PEOPLE OF MI V DANIEL ALBERT NEWMAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
July 2, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 165208
Livingston Circuit Court
LC No. 92-7032 FC
DANIEL ALBERT NEWMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Griffin, P.J., and McDonald and White, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony,
MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2), and first-degree murder, MCL 750.316; MSA 28.548, for which
he received consecutive sentences of two years and mandatory life imprisonment, respectively.
Defendant appealed his convictions and sentences to this Court as of right. Defendant subsequently
filed a motion to remand pursuant to MCR 7.211(C)(1)(b), based on a certification by the trial court
that it would vacate the first-degree murder conviction and enter judgment on, and resentence defendant
for, second-degree murder, MCL 750.317; MSA 28.549. This Court, while retaining jurisdiction,
granted the motion. On remand, the trial court vacated the first-degree murder conviction and entered a
judgment of conviction for second-degree murder, reaffirmed defendant’s previous conviction and
sentence for felony-firearm, and sentenced defendant on the second-degree murder conviction to a term
of forty to eighty years’ imprisonment. We now affirm defendant’s convictions and sentences for
second-degree murder and felony-firearm.
The evidence established that the victim, Harry Chappelear, died at his home on or about
February 28, 1992, after receiving two shotgun wounds and eight other gunshot wounds to his head,
chest, abdomen and arms. It was the prosecutor’s theory at trial that Chappelear, a drug dealer, was
shot and killed during a robbery of his home and that defendant participated in Chappelear’s killing,
either as a principal or an accomplice. Defendant presented an alibi defense.
I
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Defendant first claims that the evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt
that he was present to cause the death of the victim or that he shared a preconceived intent to kill the
victim. We note that while defendant’s original brief was addressed to the first-degree murder
conviction, his reply brief recognizes that the conviction was modified on remand and enumerates the
elements of second-degree murder.
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, People v Hampton, 407
Mich 354, 358; 285 NW2d 284 (1979), we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found
beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that there was a death, (2) that defendant’s acts were a contributory
cause that were a substantial factor in producing the death, (3) that circumstances of justification,
excuse, or mitigation did not exist, and (4) that defendant’s acts were done with the intent to kill, an
intent to inflict great bodily harm, or an intent to create a very high risk of death with the knowledge that
the acts probably would cause death or great bodily harm. People v Welch, 226 Mich App 461, 462
463; 574 NW2d 682 (1997). See also People v Bailey, 451 Mich 657, 669; 549 NW2d 325
(1996). The fact that no eyewitness were able to place defendant at the scene of the murder is not
dispositive. Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences which arise from the evidence can
constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of the crime. People v Truong (After Remand), 218 Mich
App 325, 337; 553 NW2d 692 (1996).
Here, there was evidence that one of the murder weapons belonged to defendant. While
defendant asserts that this evidence is of little relevance because the gun was purchased five months
before the murder, defendant was the last known purchaser of the gun, and a witness testified she saw a
similar-looking gun at defendant’s residence a week or two before the murder. Further, the gun was
found in an abandoned gym bag that also contained a blue jean jacket, a sawed-off shotgun with tape
on it, a ski mask, gloves, and a set of walkie-talkies. Hair found on the ski mask matched defendant’s
hair when microscopically compared, and hair similar to the hair of one of defendant’s dogs was also
found on the ski mask. Tape similar to the tape on the shotgun was found at defendant’s residence, a
substance found on the blue jean jacket appeared to contain the same elements as drywall compound
used by defendant, who was a drywaller, and twine found on the gym bag was similar to twine found at
defendant’s residence. Further, there was testimony that defendant knew the victim and had been to
the victim’s home, that the victim had made a pass at defendant’s girlfriend in defendant’s presence, and
that defendant was jealous and possessive. There was also evidence that defendant had repeatedly
asked a friend for the names of any drug dealers he could rob for drugs or money. Lastly, it appeared
that defendant’s girlfriend may have been asking others to buttress defendant’s alibi defense.
We conclude that when viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence could
support an inference beyond an reasonable doubt that defendant either committed the murder himself or
aided and abetted in its commission. Moreover, it was unnecessary for the prosecutor to negate every
reasonable theory consistent with defendant’s innocence. Rather, the prosecutor needed only to prove
his own theory beyond a reasonable doubt in the face of whatever contradictory evidence the defendant
provided. People v Daoust, 228 Mich App 1, 16; 557 NW2d 179 (1998). The prosecutor sustained
this burden.
II
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Defendant next claims that he was entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal after the
prosecutor’s opening statement because the prosecutor neglected to refer to evidence that would be
presented to establish defendant’s presence and intent, and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
move for dismissal. We disagree. Defendant’s assertion that defense counsel could have moved for
and been granted a directed verdict of acquittal at the end of the prosecutor’s opening statement is
without merit . First, a motion for directed verdict may not be brought until the prosecution has rested
its case in chief. MCR 6.419. Second, the prosecution’s opening statement was adequate when the
prosecutor explained the general nature of the case and the ultimate facts it proposed to present that
were essential to proving defendant’s participation in the killing of the victim, either as a principal or as
an aider and abettor. MCR 6.414(B).
III
In his initial brief on appeal, defendant’s third argument was addressed to an alleged double
jeopardy violation stemming from the trial court’s reconsideration of its ruling on defendant’s motion for
directed verdict on the first-degree murder charge. On remand, the first-degree murder conviction was
vacated and defendant was convicted of and sentence for second-degree murder. In his reply brief,
defendant argues that the improper submission of the first-degree charge to the jury “unfocused their
attention to the key element at issue: was [defendant] present to cause the death, or was [defendant]
present and shared a preconceived intent to kill.” Defendant argues that submission of the first-degree
charge misled the jury as to the key elements in dispute. We disagree. Clearly, the question whether
the physical evidence found in the bag and the other circumstantial evidence was sufficient to establish
defendant’s participation in the murder beyond a reasonable doubt was the key question for the jury
regardless of the degree of murder considered. We do not agree that there is a reasonable probability
that submission of the first-degree charge prejudiced defendant in that he would not have been
convicted of second-degree murder had the greater charge not been submitted. Thus, defendant has
already been accorded all appropriate relief for the alleged double jeopardy violation, and he is not
entitle to retrial of the second-degree charge.
IV
Finally, defendant argues that he was denied a fair trial by various instances of prosecutorial
misconduct, including claims relating to the charges on which he was bound over, the prosecutor’s
motion for immediate reconsideration of the trial court’s initial ruling on the directed verdict motion, and
the prosecutor’s comments during closing argument regarding defendant’s alibi defense. Because
defendant failed to timely and specifically object below to the claimed misconduct now asserted on
appeal, our review is precluded unless an objection could not have cured the error or a failure to review
the issue would result in a miscarriage of justice. People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687; 521 NW2d
557 (1994). We are convinced that a miscarriage of justice will not result in this case, and our review
of the record reveals no misconduct on the part of the prosecutor that denied defendant a fair trial.
People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261; 531 NW2d 659 (1995). We reject defendant’s arguments that the
prosecutor mislead the court or the jury.
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V
After the initial remand, defendant filed a motion to add issues and remand, which was denied
by this Court “for failure to persuade of the need for remand at this time.” We have again reviewed
defendant’s motion and we are satisfied that the motion raises no meritorious issues.
Defendant’s convictions and sentences for second-degree murder and felony-firearm are
affirmed.
/s/ Richard A. Griffin
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
/s/ Helene N. White
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