PEOPLE OF MI V WILLIAM HOURL NORRIS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 16, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 206326
Clinton Circuit Court
LC No. 96-006169 FH
WILLIAM HOURL NORRIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Sawyer and Markman, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his convictions by a jury of two counts of larceny in excess
of $100, MCL 750.356a; MSA 28.588(1). The trial court sentenced defendant to twelve to twenty
years’ imprisonment as a fourth habitual offender, MCL 769.12; MSA 28.1084. We affirm.
This case arises out the apparent theft of low-boy construction trailer and a tractor that was
loaded on the trailer. The incident occurred on June 26, 1996 at approximately 3:00 a.m. when
defendant and another man drove off with the loaded trailer. Defendant claimed that he had no
knowledge that these items were being stolen and that he had no intent to steal them. Rather, defendant
claimed that another man asked him to perform some loading work. In order to rebut defendant’s
claim, the prosecution successfully introduced evidence of two of defendant’s prior convictions also
involving larceny of heavy duty equipment.
Defendant’s sole argument is that the trial court erred when it admitted evidence of two of his
prior convictions of larceny in excess of $100. The decision whether such evidence is admissible is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 383; 582 NW2d 785
(1998). In order to be properly admitted under MRE 404(b), the evidence must be offered for a
proper purpose, must be relevant, must have probative value that is not substantially outweighed by
unfair prejudice, and the trial court may, upon request, provide a limiting instruction to the jury. People
v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 55; 508 NW2d 114 (1993).
Defendant maintains that the prosecutor’s asserted purpose in seeking admission of the prior
conviction was merely a thinly disguised “character-to-conduct” argument; that is, because defendant
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had done this crime before, he was more likely to have done it again this time. However, when a
defendant puts forth a general denial of guilt, all elements of a charged offense are at issue. People v
Mills, 450 Mich 61, 69-70; 537 NW2d 909 (1995). Felonious intent is an element of the crime of
larceny in excess of $100, and defendant’s theory was that he had been legitimately hired to help with
loading, but that he had no idea that the equipment was being stolen. Because defendant’s intent was at
issue, the evidence was properly admitted for the limited “noncharacter” purposes of showing
defendant’s intent and lack of mistake. MRE 404(b)(1).
Defendant also argues that his prior convictions were not relevant to the asserted purpose for
which they were admitted. When a prosecutor offers evidence of prior criminal acts for a proper
purpose under MRE 404(b), the “logical relationship between the proffered evidence and the ultimate
fact sought to be proven must be closely scrutinized.” Crawford, supra at 388. Relevant evidence
must be material--logically relevant to an issue or fact of consequence--and probative--having a
tendency to prove that issue or fact. People v Starr, 457 Mich 490, 497-498; 577 NW2d 673
(1998). We conclude that there was a sufficiently close factual nexus, Crawford, supra at 396,
between defendant’s prior crimes and the charged offense. Defendant claimed that his involvement with
moving the equipment was purely innocent, whereas the prosecution argued that defendant had the
necessary intent. The prior crimes evidence makes defendant’s argument less probable: someone with
previous experience in stolen goods would be more likely to suspect criminal activity when invited to
perform loading work at 3:00 a.m. Contrary to defendant’s argument, in order to be relevant, the
evidence need not “prove absence of mistake,” nor must it “demonstrate his intent”; rather, it must
merely have a tendency to prove or disprove his assertions. Accordingly, the evidence was both
material and had probative value.
Further, the probative value of the prior crimes evidence was not substantially outweighed by
any unfair prejudice to defendant. “Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when there exists a danger that
marginally probative evidence will be given undue or preemptive weight by the jury.” Id. at 398. In this
case, the only inference that the jury needed to draw from the evidence of prior crimes was the element
of intent, or absence of mistake. Defendant’s involvement with the stolen equipment on the day in
question was clearly established by other evidence. The evidence of his prior crimes merely addressed
the issue whether his actions were performed in total ignorance of the stolen nature of the vehicles.
Finally, we note that the trial court gave a proper limiting instruction to the jury concerning this
evidence, thereby offsetting any prejudicial effect of the evidence. Id. at 385.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Stephen J. Markman
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