MARK MANOR V DALE MARSH
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MARK MANOR and ROSA MANOR,
UNPUBLISHED
March 23, 1999
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
SPRINGPORT TOWNSHIP ZONING
COMMISSION, BUTCH LINCOLN and STEVE
ROLLAND,
No. 203877
Jackson Circuit Court
LC No. 96-77507-CE
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: White, P.J., and Markman and Young, Jr., JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right from the trial court’s summary disposition of their claims against
defendants Springport Township Zoning Commission, township supervisor Butch Lincoln and township
building inspector Steve Rolland. We affirm.
Plaintiffs essentially allege that defendant Rolland is liable for gross negligence and creating a
nuisance per se because he issued a building permit and certificate of occupancy which allowed
plaintiffs’ neighbors, Dale and Tina Marsh, to construct a garage next to plaintiffs’ property in violation
of the Springport Township zoning ordinance.1 Plaintiffs also claim that defendant Lincoln was grossly
negligent and responsible for creating the nuisance per se because he allowed the permit and certificate
to be issued and failed to have the nuisance abated. Finally, plaintiffs allege that defendant township is
vicariously liable for the acts of its agents, Lincoln and Rolland. The trial court determined that plaintiffs
claims against all three defendants were barred by governmental immunity and therefore granted
defendants’ motion for summary disposition.
On appeal, a trial court’s grant or denial of summary disposition will be reviewed de novo.
Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). When reviewing the
grant of summary disposition on the ground that the claim is barred by governmental immunity, all well
pleaded allegations are accepted as true and construed in favor of the nonmoving party. Codd v
Wayne Co, 210 Mich App 133, 134; 537 NW2d 453 (1995). To survive a motion for summary
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disposition, the plaintiff must allege facts warranting the application of an exception to governmental
immunity. Id. at 134-135.
Plaintiffs first argue that defendants Lincoln and Rolland were grossly negligent in issuing the
building permit and occupancy certificate. Plaintiffs claim, therefore, that governmental immunity does
not apply and that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition in favor of these defendants. We
disagree. Duty is a necessary element to set forth a cognizable claim of negligence. Jones v Wilcox,
190 Mich App 564, 568; 476 NW2d 473 (1991). Where, as here, the duty of a public official arises
from his official authority, the duty is for the benefit of the public at large. Harrison v Director of
Dep’t of Corrections, 194 Mich App 446, 456; 487 NW2d 799 (1992). “This rule applies unless a
special relationship exists between the official and the individual such that performance by the official
would affect the individual in a manner different in kind from the way performance would affect the
public.” Koenig v South Haven, 221 Mich App 711, 730; 562 NW2d 509 (1997), lv gtd 458 Mich
864 (1998).2
This Court has held that no special relationship exists between governmental employees such as
defendants Lincoln and Rolland and members of the public. For example, this Court in Jones held that
no special relationship existed between city fire inspectors and victims who perished in an apartment
fire, because the inspection of buildings for code violations is a duty owed to the public at large and not
to individuals. Jones, supra at 568-569. Likewise, in Hobrla v Glass, 143 Mich App 616; 372
NW2d 630 (1985), this Court held that summary disposition was proper when the plaintiff brought suit
against the Secretary of State and several employees for negligently issuing a driver’s license to an
individual who caused an accident, because the review of a person’s qualifications for the issuance of a
driver’s license is a duty owed to the public at large and not to any particular individual. Id. at 625-626.
Likewise in this case, defendants Lincoln and Rolland were responsible for enforcing the zoning
ordinance for the benefit of the public, just as the building inspectors in Jones enforced the city’s
ordinance and the state employees in Hobrla enforced the laws regarding driver’s license qualifications.
Because defendants Lincoln and Rolland did not owe plaintiffs a duty, they cannot be liable to plaintiffs
for gross negligence. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ gross
negligence claims against defendants Lincoln and Rolland.
Moreover, because vicarious liability is derivative, the trial court properly dismissed plaintiffs’
gross negligence claims brought against defendant township. See Gracey v Wayne Co Clerk, 213
Mich App 412, 420-421; 540 NW2d 710 (1995), overruled on other grounds American
Transmissions, Inc v Attorney General, 454 Mich 135, 143; 560 NW2d 50 (1997). In any case,
even assuming that defendants Lincoln and Rolland could be found to have been grossly negligent,
defendant township would still be immune from liability. If the activity in which a governmental
employee “was engaged at the time the tort was committed constituted the exercise of a governmental
function (i.e., the activity was expressly or impliedly mandated or authorized by constitution, statute, or
other law), the agency is immune” from liability. Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420
Mich 567, 625; 363 NW2d 641 (1984). Here, enforcement of defendant township’s zoning ordinance
is a governmental function authorized by the Township Rural Zoning Act, MCL 125.271 et seq.; MSA
5.2963(1) et seq. Rochester Hills v Six Star, Ltd, Inc, 167 Mich App 703, 708; 423 NW2d 322
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(1988). Therefore, defendant township would be immune from liability for any alleged gross negligence
on the part of defendants Lincoln and Rolland in issuing the building permit and certificate of occupancy.
“Improper performance of an activity authorized by law is, despite its impropriety, still ‘authorized’
within the meaning of the Ross governmental function test.” Richardson v Jackson Co, 432 Mich 377,
385; 443 NW2d 105 (1989).
Plaintiffs also argue that defendants are liable for creating a nuisance per se when they issued the
building permit in violation of the township’s zoning ordinance and further that they are not immune from
such a claim. Again, we disagree. We need not address the immunity issues raised by the parties
because plaintiffs in the first place have not presented a colorable claim against defendants for creating a
nuisance per se. Cf. Li v Feldt (After Second Remand), 439 Mich 457, 477; 487 NW2d 127
(1992). A governmental entity is not liable for damage caused by a nuisance unless that entity has either
created the nuisance, owned or controlled the property from which the nuisance arose, or employed
another that it knows is likely to create a nuisance. Kuriakuz v West Bloomfield Twp, 196 Mich App
175, 177; 492 NW2d 757 (1992). Liability may not be imposed when the entity’s only action was to
issue a building permit enabling another to create the nuisance. Id.; McSwain v Redford Twp, 173
Mich App 492, 499; 434 NW2d 171 (1988). Here, plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient causation
or control to impose liability on defendants, because defendants’ sole connection to the alleged nuisance
was their issuance of a building permit and certificate of occupancy which allowed plaintiffs’ neighbors
to construct the garage. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ nuisance
claims against defendants.
Finally, plaintiffs argue that defendant township is not entitled to governmental immunity because
its agents, defendants Lincoln and Rolland, committed an illegal act in issuing the building permit. We
disagree. As stated, municipalities are immune from tort liability “in all cases wherein the governmental
agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function.” MCL 691.1407(1); MSA
3.996(107)(1). A governmental function is defined as “an activity which is expressly or impliedly
mandated or authorized by constitution, statute, local charter or ordinance, or other law.” MCL
691.1401(f); MSA 3.996(101)(f). Here, the issuance of the building permit and certificate of
occupancy, although allegedly improper, was nevertheless a governmental function. Richardson,
supra.
Affirmed.
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Stephen J. Markman
/s/ Robert P. Young, Jr.
1
Plaintiffs originally filed suit against Dale and Tina Marsh for creating the alleged nuisance but later
entered into a stipulation to dismiss them. As a result, the owners of the property where the alleged
nuisance is located are not parties to this appeal.
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2
The so-called “public duty doctrine” protects governments from unreasonable interference with policy
decisions and also protects governmental employees from unreasonable liability. White v Beasley, 453
Mich 308, 317; 552 NW2d 1 (1996).
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