PEOPLE OF MI V STEPHEN PAUL MERCER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 2, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 209413
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 97-005332 FC
STEPHEN PAUL MERCER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Bandstra, C.J., and Markman and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right from his conviction by a jury of second degree murder, MCL
750.317; MSA 28.549. The trial court sentenced him to 25 to 50 years’ imprisonment. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that the trial court should have granted his motion for a new trial based on
the court’s refusal at trial to allow defense counsel to ask a follow-up question after the prosecutor’s
recross examination of a defense witness. We review a trial court’s decision regarding a motion for a
new trial for an abuse of discretion. People v Gadomski, 232 Mich App 24, 28; 592 NW2d 75
(1998). An abuse of discretion exists when an unprejudiced person, considering the facts on which the
trial court acted, could find no justification for the ruling. People v Ullah, 216 Mich App 669, 673;
550 NW2d 568 (1996).
Defendant argues that a follow-up question was necessary after the prosecutor’s recross
examination to reinforce the witness’ testimony that defendant did not intend to kill the victim. The
witness testified on direct examination that at the time of the killing defendant “would have had [a]
difficult time . . . actually form[ing] intention or intent to do what he was doing . . . .” The witness also
testified on direct examination that he saw no indication that defendant intended to kill the victim, and on
recross examination he again testified that defendant did not intend to kill the victim. MCL 768.29;
MSA 28.1052 states that the trial judge is to “limit the introduction of evidence . . . to relevant and
material matters, with a view toward the expeditious . . . ascertainment of the truth . . . . (emphasis
added).” MRE 611(a) states that the “court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order
of interrogating witnesses . . . so as to . . . avoid needless consumption of time . . . .” Here, because
additional testimony regarding defendant’s intent would have been cumulative and would have
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needlessly wasted time, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for a
new trial based on the refusal to allow the additional testimony.
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the defense of
insanity. This Court reviews jury instructions as a whole to determine if they fairly presented the issues
to the jury. People v Daniel, 207 Mich App 47, 53; 523 NW2d 830 (1994). The instructions must
not exclude a material defense or theory if there is evidence to support it. Id. An insanity instruction is
warranted only if a defendant presents evidence to rebut the presumption of sanity; the mere assertion of
an insanity defense does not mandate that the instruction be given. People v VanDiver, 79 Mich App
539, 541; 261 NW2d 78 (1977); People v Livingston, 57 Mich App 726, 732; 226 NW2d 704
(1975), remanded on other grounds 396 Mich 818 (1976).
Michigan law deems one legally insane if, “as a result of mental illness . . . [the] person lacks
substantial capacity either to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his or her conduct
or to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of the law.” MCL 768.21a(1); MSA
28.1044(1)(1). Defendant argues that based on the evidence introduced at trial, the jurors “could have
concluded that [he] suffered from a substantial disorder of thought or mood [that] significantly impaired
his ability to cope with the ordinary demands of life.” Even if defendant is correct in arguing that the
jurors could have reached this conclusion, such a conclusion w
ould not have warranted an insanity
instruction, since there was no evidence that defendant “lack[ed] substantial capacity either to
appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his or her conduct or to conform his or her
conduct to the requirements of the law.” MCL 768.21a(1); MSA 28.1044(1)(1). Indeed, defendant’s
own psychological witness testified (1) that defendant could have refrained from killing the victim if a
policeman had been in the room at the time, (2) that defendant felt guilt over the killing, and (3) that guilt
is evidence that a person can appreciate the nature and wrongfulness of his actions. Moreover, the
prosecutor’s psychological witness testified that defendant told him that “I knew as soon as I grabbed
[the victim’s] throat [that] it was wrong, but I just snapped [and] didn’t really care.” In light of this
testimony, and because defendant presented no evidence that he met the definition of legal insanity, the
trial court did not err by refusing to instruct the jury on this defense. People v Savoie (After Remand),
419 Mich 118, 126-130; 349 NW2d 139 (1984).
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court imposed a disproportionately long sentence. We
review a trial court’s sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion. People v Milbourn, 435 Mich
630, 636; 461 NW2d 1 (1990). A sentence constitutes an abuse of discretion if it violates the principle
of proportionality, which mandates that a sentence be proportionate to the seriousness of the
circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender. Milbourn, supra at 636; People v Paquette,
214 Mich App 336, 344-345; 543 NW2d 342 (1995). Here, because defendant’s sentence fell within
the sentencing guidelines’ recommended range, it was presumptively proportionate. People v Moseler,
202 Mich App 296, 300; 508 NW2d 192 (1993). If unusual circumstances existed, however, it could
have nonetheless violated the principle of proportionality. Milbourn, supra at 661. In People v
Sharp, 192 Mich App 501, 505; 481 NW2d 773 (1992), the Court defined “unusual” in this context
as “[u]ncommon, not usual, [or] rare.”
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Defendant argues that his case presented unusual circumstances because he (1) had a troubled
upbringing, (2) was mentally and emotionally unstable, (3) had no criminal history, (4) would not have
been prosecuted if he had not confessed, and (5) expressed remorse. We first note that that this Court
has already held that a lack of criminal history is not an unusual circumstance that can overcome the
presumption of proportionality. Daniel, supra at 54. We further conclude that a confession or
admission, a troubled upbringing, remorse, and mental and emotional instability are not particularly rare
in felony cases, either individually or collectively. Accordingly, defendant’s sentence did not violate the
principle of proportionality, especially since defendant heartlessly, by strangulation, took the life of a
frail, elderly woman who had befriended him.
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
Markman, J. did not participate
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