had been entered against defendants, the sole matter at
issue was the amount of damages. Accordingly, plaintiff contends, the trial court should not have
allowed defendants to question him regarding other issues.
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After a trial court has defaulted a party, a court may conduct any hearing it deems necessary to
determine the amount of damages or investigate any other matter. MCR 2.603(B)(3). In the present
case, plaintiff alleged fraud and sought exemplary damages in the form of attorney fees. An award of
exemplary damages is only appropriate where it compensates a plaintiff for the humiliation, outrage, and
indignity that stems from malicious and wilful conduct by a defendant. B & B Investment Group v
Gitler, 229 Mich App 1, 9-10; 581 NW2d 17 (1998). Thus, it was necessary for the trial court to
familiarize itself with the parties’ transactions in order to determine whether exemplary damages were
warranted. Under the circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to limit the
scope of defendants’ cross-examination of plaintiff.
II
Plaintiff next claims that the trial court erred in granting a money judgment to defendant
K.E.Y.S., Inc. When reviewing equitable actions, this Court employs review de novo of the decision
and review for clear error of the findings of fact in support of the equitable decision rendered. LaFond
v Rumler, 226 Mich App 447, 450; 574 NW2d 40 (1997). A trial court’s findings of fact are
considered clearly erroneous where this Court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been made. Id.
Plaintiff asserts that the withholding of payments was justified by defendants’ anticipatory breach
of the obligation to convey good title. The trial court did not make an express finding regarding whether
K.E.Y.S. anticipatorily breached the contract. Nevertheless, we find no error requiring reversal.
Plaintiff requested that the court quiet title to the property in himself. However, plaintiff ’s only basis for
acquiring such title was by virtue of specific enforcement of the land contract, under which plaintiff was
required to make specified payments. We find no merit in plaintiff’s contention that he was not
obligated to perform his end of the contract that was being specifically enforced at his own request.
Plaintiff also claims the court had no competent basis for ordering plaintiff to pay $3,197.81 to
K.E.Y.S. We disagree. The terms of the land contract were spelled out in the document itself, and
plaintiff admitted that he had not made a payment since May 1994. A court may compute the amount
due under a contract where the underlying facts are contained in the record. See Hoock v Sloman,
145 Mich 19, 22; 108 NW 447 (1906). Plaintiff has not shown that the trial court’s figure is clearly
erroneous. See LaFond, supra.
III
Finally, plaintiff maintains that he was deprived of his statutory right to a six-month redemption
period from a foreclosure sale. We find no merit to this issue, as the record does not reveal that the sale
has occurred, and the six-month redemption period provided in MCL
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600.3140; MSA 27A.3140 does not begin to run until the foreclosure sale takes place.1
Affirmed.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
1
Plaintiff also alleges violations of MCR 3.410, MCL 600.3125; MSA 27A.3125, and MCL
600.6052; MSA 27A.6052. However, because plaintiff did not raise these issues in his statement of
questions presented, we decline to address them. See MCR 7.212(C)(5); Grand Rapids Employees
Independent Union v Grand Rapids, 235 Mich App 398, 409; 597 NW2d 284 (1999).
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