IN RE LAURA JEAN DEERFIELD
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of MARY VILLENEUVE, a/k/a MARY
VICTORIA DEERFIELD, and LAURA JEAN
DEERFIELD, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
October 29, 1999
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
LAWRENCE ALLEN DEERFIELD and JEAN
MARIE VILLENEUVE, a/k/a JEAN MARIE
DEERFIELD,
Nos. 211504; 212232
217208; 217382
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 80-220630
Respondents-Appellants.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Saad and Gage, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In Docket Nos. 211504 & 212232, respondents appeal as of right from a family court order
terminating their parental rights to their daughter Mary under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), (i) and (j);
MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(i), (g), (i) and (j). In Docket Nos. 217208 & 217382, respondents
appeal as of right from a family court order terminating their parental rights to their daughter Laura under
MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), (i), (j) and (l); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(g), (i), (j) and (l). We affirm.
Docket Nos. 211504 & 212232
The family court did not clearly err in finding that each of the statutory grounds in question,
§§ 19b(3)(c)(i), (g), (i) and (j), were established by clear and convincing evidence with respect to
respondent Jean Villeneuve. We likewise conclude that the family court did not clearly err in finding that
§§ 19b(3)(c)(i), (g) and (j) were established by clear and convincing evidence with respect to
respondent Lawrence Deerfield.1 MCR 5.974; In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161
(1989).
Both respondents failed to show that termination of their parental rights was clearly not in
Mary’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5); In re Hall-Smith, 222 Mich
App 470, 472-473; 564 NW2d 156 (1997). Thus, the family court did not err in terminating
respondents’ parental rights to Mary. Id.
Docket Nos. 217208 & 217382
The family court’s exercise of jurisdiction over Laura is supported by a preponderance of the
evidence. MCR 5.972(C)(1); In re Brock, 442 Mich 101, 108-109; 499 NW2d 752 (1993). Hence,
the assumption of jurisdiction was proper.
Moreover, the family court did not clearly err in finding that §§ 19b(3)(i), (j) and (l) were
established by clear and convincing evidence with respect to each respondent. MCR 5.974; In re
Miller, supra at 337.
Finally, both respondents failed to show that termination of their parental rights was clearly not
in Laura’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5); In re Hall-Smith, supra at
472-473. Thus, the family court did not err in terminating respondents’ parental rights to Laura. Id.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
1
The record does not indicate that Lawrence Deerfield’s parental rights to any other children were
terminated previously. Therefore, termination of Lawrence Deerfield’s parental rights under § 19b(3)(i)
was not warranted by the evidence.
-2
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