PEOPLE OF MI V RAJAHAAN FARUQ CLARK
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 5, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 198394
Eaton Circuit Court
LC No. 95-000312 FC
RAJAHAAN FARUQ CLARK,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., McDonald and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals of right from his jury conviction of four counts of possession of a bomb with
unlawful intent, MCL 750.210; MSA 28.407, four counts of carrying a concealed weapon, MCL
750.227; MSA 28.424, two counts of possession of a short-barreled shotgun, MCL 750.224b; MSA
28.421(2), two counts of possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA
28.424(2), one count of aiding and abetting or conspiring to place explosives with intent to destroy
property, MCL 750.208; MSA 28.405, and one count of conspiracy to commit great bodily harm less
than murder, MCL 750.84; MSA 28.279 and MCL 750.157a; MSA 28.354(1). Defendant pleaded
guilty to one count of felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f; MSA 28.421(6). Defendant
was also subject to sentence enhancement under the habitual offender statute as a second offender,
MCL 769.10; MSA 28.1082.
Defendant was sentenced as a second habitual offender to terms of 4 to 7½ years’ imprisonment
for each possession of a bomb conviction, the CCW convictions, the possession of a short-barreled
shotgun convictions, and the felon in possession conviction, 8 to 22½ years’ imprisonment for the aiding
and abetting or conspiring to place an explosive device conviction, 8 to 15 years’ imprisonment for the
conspiracy to commit great bodily harm less than murder conviction, and the mandatory 2-year
consecutive sentence for the felony-firearm convictions. We affirm defendant’s convictions but remand
for correction of the judgment of sentence.
Defendant first contends that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions. This
Court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether any
rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a
-1
reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748, amended 441 Mich 1201
(1992). Application of this standard requires the appellate court to show deference to factual
determinations rendered by the trier of fact. Id. at 514-515. Furthermore, in determining whether there
was sufficient evidence, this Court must reject defendant’s “innocent explanations” (since they were
rejected by the jury); his convictions must be sustained if “finding [the evidence] where we may, and
putting what was most favorable to the prosecution together, and discarding all other [evidence], [this
Court can] say it fairly tended to establish the charge made.” Wolfe, supra at 515, quoting People v
Howard, 50 Mich 239, 242; 15 NW 101 (1883).
The prosecutor alleged that the Guy family (including defendant) conspired to arm themselves
and drive to Lansing in a minivan with the express intent to shoot and set off explosives at the houses of
two individuals who were linked to an earlier altercation that had led to the shooting of two young men
related to defendant. Thus, plaintiff had to establish defendant’s knowledge of the agreement to commit
this unlawful act and his intent to participate in that act. That knowledge and intent could be shown by
circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences. People v Justice, 454 Mich 334, 345-348; 562
NW2d 652 (1997).
When troopers stopped the minivan, defendant was seated directly above a cache of loaded
weapons. In common with the other occupants of the minivan, he was dressed in dark clothing. The
interior light was taped over to prevent the interior from being illuminated when the doors were opened.
There were sufficient masks, latex gloves, and weapons to disguise and arm each of the occupants.
Defendant was found in the possession of a flameless lighter that could have been used to light the fuses
on the two pipe bombs that were found in the van. Defendant and the other occupants of the van were
members of a close-knit family, and two members of this family were wounded in a drive-by shooting
two days earlier. According to one witness, defendant had accompanied other members of the family
when they made what can fairly be described as a surveillance videotape of the houses associated with
the suspected shooters on the afternoon of the shooting. These facts, considered in a light most
favorable to the prosecution, sufficiently established defendant’s guilt on the charged offenses.
Defendant also maintains that there was insufficient evidence that he possessed the firearms or
the explosives. Possession may be either actual or constructive. Wolfe, supra at 520. Constructive
possession means that the defendant had the right to exercise control of the firearms or explosives and
knew that they were present. People v Germaine, 234 Mich 623, 627; 208 NW2d 705 (1926).
Constructive possession may not be shown by presence alone, but it may be shown by presence in
combination with other factors. Wolfe, supra at 520-521. As noted, defendant was found seated
directly above a cache of loaded weapons, dressed in dark clothing, in possession of a flameless lighter,
and riding in a van that was apparently prepared for a surreptitious early morning attack. These facts
support the conclusion that defendant constructively possessed the firearms and bombs.
Defendant next claims that the trial court erred by permitting the prosecutor to introduce
irrelevant and prejudicial evidence concerning his involvement with the Guy family, the family’s
practices, and his father’s marital background. Although defendant objected on a number of grounds,
he failed to raise any objection under MRE 404(b). This Court will not consider an issue if an objection
at trial was based on a different ground than is urged on appeal. People v Kilbourn, 454 Mich 677,
-2
684-685; 563 NW2d 669 (1997). In the absence of an objection, review will only be for plain error,
which requires a finding that there was error, that the error was obvious, and that it affected the
defendant’s substantial rights – that is, that it was decisive of the outcome of the case. People v Grant,
445 Mich 535, 552-553; 520 NW2d 123 (1994).
In this case, the evidence of the structure and relationships of the Guy family was inextricably
blended with the crimes of which defendant was accused. The prosecutor’s theory of the evidence was
that defendant and his codefendants took the weapons and explosives to Lansing because they were
seeking revenge for the shooting of two of Guy’s sons. The relationship between defendant, his father
(Guy), the other defendants, and the victims was thus of great significance. The prosecutor is permitted
to present “the full story” to the jury even if that results in the revelation of other uncharged misconduct
evidence. People v Sholl, 453 Mich 730, 741; 556 NW2d 851 (1996). When the charged offense is
connected with an antecedent event involving the commission of another crime, the jury is entitled to
hear the complete story, even though that story will alert them to the other, uncharged crime. People v
Delgado, 404 Mich 76, 83; 273 NW2d 395 (1978). The evidence was relevant to defendant’s motive
and intent as well as his knowledge of the presence of the weapons in the van and the group’s plan in
committing the charged crimes; this was not mere propensity evidence. Defendant’s motive, intent, and
knowledge of the existence of the weaponry were in issue, since defendant disclaimed any knowledge
of the weapons or any intent to use them against anyone. The evidence regarding how the family was
organized and how it operated thus had some tendency to help establish defendant’s motive and intent,
as well as his knowledge of the weaponry and the plan of attack. The balancing test of MRE 403 was
not specifically utilized, but only because defendant failed to object. Nevertheless, for the above
reasons the danger of unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh the probative value of this evidence
and defendant failed to request a specific curative instruction. People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52,
74-75; 508 NW2d 114 (1993), amended 445 Mich 1205 (1994). Furthermore, cross-examination by
defendants brought out an abundance of information about Guy’s espousal of Afro-centrist teachings
and culture, and Guy also added more information on the background of the “Black Law Rules and
Rights.” Since most of the information would have been admitted even if defendant had objected,
defendant has failed to demonstrate plain error that was decisive of the outcome of his cases. People v
Figgures, 451 Mich 390, 406; 547 NW2d 673 (1996).
Next, defendant contends that his waiver of counsel was equivocal because he also asked for
standby counsel to be appointed. This claim is not preserved for appellate review because defendant
requested that he be allowed to proceed in propria persona with standby counsel, he subsequently
requested that his initial standby counsel be replaced with the counsel who was representing a
codefendant, and he did not raise this objection in the trial court. People v Davis, 216 Mich App 47,
55; 549 NW2d 1 (1996). Our Supreme Court held in People v Lane, 453 Mich 132, 140; 551
NW2d 382 (1996), that failure to comply with MCR 6.005(E) “is to be treated as any other trial error”
and concluded that where no objection was lodged, the review was for plain error under Grant, supra.
Even preserved claims regarding waivers of counsel are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v
Adkins (After Remand), 452 Mich 702, 721 n 16; 551 NW2d 108 (1996). We find neither an abuse
of discretion nor plain error.
-3
Pursuant to People v Anderson, 398 Mich 361, 367-368; 247 NW2d 857 (1976), the trial
court must determine that (1) the defendant’s request is unequivocal; (2) the defendant is asserting his
right knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily; and (3) the defendant’s self-representation will not disrupt,
unduly inconvenience or burden the court. Additionally, a trial court must comply with MCR 6.005 by
(1) advising the defendant of the charge and the possible sentence; (2) explaining the risks of self
representation; and (3) offering the defendant an opportunity to consult with an attorney. There need
only be substantial compliance with the requirements of Anderson and MCR 6.005; substantial
compliance requires that “the court discuss the substance of both Anderson and MCR 6.005(D) in a
short colloquy with the defendant and make an express finding that the defendant fully understands,
recognizes, and agrees to abide by the waiver of counsel procedures.” Adkins, supra at 726-727.
Our examination of the entire record indicates that the trial court substantially complied with the
requirements of the case law and court rule. Defendant was informed of the charge and possible
sentence, as well as the risks of self-representation, and he was given the opportunity to consult with an
attorney. Furthermore, defendant, on several occasions, re-affirmed his desire to represent himself, and
throughout the pre-trial and early trial proceedings, defendant exercised his right of self-representation.
That defendant chose to rely more and more on his standby counsel as the trial progressed does not
demonstrate that his initial waiver decision was equivocal or involuntary.
Defendant also claims that the multiple representation of himself and his codefendants by the
same standby counsel was improper because it created a conflict of interest that precluded his counsel
from arguing that there was substantially less evidence implicating defendant. Defendant has failed to
demonstrate an actual conflict of interest, as required by Cuyler v Sullivan, 446 US 335, 348; 100 S
Ct 1708; 64 L Ed 2d 333 (1980), and People v Larry Donnell Smith, 456 Mich 543, 556; 581
NW2d 654 (1998). Furthermore, he failed to seek a Ginther1 hearing as required by Smith.
Defendant’s only claim of a conflict was that his counsel was precluded from arguing that far less
evidence implicated defendant; however, defendant delivered his own closing argument and that
argument essentially attacked the absence of any substantial evidence of defendant’s guilt. The trial
court complied with MCR 6.005(F), and defendant has failed to demonstrate an actual conflict of
interest.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence found
in the minivan. Defendant claims that, contrary to the trial court’s ruling, he has standing to raise this
claim because the prosecutor treated the Guy family as a group. Whether a defendant has standing to
challenge a search or seizure is a legal question that is reviewed de novo on appeal. Cf., People v
Lombardo, 216 Mich App 500, 505; 549 NW2d 596 (1996). Our Supreme Court, in People v Lee
Brady Smith, 420 Mich 1, 28; 360 NW2d 841 (1984), stated that in deciding a standing issue, a trial
court must consider the totality of the circumstances and determine “whether the defendant had an
expectation of privacy in the object of the search and seizure and whether that expectation is one that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” A defendant challenging a search “bears the burden of
proving standing as a result of a personal expectation of privacy.” Lombardo, supra at 505.
The trial court noted that the passengers had not asserted any “proprietary or possessory
interest in the automobile [or] the ‘bundle’ on its floor.” The failure to assert such an interest precluded
-4
any of them from claiming standing because they did not establish an expectation of privacy in the object
of the search. Furthermore, even if defendant had a subjective expectation of privacy in the van or
bundle, it was not one that society would be prepared to recognize as reasonable. People v Lee Brady
Smith, supra at 28. The search of the bundle in the van disclosed an arsenal of loaded weapons.
Society would not recognize as reasonable a passenger’s expectation of privacy in the transportation of
illegal weapons and explosives in a third party’s van driven by someone else. Lombardo, supra at
509.
We reject defendant’s novel claim of “group standing” because he did not advance this
argument in the trial court, People v Nantelle, 215 Mich App 77, 86-87; 544 NW2d 667 (1996).
Furthermore, this Court held in People v Armendarez, 188 Mich App 61, 71; 468 NW2d 893
(1991), that a passenger who could assert no proprietary or possessory interest in an automobile, and
who could not show any legitimate expectation of privacy in the interior, lacked standing. Moreover,
even if this Court considered the underlying search issue despite defendant’s lack of standing, we would
agree with the trial court that the search was a proper protective “frisk” under Michigan v Long, 463
US 1032; 103 S Ct 3469; 77 L Ed 2d 1201 (1983).
Defendant next contends that his due process right to a fair trial was impaired where he was
observed by the jurors during voir dire while he was dressed in jail clothing. Defendant did not object
to his clothing until the second day of trial and therefore failed to preserve this claim. People v Shaw,
381 Mich 467, 474-475; 164 NW2d 7 (1969). The plain error rule applies to unpreserved claims of
constitutional error. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
Defendant was incarcerated for ten months prior to his trial and he was aware of his trial date
for at least two months. Nevertheless, he made no effort to obtain civilian clothing in a timely fashion or
to request a continuance for that purpose before the trial commenced. Additionally, defendant himself
informed the jury during his closing argument that he had been in jail for eleven months prior to trial.
Defendant cannot claim error from circumstances that he caused and took no steps to remedy, People
v Porter, 117 Mich App 422, 424-426; 324 NW2d 35 (1982), and he cannot establish prejudice
where he informed the jury of his incarceration. See Estelle v Williams, 425 US 501, 506; 96 S Ct
1691; 48 L Ed 2d 126 (1976), quoting United States ex rel Stahl v Henderson, 472 F2d 556, 557
(CA 5, 1973). This Court therefore concludes that defendant has forfeited this issue because even if
error occurred, it did not affect the outcome of the case. Carines, supra at 763; Grant, supra at 553.
Defendant finally argues that the trial court should have made the felony-firearm sentences
consecutive only to the sentences for the two felony convictions of possession of a bomb with unlawful
intent, which had been specifically alleged by the prosecution as the underlying felonies. This claim
involves interpretation of the language of the felony-firearm statute, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2),
and this Court reviews de novo questions of law regarding statutory interpretation. People v Givans,
227 Mich App 113, 124; 575 NW2d 84 (1997).
The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to effectuate the intent of the Legislature and the
first means of determining that intent is the language of the statute since the Legislature is presumed to
-5
have intended the meaning it plainly expressed. People v Pitts, 222 Mich App 260, 265-266; 564
NW2d 93 (1997). MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2) provides:
(1) A person who carries or has in his or her possession a firearm when he or
she commits or attempts to commit a felony, except a violation of section 223, section
227, 227a or 230, is guilty of a felony, and shall be imprisoned for 2 years . . . .
(2) A term of imprisonment prescribed by this section is in addition to the
sentence imposed for the conviction of the felony or the attempt to commit the felony,
and shall be served consecutively with and preceding any term of imprisonment imposed
for the conviction of the felony or attempt to commit the felony. [Emphasis supplied.]
The felony-firearm statute is intended to deter individuals who are committing felonies from
arming themselves with firearms and thereby increasing the danger that someone will be injured or killed
as a result of their felonious conduct. People v Elowe, 85 Mich App 744, 748-749; 272 NW2d 596
(1978). The language of the felony-firearm statute is plain and unambiguous. The statute is meant to
apply whenever an individual is convicted of possessing a firearm during the commission of any felony
other than a specifically excepted felony. People v Guiles, 199 Mich App 54, 59; 500 NW2d 757
(1993). Thus, subsection (1) states that anyone committing “a” felony (other than one of the
enumerated felonies) is guilty of the offense. If the Legislature had meant this provision to apply only to
the specific felony charged in the information, it could easily have said so. In the instant case, defendant
possessed the firearms with respect to all the underlying offenses (albeit that he may not statutorily be
convicted of felony-firearm with respect to the CCW convictions). The legislative intent is therefore
effectuated by making the felony-firearm sentences in the instant case consecutive to all t e felony
h
counts. The Legislature’s use of “the” felony in subsection (2) refers to the felony of which a defendant
is convicted pursuant to the first subparagraph – whatever that felony might be. Reading the words
“the felony” to refer to a specifically charged felony creates an unnecessary conflict between the
language of the first subparagraph and that of the second.
Both parties agree, however, that the judgment of sentence incorrectly indicates that the felony
firearm sentence is consecutive to the CCW sentences. We therefore remand this case to the trial court
for the ministerial act of issuing an amended judgment of sentence that makes the felony firearm
sentences consecutive to all of the felony sentences except the four CCW sentences. People v
Maxson, 163 Mich App 467, 471; 415 NW2d 247 (1987).
Affirmed but remanded for correction of the judgment of sentence.
jurisdiction.
We do not retain
/s/ Joel E. Hoekstra
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
1
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
-6
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
