STANLEY S LESIAK V DETROIT BOILER CO
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
STANLEY S. LESIAK,
UNPUBLISHED
November 5, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 213435
WCAC
LC No. 95-000546
DETROIT BOILER COMPANY and SENTRY
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: O’Connell, P.J., and Talbot and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This case has been remanded by our Supreme Court for consideration as on leave granted.
458 Mich 867; 586 NW2d 400 (1998).1 Plaintiff appeals from the opinion and order of the Worker’s
Compensation Appellate Commission (WCAC) affirming the magistrate’s calculation of plaintiff’s
average weekly wage at $603.25. We affirm.
The facts in this case are not in dispute. Plaintiff worked for several years as a skilled
boilermaker/welder. He received job assignments through a union hall on an as-needed basis. Plaintiff
worked on a variety of jobs for different employers. He earned about $21 an hour, but worked
sporadically on jobs that often lasted only one day or less. Plaintiff suffered his injury in November
1992, while working on a job with defendant Detroit Boiler Company. 2
During the fifty-two-week period before his injury, plaintiff worked a total of 109 days, earning
$31,338. He estimated that he worked a total of thirty weeks during that period. However, plaintiff
calculated that he only worked for defendant for eighteen days during that period. From February
1991, his first job with defendant, through November 1992, the day of his injury, plaintiff worked for
defendant for a total of 10.2 weeks, earning $6,153.17. The parties agree that plaintiff is entitled to
benefits, and they only dispute the calculation of his average weekly wage. The magistrate calculated
plaintiff’s average weekly wage at $603.25 by dividing the total wages he earned from defendant by the
total number of weeks he worked there. The WCAC affirmed this calculation, which resulted in a
weekly benefit rate of $376.74. Plaintiff argues that this calculation of his average weekly wage and
resultant benefits stems from an incorrect application of MCL 418.371; MSA 17.237(371).
-1
Although the factual findings of the WCAC are generally conclusive on this Court, we may
nonetheless review questions of law involved in final orders of the WCAC. MCL 418.861a(14); MSA
17.237(861a)(14); Goff v Bil-Mar Foods, Inc (After Remand), 454 Mich 507, 512; 563 NW2d 214
(1997). Our review of questions of law is de novo; however, we accord great weight to the WCAC’s
statutory interpretation unless it is clearly wrong. Tyler v Livonia Public Schools, 459 Mich 382, 388;
590 NW2d 560 (1999). The WCAC’s decision is subject to reversal if it operated within the wrong
legal framework or its decision was based on erroneous legal reasoning. Jones-Jennings v Hutzel
Hospital (On Remand), 223 Mich App 94, 105; 565 NW2d 680 (1997).
The magistrate calculated plaintiff’s average weekly wage pursuant to MCL 418.371(3); MSA
17.237(371)(3), which provides as follows:
If the employee worked less than 39 weeks in the employment in which the
employee was injured, the average weekly wage shall be based upon the total wages
earned by the employee divided by the total number of weeks actually worked. For
purposes of this subsection, only those weeks in which work is performed shall be
considered in computing the total wages earned and the number of weeks actually
worked.
The magistrate only included information relating to plaintiff’s employment with defendant in its
calculation of plaintiff’s average weekly wage. As noted above, the magistrate divided plaintiff’s wages
by the weeks he worked for defendant. Specifically, the magistrate divided plaintiff’s wages of
$6,153.17 by 10.2 weeks, for an average weekly wage of $603.25. Plaintiff argues that his average
weekly wage should have been calculated based on the total wages he earned from all employers while
working as a boilermaker/welder. Plaintiff argues that the total wages should be divided by the total
number of weeks he worked as a boilermaker/welder during the fifty-two-week period before his
injury. Specifically, plaintiff seeks a calculation based on $31,338 divided by thirty weeks, for an
average weekly wage of $1,044.60.
Subsection (3) applies where “the employee worked less than 39 weeks in the employment in
which the employee was injured . . . .” (emphasis added). This subsection “applies only to
employees who have not yet worked thirty-nine weeks for their employer at the time they are injured.”
Montano v General Motors Corp, 187 Mich App 230, 236; 466 NW2d 707 (1991). Here, plaintiff
had only worked 10.2 weeks for defendant; therefore, subsection (3) clearly applied. Plaintiff argues
that the wages he earned from other employers while working as a boilermaker/welder should be
included in the calculation of his average weekly wage under subsection (3). Plaintiff interprets the
phrase “in the employment in which the employee was injured” to refer not to a specific employer, but
to a trade. We conclude that the WCAC’s refusal to interpret the statute in such a manner was not
clearly wrong, given the holding from Montano that subsection (3) only applies where the employee has
not yet worked thirty-nine weeks for his or her employer at the time of the injury. Id. A further
problem with plaintiff’s interpretation is that he seeks to include only wages earned during the fifty-two
week period before his injury. However, this Court has specifically rejected the argument that the
phrase “less than 39 weeks” means less than thirty-nine of the fifty-two weeks immediately preceding
the injury. Id. at 235-236.
-2
Plaintiff alternatively argues that MCL 418.371(6); MSA 17.237(371)(6) should apply instead
of subsection (3) because the magistrate’s calculation under subsection (3) was inequitable, given
plaintiff’s circumstances of employment. MCL 418.371(6); MSA 17.237(371)(6) provides as follows:
If there are special circumstances under which the average weekly wage cannot
justly be determined by applying subsections (2) to (5), an average weekly wage may
be computed by dividing the aggregate earnings during the year before the injury by the
number of days when work was performed and multiplying that daily wage by the
number of working days customary in the employment, but not less than 5.
In this case, the WCAC concluded, as did the magistrate, that subsection (6) did not apply
because subsection (3) was plainly applicable and the circumstances of plaintiff’s employment resulted
from plaintiff’s choice to work out of a union hall as a skilled laborer assigned on an as-needed basis.
We agree that subsection (6) was inapplicable because the average weekly wage was justly determined
under the clearly applicable subsection (3). See Montano, supra at 236 (applying subsection (6)
where no other subsections applied and because the average weekly wage could not be justly
determined otherwise).
We accordingly find no error of law in the WCAC’s decision to affirm the magistrate’s
calculation of plaintiff’s average weekly wage.
Affirmed.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
1
This Court had previously denied plaintiff’s application for leave to appeal. Lesiak v Detroit Boiler
Co, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered August 18, 1997 (Docket No. 202613).
2
For the sake of convenience, any references in this opinion to “defendant” refer only to defendant
Detroit Boiler Company because it was plaintiff’s employer at the time he was injured.
-3
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.