PEOPLE OF MI V ROBERT FRANCIS HANLEY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 26, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 210361
Delta Circuit Court
LC No. 97-006165 FH
ROBERT FRANCIS HANLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Griffin, P.J., and Sawyer and Smolenski, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals of right from his jury conviction of conspiracy to deliver lysergic acid
diethylamide (LSD), MCL 750.157a; MSA 28.354(1) and MCL 333.7401(2)(b); MSA
14.15(7401)(2)(b). The trial court sentenced defendant as an habitual offender to five to ten and one
half years’ imprisonment. We affirm.
Defendant first contends that the testimony of several prosecution witnesses was inadmissible
because it resulted from improper promises of leniency or other inducements. Because defendant did
not raise this issue in the trial court, we will review it only for plain error. People v Grant, 445 Mich
535, 552-553; 520 NW2d 123 (1994). A plain, unpreserved error may not be considered by an
appellate court for the first time on appeal unless the error could have been decisive of the outcome or
unless it falls under the category of cases where prejudice is presumed or reversal is automatic.
Defendant’s argument is premised on a federal case that interprets a federal statute, United
States v Singleton, 144 F3d 1343 (CA 10, 1998); 18 USC 201(c)(2). That case has been overruled
by an en banc panel, United States v Singleton,165 F3d 1297 (CA 10, 1999), and the federal statute
is inapplicable both because it does not govern state prosecutors and because the overruling Singleton
decision held that the statute did not restrict the ability of federal prosecutors to offer leniency deals to
witnesses in return for their testimony.
Defendant argues that MCL 775.7; MSA 28.1244 performs the same function in this state that
the initial panel in Singleton concluded was performed by the federal statute – precluding the
prosecutor from offering anything of value to a witness in exchange for testimony. However, as the
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prosecutor points out on appeal, MCL 775.7; MSA 28.1244 by its plain terms provides the means for
a prosecutor to obtain reasonable payment for a witness’ expenses. When interpreting a statute, a
reviewing court must give words their common, generally accepted meanings and if “the plain and
ordinary meaning of the language is clear, judicial construction is normally neither permitted nor
necessary.” People v Fox (After Remand), 232 Mich App 541, 553; 591 NW2d 384 (1998). The
statute authorizes payment of “expenses” and precludes the prosecutor from paying any other “fees.”
Neither of these terms implies that the statute forbids leniency agreements such as the dropping of other
outstanding charges, or the reduction of a sentence in return for the witness’ testimony. Thus, the statute
by its terms does not apply to leniency agreements and defendant’s suggested interpretation must be
rejected.
Defendant contends that the prosecutor violated MRPC 3.4(b). That rule provides that a
lawyer is not to “offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The Tenth Circuit made clear in Singleton, supra at 1301, that “From the common law, we have
drawn a long-standing practice sanctioning the testimony of accomplices against their confederates in
exchange for leniency.” Our Supreme Court has long held that, upon defense request, leniency
agreements extended by the prosecutor to an accomplice or co-conspirator must be disclosed by the
prosecutor to the jury. People v Atkins, 397 Mich 163, 173; 243 NW2d 292 (1976). Thus, the
prosecutor’s offer of inducements in the form of leniency regarding pending or potential charges or
sentences was not “prohibited by law” and therefore did not contravene MRPC 3.4(b).
Defendant next contends that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to grant his motion
for a mistrial after a witness testified that defendant served time in prison. This Court reviews the trial
court’s decision regarding a request for a mistrial for an abuse of discretion. People v Haywood, 209
Mich App 217, 228; 530 NW2d 497 (1995). A mistrial should be granted only for an irregularity that
is prejudicial to the rights of the defendant, and impairs his ability to get a fair trial. Id . Although
evidence of a defendant’s prior conviction may be prejudicial because of the danger that the jury may
use such evidence improperly to focus on the defendant’s bad character, revelation of a prior conviction
resulting from a volunteered or unresponsive answer to a proper question is not grounds for a mistrial.
People v Griffin, 235 Mich App 27, 36; 597 NW2d 176 (1999). Here, defendant conceded at trial
that the witness’ answer was volunteered and unresponsive to the prosecutor’s question. We also note
that the reference was very brief, i did not refer to defendant by name, and the prosecutor did not
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mention this evidence in closing argument. Furthermore, defendant declined the trial court’s offer of a
curative instruction. We conclude that the trial court properly denied the motion for a mistrial.
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred by refusing a request to instruct the jury using
CJI2d 5.7, and to change the instruction on delivery by using “co-conspirator” rather than the phrase
“someone who delivers.” Defendant also contends that the trial court erred by instructing the jurors that
they should disregard the order in which the possible verdicts were listed on the verdict form because
that instruction implied that the trial court thought defendant was guilty. Defendant raised these claims in
the trial court and this Court reviews preserved claims of instructional error de novo, People v
Hammond (After Remand), 217 Mich App 459, 487; 552 NW2d 493 (1996), by considering jury
instructions in their entirety to determine if there is error requiring reversal. People v McFall, 224 Mich
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App 403, 412; 569 NW2d 828 (1997). Even if the instructions are imperfect, there is no error if they
fairly presented the issues to be tried and sufficiently protected the defendant’s rights. People v Daniel,
207 Mich App 47, 53; 523 NW2d 830 (1994).
The “addict informer” instruction, CJI2d 5.7, should be given where the testimony of the
informant is the only evidence linking the defendant to the offense. Griffin, supra at 40. In this case,
there was testimony from several witnesses other than the alleged addict concerning defendant’s
involvement in deliveries of LSD. Furthermore, it was never established that the informant was an
addict. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that the addict
informant instruction was not appropriate.
Defendant has presented no argument or authority in support of his second claim of instructional
error – that the trial court erred in explaining the elements of delivery of a controlled substance in the
context of this case by failing to use the term “co-conspirator” rather than “someone.” A claim that is
merely stated without citation of authority or argument is considered abandoned. People v Kent, 194
Mich App 206, 210; 486 NW2d 110 (1992); People v Roberson, 167 Mich App 501, 519; 423
NW2d 245 (1988). Even if reviewed to prevent a miscarriage of justice, this claim is without merit.
The conspiracy instructions provide that the prosecutor must prove “that the defendant and someone
else knowingly agreed to commit the offense of delivery of . . . LSD.” The use of the word “someone”
in the instruction regarding the actual delivery would suggest to the jury that the someone who agreed to
commit the offense with defendant and the someone who actually delivered the controlled substance
were references to the same person. Substitution of the term “co-conspirator” would not have made
the instruction any clearer. Thus, because the instructions considered as a whole properly stated the
law, there is no basis upon which to reverse defendant’s conviction.
Defendant’s final claim of instructional error likewise is not supported with any argument or
citation of authority and is therefore abandoned. Kent, supra at 210; Roberson, supra at 519. Even if
considered, this claim does not demonstrate manifest injustice because the trial court’s admonition to the
jury to disregard the order of the possible verdicts on the verdict form cannot be taken to indicate that
the court was subtly transmitting its own view of the case to the jurors. Defendant’s argument requires
this Court to conclude that the jurors would interpret the court’s instruction to attach no significance to
the order of the possible verdicts as a suggestion that they, in fact, attach significance to the order.
Because jurors are presumed to follow a court’s instructions, People v Reed, 449 Mich 375, 401; 535
NW2d 496 (1995), this argument is untenable.
Defendant next argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. This Court
reviews a claim that the evidence was insufficient to support a defendant’s conviction by considering the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could
have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v
Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748, amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992). Defendant does not
argue that there was no conspiracy to deliver LSD; rather, he argues that there was insufficient evidence
to establish that he was involved in the conspiracy. In People v Justice (After Remand), 454 Mich
334, 347; 562 NW2d 652 (1997), our Supreme Court observed that because it is often difficult to
identify the participants in a criminal conspiracy, direct proof of the conspiracy is not required and
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sufficient proof “may be derived from the circumstances, acts, and conduct of the parties.” In this case,
two witnesses testified that they either bought or obtained LSD in trade from defendant and his girl
friend. Two other witnesses testified that they obtained LSD from defendant’s girl friend, and they also
related statements made by defendant that, interpreted in a light most favorable to the prosecution,
indicated defendant’s knowledge of, and participation in, these deliveries of LSD. Several witnesses
also testified concerning threats that defendant made after his girl friend was arrested; such statements
may be considered as conduct evidencing a defendant’s consciousness of guilt. People v Sholl, 453
Mich 730, 740; 556 NW2d 851 (1996). We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support
defendant’s conviction.
Although defendant also contends that his conviction was against the great weight of the
evidence, he failed to preserve this claim by moving for a new trial. People v Winters, 225 Mich App
718, 729; 571 NW2d 764 (1997). We review this unpreserved claim for plain error, Grant, supra at
544-547, and we conclude that, as we noted above regarding defendant’s sufficiency of the evidence
claim, the clear weight of the evidence established defendant’s guilt. People v DeLisle, 202 Mich App
658, 661; 509 NW2d 885 (1993).
Defendant next claims that the cumulative effect of the above errors deprived him of a fair trial
and therefore requires reversal of his conviction. Defendant has failed to establish error with respect to
any of the claims he presents on appeal. Therefore, the cumulative effect of these meritless claims
cannot establish error requiring reversal. People v Maleski, 220 Mich App 518, 525; 560 NW2d 71
(1996).
Defendant also raises four issues in a brief filed in propria persona. None of these claims
require reversal of his conviction. Regarding defendant’s argument that the trial court improperly
allowed the prosecutor to present testimony concerning alleged threats made after the conspiracy had
ended, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting this testimony, People v Starr, 457 Mich
490, 494; 577 NW2d 673 (1998), because threats to a witness constitute evidence showing
defendant’s consciousness of guilt, Sholl, supra at 740, and they were not hearsay because they were
defendant’s statements. MRE 802(d)(2)(A).
Defendant also contends that it was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion to admit testimony
regarding the attempted purchase of cocaine and marijuana by defendant’s girl friend. This testimony
was properly admitted because it completed the picture of the drug conspiracy in which defendant
participated and provided an explanation for the arrest of defendant’s girl friend as well as for
defendant’s subsequent threatening behavior. Such testimony may be admitted even where it involves
the disclosure of other crimes. Sholl, supra at 741-742; People v Delgado, 404 Mich 76, 83; 273
NW2d 395 (1978).
Defendant next argues that the trial court denied a proper jury instruction; however, defendant
does not indicate what jury instruction should have been given and fails to demonstrate that he requested
an instruction. This issue is therefore not preserved because defendant did not request the instruction,
People v Kelly, 423 Mich 261, 271-272; 378 NW2d 365 (1985), and because defendant has failed
to present any argument or authority in support of his position. People v Leonard, 224 Mich App 569,
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588; 569 NW2d 663 (1997). To the extent that defendant’s argument simply repeats claims he raised
in other issues, this issue is not preserved because defendant has failed to set forth his claim in his
statement of questions presented. City of Lansing v Hartsuff, 213 Mich App 338, 351; 539 NW2d
781 (1995).
Defendant finally contends that he is entitled to a new trial, or at least to a remand for an
evidentiary hearing, on the basis of newly discovered evidence. This claim is not preserved for
appellate review because defendant failed to make a motion for a new trial and did not move for a
remand for an evidentiary hearing to make a record providing support for this claim. MCR 6.431(B);
People v Torres (On Remand), 222 Mich App 411, 415; 564 NW2d 149 (1997). Defendant has
failed to present any evidence in support of his allegations and thus a remand for an evidentiary hearing
is not appropriate. Moreover, with reasonable diligence, defendant could have discovered the technical
capabilities of the recording system used by the police to monitor their informant. Therefore, this alleged
evidence is not newly discovered. People v Davis, 199 Mich App 502, 515; 503 NW2d 457 (1993).
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
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