CYNTHIA HAYNES V LAWRENCE MOON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CYNTHIA HAYNES and the
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
February 23, 1999
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 206216
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 94-033526 DP
LAWRENCE MOON,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Sawyer and Markman, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal from the trial court’s order granting defendant summary disposition in a
paternity action, pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), because the action was barred by a prior adjudication.
After being denied leave to bring a delayed appeal in this Court,1 a delayed application for leave to
appeal in the Supreme Court resulted in a remand to this Court for consideration as on leave granted.2
Upon full consideration, we affirm the trial court, but note that a future paternity action by the Family
Independence Agency brought on behalf of Haynes’ minor child is not precluded by prior adjudication.
This is an appeal from the dismissal of the second of two paternity suits involving the same
parties and operative facts. The first suit was filed by Cynthia Haynes in May 1994 and was dismissed
with prejudice as a discovery sanction in December 1994. Defendant had served Haynes with a brief
set of relevant interrogatories and despite the issuance of an order compelling a response, Haynes never
provided the requested information. Sixteen days after the first suit was dismissed with prejudice,
Haynes filed a second suit, this time represented by the Genesee County prosecutor’s office. The case
was assigned to the same trial court and defendant moved the court for summary disposition pursuant to
MCR 2.116(C)(7) based on the prior adjudication as enforced by the principles of res judicata and
collateral estoppel. On the day before the hearing on defendant’s motion, the Department of Social
Services, now known as the Family Independence Agency, filed a motion seeking to be added as a
party-plaintiff. At the subsequent hearing, the court dismissed the case, without addressing the FIA’s
motion to be added as a party, because the claim was a refiling of the earlier case which had been
dismissed with prejudice.
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We first address the extent of the preclusive effect of the dismissal of Haynes’ paternity action.
The application of res judicata and collateral estoppel present questions of law which we review de
novo. Phinisee v Rogers, 229 Mich App 547, 551; 582 NW2d 852 (1998) (res judicata);
McMichael v McMichael, 217 Mich App 723, 727; 552 NW2d 688 (1996) (collateral estoppel). The
principle of res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, is a doctrine which prevents claims from being
relitigated. In order for it to apply, a party must establish that: “(1) the former suit was decided on the
merits, (2) the issues in the second action were or could have been resolved in the former action, and
(3) both actions involved the same parties or their privies.” Phinisee, supra at 551; Limbach v
Oakland Bd of Rd Comm’rs, 226 Mich App 389, 395; 573 NW2d 336 (1997). By comparison, the
principle of collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, is a doctrine which prevents issues from
being relitigated. In order for it to apply, a party must show that: (1) the issue was actually litigated in a
prior proceeding, (2) a determination of the issue was necessary to the outcome of the proceeding, and
(3) the parties in the prior proceeding are the same as in the present proceeding. McMichael, supra at
727; Porter v Royal Oak, 214 Mich App 478, 485; 542 NW2d 905 (1995).
Standing to pursue relief under the Paternity Act is conferred upon (1) the mother of a child
born out of wedlock, (2) the father of a child born out of wedlock, and (3) the Family Independence
Agency on behalf of a child born out of wedlock who is being supported in whole or in part by public
assistance. MCL 722.714(1), (8); MSA 25.494(1), (8). Regardless of the party bringing suit, the
court may enter an order of filiation which may be enforced in the same manner as if the action were
brought by the mother. MCL 722.714(10); MSA 25.494(10). Although the interests of a mother and
her out-of-wedlock child in obtaining an order of filiation may be similar, they are not identical and one
does not derive from the other. This Court has recently made it clear that a mother and child are not in
privity for purposes of a paternity action. Phinisee, supra at 551-554. Hence, a claim under the
Paternity Act brought by the FIA on behalf of a child, would not be precluded, under the doctrine of res
judicata, by the prior adjudication of a claim brought by the mother.
The application of collateral estoppel needs even less analysis. The issue whether defendant
was the child’s father was never actually and necessarily litigated. Moreover, the child’s non-party/non
privy status with regard to that prior adjudication would prevent collateral estoppel from precluding the
relitigation of determinative issues even if they had already been litigated.
Confusion regarding the preclusive effect of the trial court’s orders of dismissal may stem
primarily from the FIA’s pretense that it was a party in the trial court to the action presently on appeal.
Had the FIA filed a paternity action on behalf of the child and the trial court had dismissed it on res
judicata grounds, that dismissal would have been error. Phinisee, supra at 554. However, that is not
what happened. Haynes’ second action was dismissed before the FIA was ever joined and rather than
filing a separate action on behalf of the child, the FIA has joined Haynes in the present appeal. The net
result is that the FIA was not and is not precluded from bringing a suit under the Paternity Act on behalf
of the child and no modification of the order being appealed is necessary to effectuate that result.
We next address the propriety of the trial court’s granting summary disposition pursuant to
MCR 2.116(C)(7) despite plaintiffs’ collateral attack on the dismissal in the earlier case. We review
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summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) de novo. Limbach, supra at 395. Summary disposition
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) is proper when a prior adjudication bars the claim. Id.
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at 395-396. The dismissal presently being appealed was granted because Haynes had earlier filed an
identical claim which was dismissed with prejudice. An involuntary dismissal with prejudice is an
adjudication on the merits. MCR 2.205(B)(3); ABB Paint Finishing, Inc v Nat’l Union Fire Ins Co
of Pittsburgh, PA, 223 Mich App 559, 562-563; 567 NW2d 456 (1997). On its face, Haynes’
second claim clearly falls within the category of cases properly dismissed under MCR 2.116(C)(7)
based on res judicata.
However, plaintiffs argue that the dismissal in the first case was an abuse of discretion and it
violated the Equal Protection Clause with regard to the minor child whose rights were summarily
terminated. Plaintiffs argue that because of this, the original dismissal was a nullity so the dismissal
presently on appeal was erroneous. Given our above analysis that the rights of the minor child were
unaffected by the dismissal, plaintiff s’ arguments which invoke prejudice to the minor child are without
merit. As for the prior dismissal being an abuse of discretion, where a court has jurisdiction over the
parties and the subject matter, irregularities which may render a judgment erroneous do not render the
judgment void. Altman v Nelson, 197 Mich App 467, 472-475; 495 NW2d 826 (1992). “[U]ntil the
judgment is set aside [in a proper proceeding for that purpose] it is valid and binding for all purposes
and cannot be collaterally attacked.” Id. at 475. Hence, the only proper course of action for the trial
court to have taken in the instant case was to grant defendant’s motion to dismiss under MCR
2.116(C)(7) because of the prior adjudication.
Lastly, we address plaintiffs’ contention that the trial court abused its discretion by granting
summary disposition before ruling on the FIA’s motion to be joined as a party-plaintiff. Defendant
correctly points out that the FIA’s motion was never properly noticed pursuant to MCR 2.119(C)(1).
Moreover, the FIA raised no objection to the trial court’s failure to rule on its insufficiently noticed
motion, nor did it bring a motion under MCR 2.119(F) for reconsideration of the summary disposition in
conjunction with a hearing on its motion to be added. The decision whether to hear a motion without
sufficient notice to the other party is within the discretion of the trial court. Michigan Nat’l Bank v
Mudgett, 178 Mich App 677, 681; 444 NW2d 534 (1989). However, because the trial court was not
afforded the opportunity to rule on this issue, we review it only for manifest injustice. Herald Co v
Kalamazoo, 229 Mich App 376, 390; 581 NW2d 295 (1998); Miller v Inglis, 223 Mich App 159,
168; 567 NW2d 253 (1997). The rights of the child as represented by the FIA were not detrimentally
affected by the court’s declination to hear the FIA’s motion before ruling on defendant’s motion.
Adding the FIA as a party to an action from which Haynes was necessarily barred, at a time when
direct appeal from the prior adjudication was still available, would have detrimentally affected Haynes’
position. Therefore, we find no manifest injustice resulted.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Stephen J. Markman
1
Haynes v Moon, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered September 12, 1996 (Docket
No. 195216).
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2
Haynes v Moon, 456 Mich 867; 569 NW2d 160 (1997).
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