PEOPLE OF MI V MARSHALL RAYMOND SIMPSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 29, 1998
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 199856
Clinton Circuit Court
LC No. 96-006069 FC
MARSHALL RAYMOND SIMPSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: MacKenzie, P.J., and Bandstra and Markman, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL
750.520b(1)(b); MSA 28.788(2)(1)(b). He was sentenced to ten to twenty years’ imprisonment.
Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that the prosecutor’s comments during closing argument amounted to
prosecutorial misconduct and consequently denied him his right to a fair trial. Defendant asserts that the
prosecutor impermissibly attacked defendant’s credibility, insinuated he was lying, and vouched for the
veracity of the complainant, defendant’s daughter. Claims of prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed de
novo. People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 267; 531 NW2d 659 (1995). An appellate court will
determine if the remarks, taken in context, denied the defendant the right to a fair trial. Id. at 267. In
this case, they did not.
The prosecutor’s comments, taken as a whole, constituted a permissible argument that
defendant’s testimony was not credible. Defendant elected to testify, and like any other witness, his
credibility was subject to attack. People v Fields, 450 Mich 94, 110; 538 NW2d 356 (1995), citing
Brown v United States, 356 US 148, 154; 78 SCt 622; 2 LEd 2d 589 (1958). Moreover, a
prosecutor may comment on the testimony of witnesses in the case, and “may argue upon the facts and
evidence that a witness is not worthy of belief.” People v Caldwell, 78 Mich App 690, 692; 261
NW2d 1 (1977). Furthermore, the prosecutor’s comments suggesting that the defense theory was not
plausible did not amount to shifting the burden of proof. See Fields, supra, pp 115-116.
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We also disagree with defendant’s claim that the prosecutor committed misconduct by vouching
for the complainant’s veracity. A prosecutor may not vouch for the credibility of a witness, but a
prosecutor may argue from the facts that a witness is credible. People v Howard, 226 Mich App 528,
548; 575 NW2d 16 (1997). Here, the prosecutor merely asked the jury to consider the complainant’s
interest in the outcome of the case and to contrast her interests with defendant’s own interests in the
outcome. The prosecutor never suggested that the People had the knowledge or ability to determine
whether the complainant was being truthful or that the complainant was telling the truth. In short, the
prosecutor never vouched for the complainant’s credibility. Finally, contrary to defendant’s assertion,
the prosecutor’s closing argument did not violate a court order prohibiting experts from testifying about
the complainant’s veracity. Again, the prosecutor was free to make permissible comments about the
complainant’s credibility in closing. Caldwell, supra, p 692.
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by admitting testimony regarding defendant’s
alleged prior acts of sexual misconduct with the complainant and that, consequently, his right to a fair
trial was denied. Again, we disagree. Although both parties argue the applicability of the rape-shield
law, MCL 750.520j; MSA 28.788(10), and MRE 404(a)(3), their reliance on that authority is
misplaced because the law is aimed at protecting the victim, not a defendant. The statute was designed
to minimize the possibility that the victim would be tried for her character, “instead of the defendant for
his conduct.” People v Stull, 127 Mich App 14, 17; 338 NW2d 403 (1983). Defendant also claims
that the evidence was inadmissible similar acts testimony under MRE 404(b). However, in admitting the
evidence, the trial court properly weighed its probative value against the risk of unfair prejudice and
concluded that its admission was permissible under People v DerMartzex, 390 Mich 410; 213 NW2d
97 (1973). In DerMartzex, the Supreme Court held that “the probative value [of similar acts evidence]
outweighs the disadvantage where the crime charged is a sexual offense [involving a member of the
same household] and the other acts tend to show a familiarity between the defendant and the person
with whom he allegedly committed the offense.” 390 Mich 413. Because the probative value of the
antecedent uncharged sexual acts between defendant and his daughter outweighed any prejudice to
defendant, we find no abuse of discretion in the admission of the evidence. DerMartzex, supra, pp
413-415.
Affirmed.
/s/ Barbara B. MacKenzie
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
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