MARGARET E FURZE V CLIO CONVALESCENT CTR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MARGARET E. FURZE and MELANIE
SMALLIDGE,
UNPUBLISHED
December 3, 1999
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 212515
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 96-052584 CZ
CLIO CONVALESCENT CENTER, INC., and
PEARL FREDELL,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Collins, P.J., and Sawyer and Cavanagh, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right from the trial court’s order denying reconsideration of its order
granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition of plaintiffs’ age discrimination claims pursuant to
MCR 2.116(C)(10). We affirm.
In November 1993, fifty-seven-year-old Margaret Furze was hired by defendants as a
Minimum Data Set Coordinator. Furze was responsible for assessing and planning patient care at Clio
Convalescent Center (CCC) and recording assessments onto Minimum Data Set (MDS) forms used
during inspections by the Michigan Department of Consumer and Industry Services (MDCIS). In July
1995 and again in December 1995, state inspectors noted errors in forms completed by Furze. In
January 1996, defendants terminated Furze’s employment.
Defendants hired Melanie Smallidge in 1981 and promoted her to the position of Activities
Director in 1992. In early December 1995, Smallidge was instructed to investigate a patient’s family
member’s complaint that patients were left unattended and unoccupied before evening meals. On an
evening prior to Christmas 1995, Smallidge investigated the matter and found some patients had,
indeed, been left unattended in urine-soaked clothing. Smallidge did not report the situation to center
administrators until she returned from her winter vacation in early January 1996. Thereafter, defendants
terminated Smallidge’s employment. She was forty-eight years old.
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Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging defendants terminated them based on their age in violation of the
Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq.; MSA 3.548(101) et seq., and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 USC 621 et seq. Defendants brought a motion for summary
disposition, claiming that plaintiffs were terminated for the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason that they
failed to adequately perform their assigned tasks. At about the same time, plaintiffs brought a motion to
compel the production of documents. They argued that there were documents in defendants’
possession that would enable them to show that defendants’ proffered reasons for terminating plaintiffs’
employment were a pretext for discrimination.
The trial court granted summary disposition. It found that even if plaintiffs were able to establish
a prima facie case of discrimination, there was insufficient evidence to show defendants’ asserted
nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating plaintiffs’ employment were pretext for discrimination. The
court stated, however, that it would not enter the order for thirty days, during which time defendants
were required to produce the requested documents. After examining the requested documents,
plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration. The court heard oral arguments and denied the motion. The
court found that plaintiffs still had not provided evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue that defendants’
proffered reason for terminating plaintiffs’ employment was pretextual.
On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition because
there was sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination and to create a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether defendants’ asserted nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating
plaintiffs were a pretext for age discrimination. On appeal, we review a trial court’s grant of summary
disposition de novo. Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998).
A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests whether there is factual support for a
claim. Id. This Court reviews the record, considering affidavits, pleadings, depositions, and any other
documentary evidence presented by the parties in the light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion, to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial. Quinto v Cross & Peters
Co, 451 Mich 358, 362; 547 NW2d 314 (1996). Where the documentary evidence shows that there
is no genuine issue with regard to any material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Id.
To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under an intentional discrimination theory,
the plaintiff must show that (1) she was a member of a protected class, (2) she suffered an adverse
employment action, (3) she was qualified for the position; and (4) she was replaced by a younger
person. Lytle v Malady (On Rehearing), 458 Mich 153, 177; 579 NW2d 906 (1998). Once the
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate and set forth
admissible evidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its decision. Id. at 173. If the
defendant satisfies this burden of production, “the presumption drops away, and the burden of proof
shifts back to plaintiff,” who must show “that there was a triable issue of fact that the employer’s
proffered reasons were not true reasons, but were a mere pretext for discrimination.” Id. at 174. The
Michigan Supreme Court has adopted the “intermediate position,” or standard, of proof for surviving
summary disposition of a discrimination claim under the Elliott-Larson Civil Rights Act:
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Under this position, disproof of an employer’s articulated reason for an adverse
employment decision defeats summary disposition only if such disproof also raises a
triable issue that discriminatory animus was a motivating factor underlying the
employer’s adverse action. In other words, plaintiff must not merely raise a triable issue
that the employer’s proffered reason was pretextual, but that it was a pretext for age or
sex discrimination. Therefore, we find that, in the context of summary disposition, a
plaintiff must prove discrimination with admissible evidence, either direct or
circumstantial, sufficient to permit a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that
discrimination was a motivating factor for the adverse action taken by the employer
toward the plaintiff. [Id. at 175-176. Footnotes omitted.]
We agree with the trial court that even assuming that plaintiffs can establish a prima facie case of
age discrimination, they failed to put forth admissible evidence to raise a question of fact with regard to
whether defendants’ proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for discharging plaintiffs were a pretext for age
discrimination. As an initial matter, plaintiffs did not submit evidentiary material in opposition to
defendants’ motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). When a defendant brings
a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), the moving party must specifically
identify the matters which have no disputed factual issues, and has the initial burden of supporting his
position by affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence. Patterson v Kleiman,
447 Mich 429, 432; 526 NW2d 879 (1994). The party opposing the motion then has the burden of
showing, by evidentiary materials, that a genuine issue of disputed fact exists. Skinner v Square D Co,
445 Mich 153, 160; 516 NW2d 475 (1994). The nonmovant may not rest upon mere allegations or
denials in the pleadings, but must, by documentary evidence, set forth specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial. Quinto, supra at 362.
Here, defendants attached affidavits to their motion for summary disposition, wherein the
director of nursing at CCC explained that defendants discharged plaintiffs because they failed to
adequately perform their assigned tasks. In their response to defendants’ motion for summary
disposition, plaintiffs argued, among other things, that there existed a pattern at CCC of discharging
older employees and that the existence of this pattern rebutted defendants’ assertion that plaintiffs had
been discharged for nondiscriminatory reasons. In support of their arguments, plaintiffs made general
statements regarding defendants’ treatment of other employees and, in some instances, referred to
deposition testimony of former employees. However, plaintiffs did not attach any of those depositions
or any other documentary evidence.1 Because plaintiffs failed to present documentary evidence
establishing the existence of a material factual dispute, the trial court properly granted summary
disposition to defendants. Given that the court then permitted plaintiffs to pursue further discovery,
however, we will consider the documentary evidence submitted with their motion for reconsideration.
Plaintiffs provided affidavits from plaintiffs, two former employees, and one current employee.
The current employee stated that she observed that CCC regularly discharged older employees and
replaced them with younger ones and that she was fifty-eight years old and felt as though they were
“trying to get rid of [her].” One of the former employees stated that after working for defendants for
nine years, she was accused of engaging in sexual harassment. She stated that she believes she was
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fired at the age of forty-four because she had nine years experience and a correspondingly high hourly
wage, not because she engaged in wrongdoing. The other former e
mployee stated that she quit
because, among other things, CCC did not treat its employees fairly. These statements, based on the
affiants’ subjective beliefs, are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact with regard to whether
discrimination was the motivating factor in plaintiffs’ discharge. Plaintiffs also included with their motion
for reconsideration a list of forty former employees whom they contend were over forty years of age
and were discharged from CCC. However, plaintiffs provided no evidence that defendants discharged
older employees at any greater rate than younger employees.
Finally, plaintiffs included deposition testimony from an employee discharged from CCC nearly
ten years earlier and from the supervisor who discharged both plaintiffs. With regard to statements that
the former employee alleged were made at the time of her discharge, we find that they do not
necessarily suggest discrimination and they are too remote in time to be a reliable indicators of
defendants’ intent with regard to plaintiffs. Likewise, the supervisor’s testimony that other employees
involved in the incident that led to Smallidge’s discharge were not punished does not, in and of itself,
suggest discriminatory animus. There is no evidence that the other employees were similarly situated to
Smallidge, who was a department head.
Because plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of showing, by documentary evidence, that there is
a genuine issue of fact for trial, we conclude that the trial court properly granted summary disposition to
defendants.
Affirmed.
/s/ Jeffrey G. Collins
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
1
Neither was the evidence referenced in plaintiffs’ brief included with defendants’ brief in support of
their motion for summary disposition.
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