PEOPLE OF MI V ANTHONY NOBLE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 2, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 196735
Recorder’s Court
LC No. 91-000013
ANTHONY NOBLE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Gage, P.J., and MacKenzie and White, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In 1991, defendant pleaded guilty to attempted breaking and entering an unoccupied building,
MCL 750.92; MSA 28.287 and MCL 750.110; MSA 28.305, and was sentenced to two years’
probation. The order of probation required defendant to report to his probation officer, to report to a
clinic, and to not move without probation department permission. Defendant did not comply with these
terms, but instead moved to Maryland. A bench warrant was issued for his arrest in October, 1991.
Defendant returned to Michigan and turned himself in to the police on March 3, 1996. The following
day, defendant pleaded guilty to violating his probation and was subsequently sentenced two to five
years’ imprisonment. He then filed his claim of appeal in this Court. We affirm.
This Court previously directed the parties to address the question “whether a defendant has an
appeal of right from a guilty plea to a probation violation even though the underlying crime was
committed before December 27, 1994.” In 1994, Const 1963, art 1, § 20, was amended to eliminate
appeals as of right from guilty pleas. The legislation implementing the amendment became effective
December 27, 1994, and applies to crimes committed after that date. See MCL 600.308(2)(d); MSA
27A.308(2)(d), as amended by 1994 PA 375, and MCL 770.3(1)(e); MSA 28.1100(1)(e), as
amended by 1994 PA 375. See also MCR 7.203(A)(1)(b) and 448 Mich cxiii-cxiv.
In this case, although defendant’s guilty plea was not taken until 1996, it is undisputed that the
underlying crime and the conduct that served as the basis for defendant’s probation violation
proceedings occurred in 1990 and 1991, well before December 27, 1994. We therefore conclude that
defendant is entitled to appeal his probation violation guilty plea and the resulting sentence as of right.
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Defendant contends that the trial court should have granted his motion to withdraw his guilty
plea because defendant did not substantially admit his guilt at the plea hearing. We find no abuse of
discretion in denying the motion. People v Jones, 190 Mich App 509, 512; 476 NW2d 646 (1991).
In reviewing the adequacy of the factual basis for a plea, this Court examines whether the fact finder
could properly convict on the facts elicited from the defendant at the plea proceeding. People v
Hogan, 225 Mich App 431, 433; 571 NW2d 737 (1997). Here, defendant admitted that he “didn’t
acknowledge the fact of the whole probation procedure.” This was sufficient to establish that defendant
failed to perform the affirmative duties placed on him in his order of probation and hence that he violated
the terms of his probation. The court’s statement “I find by a preponderance of evidence there has
been a violation of probation” did not alter the fact that defendant offered and the court accepted a
guilty plea.
Defendant also contends that the matter should be reversed and remanded for resentencing,
with the question whether to revoke probation being revisited, because the trial court improperly
considered uncharged conduct in deciding to revoke defendant’s probation. Defendant correctly
observes that the court did not revoke defendant’s probation at the violation proceeding, but simply
accepted his plea and found a probation violation, leaving the questions of revocation and sentencing
pending until the preparation of an updated presentence report, and that in revoking defendant’s
probation and imposing a prison term, the court relied on the report’s account of defendant’s extensive
criminal activity before and after being placed on probation. Relying on a line of cases holding that both
the decision that probation has been violated and the decision to revoke probation after finding a
violation must be based only on the charged conduct, defendant argues that the revocation must be set
aside and the matter must be remanded for consideration whether to revoke probation based only on
the conduct set forth in the original presentence report and the probation violation hearing. We find the
cases relied on by defendant distinguishable. At the revocation/sentencing proceeding, defense counsel
reviewed the presentence report with defendant and offered only one correction, to his birth date.
Defendant did not otherwise challenge the accuracy of the report. Thus, unlike the cases cited, here
defendant, in effect, admitted the conduct by admitting the accuracy of the presentence report. We find
no error requiring reversal.
Defendant’s final argument is that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to order a
psychiatric evaluation to evaluate defendant’s competency. This issue was not raised during the plea
hearing or sentencing and is not preserved. Although defendant’s attorney suggested that defendant
undergo a psychological evaluation as part of the preparation of an updated presentence report, see
People v Wright, 431 Mich 282, 287; 430 NW2d 133 (1988), no one ever suggested that defendant
undergo an evaluation to establish his mental competency to understand the charges against him and
enter a plea. In any event, unlike People v Martin, 61 Mich App 102; 232 NW2d 191 (1975), where
there was bona fide doubt as to the defendant’s competency, the record in this case shows that
defendant understood the nature of the probation violation proceedings. Accordingly, we find no abuse
of discretion in the trial court’s failure to order a competency examination for defendant.
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Affirmed.
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Barbara B. MacKenzie
/s/ Helene N. White
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