IN RE REID/JOHNSON MINORS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of CHARLES EDWARD REID, JR.,
ANTHONY EDWARD REID, II, PAUL ANTHONY
W. REID, NATHANIEL DEVON REID, and ADELL
DESIA M. JOHNSON, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
July 30, 1999
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 214482
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 83-236078
EDWARDESIA DAVRIETTA REED,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
JAMES MARVIN JOHNSON and CHARLES
EDWARD REID,
Respondents.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 214646
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 83-236078
CHARLES EDWARD REID,
Respondent-Appellant,
-1
and
EDWARDESIA DAVRIETTA REED and JAMES
MARVIN JOHNSON,
Respondents.
Before: McDonald, P.J., and Kelly and Cavanagh, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In No. 214482, respondent Edwardesia Reed appeals as of right from a family court order
terminating her parental rights to her minor children, Charles Reid, Jr., Anthony Reid, Paul Reid,
Nathaniel Reid, and Adell Johnson. In No. 214482, respondent Charles Reid appeals as of right from
a family court order terminating his parental rights to Charles Reid, Jr., Anthony Reid, Paul Reid, and
Nathaniel Reid. In a single order, the family court terminated the parties’ parental rights pursuant to
MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) [conditions that led to adjudication continue to exist and are not likely to be
rectified within a reasonable time], (g) [parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or
custody for the children], (h) [parent is imprisoned and unable to provide care and custody within a
reasonable time], (i) [parental rights to one or more siblings have been terminated due to neglect or
abuse and prior attempts at rehabilitation have been unsuccessful], and (j) [there is a reasonable
likelihood that the children will be harmed if returned to the parent]; MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(i),
(g), (h), (i) and (j). We affirm.
A two-prong test applies to a family court’s decision to terminate parental rights. First, the
family court must find that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination set forth in MCL
712A.19b; MSA 27.3178(598.19b) has been met by clear and convincing evidence. In re Jackson,
199 Mich App 22, 25; 501 NW2d 182 (1993). This Court reviews the findings of fact under the
clearly erroneous standard. MCR 5.974(I); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161
(1989). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous where the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made. Jackson, supra at 25.
Once a statutory ground for termination has been met by clear and convincing evidence, the
parent against whom termination proceedings have been brought has the burden of going forward with
some evidence that termination is clearly not in the child’s best interest. If no such showing is made and
a statutory ground for termination has been established, the trial court is without discretion; it must
terminate parental rights. MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5); In re Huisman, 230 Mich
App 372, 384; 584 NW2d 349 (1998).
-2
On appeal, respondent Edwardesia Reed argues that clear and convincing evidence was not
presented that the statutory grounds for terminating her parental rights had been met.1 We conclude that
the referee did not clearly err in finding that §§ 19b(3)(c)(i),2 (g),3 and (j) were all established by clear
and convincing evidence.4 See Miller, supra; Jackson, supra. Furthermore, respondent Edwardesia
Reed failed to show that termination of her parental rights was clearly not in the children’s best interests.
See MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5); Huisman, supra.
In his sole issue on appeal, respondent Charles Reid contends that he was deprived of due
process because he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel. Because he did not raise this
issue in the trial court, appellate review of this claim is limited to the existing record. See In re
Schmeltzer, 175 Mich App 666, 673; 438 NW2d 866 (1989). Applying the analogous principles of
ineffective assistance of counsel as they have developed in the criminal context to the existing record, we
conclude that respondent Charles Reid has not demonstrated any basis for relief due to ineffective
assistance of counsel. See People v Dixon, 217 Mich App 400, 408; 552 NW2d 663 (1996); In re
Simon, 171 Mich App 443, 447; 431 NW2d 71 (1988). Even if a motion for adjournment had been
made and granted, the record does not provide any basis for concluding that the result of the
proceeding would have been different. Thus, respondent’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails
because the requisite prejudice has not been shown. 5 See People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 338; 521
NW2d 797 (1994). Furthermore, we are not persuaded that the case should be remanded for a
hearing on this claim.
Accordingly, with respect to both respondents, we uphold the family court’s entry of the
termination order based on the referee’s findings and recommendations. However, petitioner’s request
for relief under MCR 7.215(E) is denied because petitioner has failed to establish that such relief is
warranted.
Affirmed.
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
1
Relying on Town & Country Dodge, Inc v Dep’t of Treasury, 118 Mich App 778, 789; 325
NW2d 577 (1982), aff’d 420 Mich 226 (1984), petitioner argues that respondent Edwardesia Reed
waived this issue by failing to raise it in the lower court. However, Town & Country Dodge involved
an appeal from a Tax Tribunal order. This Court has held that a parent’s failure to challenge factual
findings in a termination proceeding below does not constitute a waiver. See In re Rose, 174 Mich
App 85, 88; 435 NW2d 461 (1989), rev’d on other grounds 432 Mich 934 (1989).
2
On appeal, Edwardesia Reed argues in her appellate brief that the condition that led to the
adjudication was an accidental scalding of Nathaniel Reid while she was not home. However, except
for her testimony at the termination hearing, the evidence in the record reflects that Nathaniel was
burned when Anthony attempted to give him a bath without adult supervision. The referee noted in her
report on the adjudication, based on Edwardesia Reed’s contemporaneous statement, that “she admits
-3
to being neglectful by not getting the proper medical treatment.” This same finding is in the referee’s
report on termination. Thus, it is clear that the condition that led to the adjudication for the three
younger Reid children and Adell Johnson revolved around Edwardesia Reed’s medical neglect of
Nathaniel, rather than an accidental injury. See Jackson, supra at 26 (“evidence of the mistreatment of
one child is probative of the treatment of other children of the party”).
As for Charles Reid, Jr., he was first made a temporary court ward in 1988 as a result of the
physical abuse of a sibling. He was later placed in a legal guardianship. The FIA took action to again
make him a temporary court ward in September 1996, after his behavior caused the legal guardian to
rescind her guardianship, but the referee also considered Edwardesia Reed’s history when
recommending that Charles Reid join his siblings as a temporary court ward. Hence, the conditions that
led to the adjudication appeared to revolve around Edwardesia Reed’s inability to properly care for
Charles Reid.
3
In disputing that § 19b(g) was established by clear and convincing evidence, Edwardesia Reed points
out that the evidence showed that she interacted appropriately with the children during visitation.
However, this fact is not dispositive, as she had not even progressed to the point of having unsupervised
visitation with the children at the time of the termination hearing.
4
The parties agree that § 19b(3)(h) is applicable to respondent Charles Reid only. Because only one
statutory ground is required to terminate parental rights, Jackson, supra at 25, we need not determine
whether termination of respondent Edwardesia Reed’s parental rights was also warranted under
§ 19b(3)(i).
5
Respondent Charles Reid asserts that if he had been present, he could have testified as to placement
with a relative, disputed evidence about the mother, and presented firsthand evidence about his prison
outdate. However, his inability to attend the hearing or participate by speakerphone would not have
prevented him from communicating with his attorney before the hearing about any relative interested in
providing for his children. His claim that he could have disputed evidence pertaining to Edwardesia
Reed fails to establish any basis for relief because he does not have standing to contest the termination
of her parental rights. Finally, in his appellate brief, he asserts that his earliest outdate is 2001. This
corresponds to the evidence presented by petitioner at the February 13, 1998, hearing on his planned
discharge date. Thus, he was not prejudiced by his inability to provide firsthand testimony regarding his
outdate.
-4
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.