STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTO INS CO V CLARENCE GUY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY, Subrogee of
PATRICIA ANN SMITH,
UNPUBLISHED
February 19, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 206382
Muskegon Circuit Court
LC No. 95-333472 NI
CLARENCE GUY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Gribbs, P.J., and Saad and P. H. Chamberlain,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Clarence Guy appeals of right from the judgment entered in favor of plaintiff State
Farm Automobile Insurance Company. We affirm.
Patricia Smith was injured when she was struck by an uninsured car owned by defendant and
driven by Tracy Gates. Plaintiff, Smith’s insurer, paid her a total of $63,123.93 in no-fault and
uninsured motorist benefits.
The case was tried without a jury. The parties stipulated that defendant owned the uninsured
car, and that Gates operated the car in a negligent manner. Defendant testified that Gates came to his
home to change a switch in the car. He put the keys in the ignition in order to allow Gates to gain
access to the problem area, but told Gates that the car was not to be driven. Defendant acknowledged
that when he gave his deposition he did not state that the keys had been removed from the car after the
repair was completed. He stated that he had not been aware of this fact at the time. Keith Guy,
defendant’s son, and Clarence Guy, defendant’s nephew, testified that after the repair was completed
Keith removed the keys and placed them inside the house. Neither could testify as to how Gates
obtained the keys in order to drive the car.
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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In a written opinion the trial court rendered judgment against defendant in the amount of
$63.123.93, plus interest and costs. The court concluded that defendant was liable under MCL
257.401(1); MSA 9.2101(1) because his act of turning over the keys to Gates constituted implied
consent for Gates to operate the car. The court discounted Keith Guy’s testimony that he removed the
keys on the grounds that that testimony had materialized after defendant gave his deposition. The court
erroneously stated that Clarence Guy, defendant’s nephew, did not testify.
In a case tried without a jury, a court must find facts and state separately its conclusions of law.
MCR 2.517(A)(1). We review those findings of fact for clear error. Triple E Produce Corp v
Mastronardi Produce, Ltd, 209 Mich App 165, 171, 176; 530 NW2d 772 (1995).
MCL 257.401(1) provides in pertinent part:
The owner of a motor vehicle is liable for an injury caused by the negligent
operation of the motor vehicle whether the negligence consists of a violation of a statute
of this state or the ordinary care standard required by the common law. The owner is
not liable unless the motor vehicle is being driven with his or her express or implied
consent or knowledge.
The purpose of this statute is to place the risk on the person who has the ultimate control of the motor
vehicle, as well as the person in immediate control. Poch v Anderson, 229 Mich App 40, 52; 580
NW2d 456 (1998).
Defendant argues that the trial court clearly erred by finding that he gave implied consent to
Gates to operate the car. The unrebutted evidence showed that he told Gates to not drive the car.
Keith Guy testified that after the repair was completed he removed the keys from the car and placed
them in the house. This testimony was corroborated by Clarence Guy.
We affirm. Although the trial court erred by finding that Clarence Guy did not testify, that error
was harmless because the trial court’s other findings were not clearly erroneous. The finding that Keith
Guy’s testimony regarding the removal of the keys was not credible in view of the chronology of its
development cannot be said to be clearly erroneous. We defer to a trial court’s ability to judge the
credibility of witnesses who appear before it. MCR 2.613(C).
To establish liability under MCL 257.401(1), a plaintiff must show only that the defendant
owned the vehicle and that it was operated with his or her express or implied consent or knowledge.
Operation of a vehicle is not limited to the act of driving. Actual physical control of a vehicle equates to
operation. North v Kolomyjec, 199 Mich App 724, 727-728; 502 NW2d 725 (1993). By leaving
the keys in the ignition, defendant turned over actual physical control of the car to Gates. The trial court
found no “positive, unequivocal, strong and credible evidence” that defendant did not consent to Gates
driving his car, Bieszck v Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc, 459 Mich 9, 18-19; 583 NW2d 691 (1998),
and the trial court’s finding was not clearly erroneous. Imposition of liability under MCL 257.401(1)
was proper.
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Affirmed.
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Paul H. Chamberlain
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