IN RE SAMANTHA; KRISTEN & ALLISON MARKS MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of SAMANTHA MARKS, KRISTEN
MARKS and ALLISON MARKS, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
February 12, 1999
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 208211
Jackson Juvenile Court
LC No. 84-014430 NA
JUDY GOULD,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
DALE MARKS,
Respondent.
Before: White, P.J., and Markman and Young, Jr., JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent Judy Gould appeals by delayed leave granted the juvenile court’s order terminating
her parental rights to her three minor children pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (b)(ii), (g) and (j);
MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(b)(i), (b)(ii), (g) and (j). We affirm.
Respondent is the biological mother of three children: Samantha, born May 25, 1989; and
twins Kristen and Allison, born June 16, 1991. After marrying in May 1993, she was also the
stepmother to her husband’s three children: Kristin Gould, born October 28, 1982; Joshua Gould,
born January 16, 1984 and James Gould, born November 28, 1984. All six children lived with
respondent and her husband in a two-bedroom house. Although it appears that respondent’s biological
children were generally treated well, all six children were removed from the home when the Family
Independence Agency (FIA) discovered that respondent and her husband had severely abused and
neglected the Gould children.1 The Gould children were not only forced to sleep in the basement, but
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were locked there whenever they were not at school, upstairs cleaning or stealing on behalf of
respondent and her husband. The Goulds were fed in the basement, if they received food at all, and
Samantha Marks would sometimes sneak food to the basement or the Goulds would sneak upstairs to
get food. Since there were no bathroom facilities in the basement, the children often had to use the
woods when the basement door to the yard was open or else they used bottles or a bucket that their
father and stepmother would sometimes leave in the basement. The children were forced to hide the
bottles or face punishment. On one occasion, James was forced to drink some of the urine and then
respondent dumped the urine on James’ bed. Respondent then struck him all over his body with her
fist. As punishment, the Goulds were also locked in a shed, sometimes in winter without adequate
clothing, or handcuffed to a pole in the basement as long as overnight. Respondent also hit the Goulds
with objects or forced the children to hit each other. The Goulds were allowed out of the basement in
order to steal for their father and stepmother. They regularly were taken to stores by respondent and
forced to steal gifts, toys, clothing, bikes, tools and craft items. They were also forced to lie to
authorities to cover up their stealing, to qualify their family for SSI benefits and to cover up their abusive
home life. As a result of the severity of the abuse and neglect, the FIA filed a petition for termination of
parental rights without offering additional services to try to reunify the family.2 Before termination, this
family had taken advantage of numerous family services, beginning in 1984 when the FIA investigated
allegations that the Gould’s father was physically abusive. Since the Marks and Gould families merged
in 1993, they had seen counselors on numerous occasions. Respondent and her husband worked with
protective services, in-home service agencies, a family therapist and a psychologist, apparently to get
help for the Gould children’s “behavioral problems.” However, because respondent and her husband
had consistently failed to follow recommendations, the foster care worker in this case believed that none
of these services had benefited the family and that further services would also not be beneficial.
According to Samantha Marks and a foster worker who worked with the twins, the Marks
children were fully aware of the treatment suffered by the Gould children. Samantha stated that the
Marks saw the Goulds get handcuffed and heard them yelling and crying when she knew that they were
being hit with a board. The Marks knew that the Goulds were forced to steal things, and were often
present while they stole things. After the children were removed, respondent told Samantha not to talk
about these things. Although respondent visited her children after they were removed from her home,
visitation with Samantha was stopped because she was afraid to visit her mother after she testified. On
November 17, 1997, the trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights to her three biological
children.3
In this case, respondent argues that the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights when
she did not abuse or neglect her own children and was not given an opportunity to prove her parenting
skills without the Gould family. Although the severe abuse and neglect here was limited to the Gould
children, we believe that it properly served as support for the termination of respondent’s parental rights
to her own children for two reasons. First, under the doctrine of anticipatory neglect or abuse, how a
parent treats one child is probative of how that parent may treat other children. In re Powers, 208
Mich App 582, 588; 528 NW2d 799 (1995). This Court held that the doctrine of anticipatory neglect
is not limited to situations where a parent neglects or abuses her own children and applied it to provide
evidence for termination of a parent’s rights under §19b(3)(g) in In re Powers, supra at 593. We
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recognize that this doctrine is only a presumption that harm will occur in the future, and that an argument
could be made in the instant case that respondent will not physically harm her own children based on the
extreme difference in treatment that the Marks and Gould children received from respondent.
However, ultimately we conclude that respondent’s treatment of the Gould children in her c is
are
relevant evidence of how respondent may be expected to care for her own children in the future. We
believe that it is reasonable to assume that as the Marks children grow older, they may also test her
parenting abilities, as do most children; respondent has clearly demonstrated that her response to
problems is abuse and neglect. This conclusion is supported by the foster care worker’s testimony that
respondent’s severe abuse was beyond the scope of treatment within a reasonable amount of time and
that she feared that the Marks children would become respondent’s target once the Gould children
were gone.
Second, in our judgment, the negative impact on the Marks children of witnessing the neglect
and abuse of the Gould children was abusive in itself. The Marks children were fully aware of
respondent’s treatment of the Goulds. The Marks children were seven and five years old when
respondent’s behavior showed them that it was acceptable to beat people, lock them up and treat them
like prisoners, and steal. The younger children appeared confused when their foster parents paid for
items on shopping trips, and Samantha was afraid to visit her mother after she testified about the abuse
to the Gould children in direct contravention of respondent’s command to stay silent. Although the
Marks children were not physically abused, they did suffer through respondent’s treatment of the
children in her house and returning them to her care would be detrimental at least to their emotional
well-being.
Thus, we find that the court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory grounds for
termination were established by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and
(j); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(g) and (j). MCR 5.974(I); In re Hall-Smith, 222 Mich App 470,
472; 564 NW2d 156 (1997). Since only one statutory ground is required for termination and the
juvenile court’s decision to termination parental rights in this case is supported by two other statutory
grounds, we need not determine whether the court’s reliance on § 19b(3)(i) and (ii) was proper.4 In re
McIntyre, 192 Mich App 47, 50; 480 NW2d 293 (1991). In addition, respondent failed to make any
attempt to show that termination of her parental rights was clearly not in her children’s best interests.
MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19B)(5); Hall-Smith, supra at 472-73. Thus, the juvenile
court did not clearly err in terminating respondent’s parental rights to her children. Id.
Affirmed.
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Stephen J. Markman
/s/ Robert P. Young, Jr.
1
The juvenile court also terminated the parental rights of William Gould, father of the three Gould
children, and Dale Marks, father of the three Marks children. They have not appealed this decision.
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2
Respondent was also convicted of receiving or concealing stolen property, three counts of child abuse
and three counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor in connection with the facts of this case.
Her appeal is currently pending before this Court. We note that although respondent’s incarceration for
these crimes would likely have provided an additional and compelling basis for termination of her
parental rights, she was convicted only after her parental rights were terminated. Thus, we do not
address this issue further.
3
The court terminated respondent’s parental rights because the parent caused physical injury or abuse
to the child or a sibling of the child and there is a reasonable likelihood that the child will suffer from
injury or abuse in the foreseeable future if placed in the parent’s home, MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i); MSA
27.3178(598.19b)(3)(b)(i); the parent who had the opportunity to prevent the physical injury or abuse
to the child or a sibling of the child failed to do so and there is a reasonable likelihood that the child will
suffer injury or abuse in the future if placed with the parent, MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii); MSA
27.3178(598.19b)(3)(b)(ii); the parent failed to provide proper care or custody for the child and there
is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care within a reasonable time
considering the age of the child, MCL 712A.19b(3)(g); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(g); and there is a
reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child’s parent, that the child will be
harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent, MCL 712A.19b(3)(j); MSA
27.3178(598.19b)(3)(j).
4
Section 19b(3)(b) provides that abuse of either the parent’s child “or a sibling of the child” is grounds
for termination of parental rights. In In re Powers, supra at 590-92, this Court held that termination of
a parent’s rights in regard to a sibling of an abused child was not available under § 19b(3)(b) when the
respondent was not the parent or legally responsible for the child that he abused. Although we disagree
that the statutory language requires that the respondent be the “parent” of both children, whether the
word “sibling” includes step-siblings is susceptible to reasonable debate. On the one hand, the
termination statute is to be liberally construed in order to protect children. On the other hand, the
Legislature did not expressly include “step-siblings” or other additional language, such as “related by
affinity,” in the statutory language. See People v Armstrong, 212 Mich App 121, 122-29; 536
NW2d 789 (1995); MCL 400.57(1)(b); MSA 16.457(1)(b). In In re Powers, supra at 592, this
Court urged the Legislature to consider amending § 19b(3)(b). We again urge the Legislature to make
clear the effects of a parent’s abuse of children other than the child at issue in a parental termination
case.
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