PEOPLE OF MI V DWAYNE ROBINSON
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 16, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 202450
Recorder’s Court
LC No. 96-003330
DWAYNE ROBINSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Doctoroff and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, MCL 750.321;
MSA 28.553, and sentenced to five to fifteen years’ imprisonment. Defendant now appeals as of right.
We affirm.
Defendant first argues that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to support his
conviction, given evidence that he acted in self-defense. We disagree. When reviewing the sufficiency
of the evidence presented at trial, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecutor and determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the
crime were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d
748, amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992).
The elements of voluntary manslaughter are: (1) the defendant killed the victim in the heat of
passion, (2) the passion was caused by an adequate provocation, (3) the killing occurred before a
reasonable time had passed to allow the heat of passion to subside, and (4) the defendant possessed the
intent to kill or to commit serious bodily harm. People v Sullivan, 231 Mich App 510, 518; 586
NW2d 578 (1998); People v Hess, 214 Mich App 33, 38; 543 NW2d 332 (1995). However, “the
killing of another person in self-defense is justifiable homicide if the defendant honestly and reasonably
believes that his life is in imminent danger or that there is a threat of serious bodily harm.” People v
Heflin, 434 Mich 482, 502; 456 NW2d 10 (1990). Once the defendant introduces evidence of self
defense, the prosecutor must then prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in
self-defense. People v Fortson, 202 Mich App 13, 20; 507 NW2d 763 (1993).
-1
In the present case, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecutor, we
conclude that the prosecutor presented sufficient evidence to prove the elements of voluntary
manslaughter and to prove that defendant did not act in self-defense. Three witnesses testified
consistently regarding the events that led to the victim’s death. These witnesses testified that defendant
was angry and aggressive when he entered the victim’s house and that defendant instigated a fistfight
with the victim. One of these witnesses also testified that he observed defendant stab the victim with a
small knife attached to a key chain during that altercation. All three witnesses testified that no one in the
house, aside from defendant, possessed a weapon or threatened to retrieve a gun. This evidence
allowed the jury to conclude that defendant intended to kill or cause serious bodily harm to the victim
and that defendant killed the victim in the heat of passion and not in self-defense.
Portions of defendant’s testimony also supported the jury’s verdict. Defendant, himself, testified
that he fought with the victim and that he stabbed the victim with a three-inch knife that was attached to
his key chain. Defendant did not clearly assert that he stabbed the victim in self-defense. He testified
that he struggled to break free from the victim as the victim held him on the ground and that only after
breaking free did he realize that the victim had been stabbed. Defendant in effect admitted that he did
not stab the victim in self-defense when he claimed that the stabbing was unintentional, stating,
“Evidently, when I grabbed him, tried to get him off me, the knife had to puncture him. Evidently. It
was not intentionally at all.” “A finding that a defendant acted in justifiable self-defense necessarily
requires a finding that the defendant acted intentionally . . . .” Heflin, supra at 503. Defendant also
admitted that he did not see the victim or anyone else possess a weapon.
Although portions of the testimony of defendant and his girlfriend contradicted the testimony of
prosecution witnesses, this does not render the evidence presented insufficient. When reviewing a claim
that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict, we must not interfere with the role of the jury to
weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of testimony. Wolfe, supra at 514-515. We conclude
that the prosecutor presented sufficient evidence to allow the jury to find defendant guilty of voluntary
manslaughter.
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial on the ground
that he was prejudiced by the introduction of evidence regarding a prior dismissed charge.1 We review
the trial court’s ruling on a motion for mistrial for an abuse of discretion. People v Griffin, 235 Mich
App 27, 36; 597 NW2d 176 (1999). An abuse of discretion occurs only when denial of the motion
deprives the defendant of a fair and impartial trial. People v Wolverton, 227 Mich App 72, 75; 574
NW2d 703 (1997).
Defendant bases his argument on a reference to a prior criminal charge against defendant during
the testimony of a police officer. The prosecutor was asking the officer about why defendant’s girlfriend
was needed to be present at a preliminary examination a few months before trial, and the officer stated,
“Because in addition to the charges that were lodged against [defendant], he was also charged with
assault with intent to commit murder on [his girlfriend], great bodily harm.” The prosecutor claimed that
it was seeking to elicit testimony regarding the girlfriend’s failure to attend the preliminary examination in
order to demonstrate that she was afraid of defendant, and that her testimony in support of defendant at
trial was motivated by this fear. Although the comment regarding a prior criminal charge was not
-2
relevant to the present case and should not have been mentioned, the trial court questioned the officer to
clarify for the jury that the charge had been dismissed and had no bearing on the trial at hand.
Moreover, “not every instance of mention before a jury of some inappropriate subject matter warrants a
mistrial.” Griffin, supra at 36. In light of other testimony that informed the jury that defendant had also
assaulted his girlfriend on the night the victim was killed, we conclude that the mention that defendant
was charged with assault for this conduct was harmless. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying defendant’s motion for mistrial because he was not denied a fair and impartial trial.2
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
1
Although this issue was stated in terms of whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the
evidence, defendant presents the argument in the context of the trial court’s denial of his motion for
mistrial.
2
To the extent that the admission of the evidence itself was error, we would conclude that the error was
harmless because defendant has not demonstrated that “it is more probable than not that the error was
outcome determinative.” People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 496; 596 NW2d 607 (1999).
-3
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
