PEOPLE OF MI V MARTIN PRENTIS PATTERSON
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 27, 1998
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 201260
Marquette Circuit Court
LC No. 96-032411 FC
MARTIN PRENTIS PATTERSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Saad, P.J., and Hood and Gribbs, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted following a jury trial of three counts of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct (CSC I), MCL 750.520b; MSA 28.788(2), and one count of distributing obscene matter to a
minor, MCL 722.675; MSA 25.254(5). He was sentenced to terms of twenty-five to forty years’
imprisonment for each CSC I conviction and sixteen to twenty-four months’ imprisonment for the
distributing conviction. He appeals as of right, and we affirm.
Defendant first argues that he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial because of a
twelve month and one week delay. A determination regarding whether defendant was denied a speedy
trial requires a balancing of the following factors: (1) length of delay; (2) reasons for delay; (3) whether
defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial; and (4) prejudice resulting from the delay. People v
Daniel, 207 Mich App 47, 51; 523 NW2d 830 (1994), citing Barker v Wingo, 407 US 514, 530;
92 S Ct 2182; 33 L Ed 2d 101 (1972). A delay of more than eighteen months triggers an inquiry into
these factors because such a delay is presumed to be prejudicial. People v Gilmore, 222 Mich App
442, 459; 564 NW2d 158 (1997); People v Wickham, 200 Mich App 106, 109-110; 503 NW2d
701 (1993). The prosecution bears the burden of proving lack of prejudice to the defendant under
those circumstances. Id. Where the delay is less than eighteen months, however, the defendant has the
burden to prove that he was prejudiced by the delay. Daniel, supra. Defendant has not done so in this
case.
Defendant's general allegations of prejudice are insufficient to establish that dismissal was
warranted on speedy trial grounds. He simply asserts that the delay "caused him prejudice by allowing
-1
memories of witnesses to fade, creating difficulty in locating some witnesses, developing undo anxiety
and stress, and preventing the commencement of critical necessary medical attention." On appeal, he
fails to explain how the memories of witnesses had faded, causing him prejudice. Moreover, he fails to
identify how the testimony of a "possible" lost witness would have aided him. People v Simpson, 207
Mich App 560, 564; 526 NW2d 33 (1994). In addition, his claim that the delay caused him undo
anxiety is not supported by any objective facts or evidence. Defendant's only serious claim of prejudice
is that he was denied critical medical attention. A review of the record, however, leads to the
conclusion that the medical attention was not critical to the health and safety of defendant. Defendant
even concedes, in his brief on appeal, that there was no clear cut evidence that his medical condition
deteriorated because of a failure to receive treatment.
Defendant next argues that reversal of his convictions is required because the prosecutor made
improper comments about the evidence, which amounted to improper comments on his decision not to
testify. We disagree.
The prosecution is never permitted to comment on a defendant's failure to testify. People v
Perry, 218 Mich App 520, 538; 554 NW2d 362 (1996). A comment that certain inculpatory
evidence is undisputed does not, however, necessarily constitute an improper comment on a defendant's
failure to testify. Id.; People v Guenther, 188 Mich App 174, 177; 469 NW2d 59 (1991). If the
comment is made when arguing the weight to be given to the testimony, it is not improper. Id.
Our review of the prosecutor's rebuttal argument reveals no error requiring reversal. His use of
the terms “uncontroverted” and “undisputed” represented proper comments on the weight to be given
to the victim’s testimony. Moreover, the trial judge instructed the jury, as a precaution, that it could not
consider that defendant had failed to testify. In doing so, it made specific reference to the prosecutor's
argument that the victim's testimony was undisputed. Thus, even if the comments had been improper, a
curative instruction was given. We also note that the comments of the prosecutor were responsive to
defense counsel’s argument that defendant had insufficient time, and therefore, insufficient opportunity,
to engage in sexual contact with the victim. People v Hart, 161 Mich App 630, 638; 411 NW2d 803
(1987). Given that the comments were not improper, that the trial court nevertheless issued a
precautionary, curative instruction, and that the comments were induced by defense counsel's argument,
we find no miscarriage of justice, which would necessitate reversal of defendant's convictions.
Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to sever the charge of
distributing obscene matter to a minor from the CSC I charges. He claims that the charges stem from
unrelated offenses. We disagree.
Defendant supplied the victim with pornographic videotapes, which depicted scenes of sexual
contact like those the victim ultimately engaged in with defendant. We find that defendant's acts of
distributing pornographic materials to the victim aided defendant in accomplishing the criminal sexual
conduct at issue. They were part of defendant's ultimate plan or scheme to induce the victim to engage
in sexual acts. Therefore, the joinder of the charges did not constitute an abuse of discretion. MCR
6.120(B); People v Daughenbaugh, 193 Mich App 506, 509-510; 484 NW2d 690 (1992). See
also People v Miller, 165 Mich App 32, 43-45; 418 NW2d 668 (1987), remanded 434 Mich 915,
-2
on remand 186 Mich App 660; 465 NW2d 47 (1990), where this Court held that two distinct acts of
criminal sexual conduct, which occurred at different times, could be tried together because the facts
indicated "a single plan or scheme on the part of defendant to sexually molest the victim when the
opportunity presented itself."1
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by failing to grant his motion for a directed
verdict of acquittal on the CSC I charges, which were brought under MCL 750.520b(1)(b); MSA
28.788(2)(1)(b). He maintains that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to show that he
either “coerced” the victim to submit to sexual contact or that he and the victim were members of the
same “household”. We disagree and find that, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
prosecution, a rational trier of fact could conclude that the essential elements of the crime were proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Warren, 228 Mich App 336, 345; 578 NW2d 692 (1998), lv
pending.
There was sufficient evidence to find that defendant and the victim were members of the same
household at the time of the criminal conduct. The Legislature intended the term "household" to be "an
all-inclusive word for a family unit residing under one roof for any time other than a brief or chance
visit." People v Garrison, 128 Mich App 640, 646; 341 NW2d 170 (1983) (emphasis added). It
"assumes a close and ongoing subordinating relationship that a child experiences with a member of his or
her family or with a coercive authority figure." Id. at 646-647. In this case, there was evidence that
defendant often referred to the victim as his son or step-son; that the victim had his own room in the
home where defendant resided; and that the victim was expected to abide by defendant's rules, which
included keeping his room clean, picking up after himself and going to school. Under the facts of the
case, the victim was not at defendant's home for a chance visit, and although there was testimony that
the victim's stay was not to be permanent, the length or permanency of residence is not determinative.
Id. The trial court therefore properly denied a directed verdict because the prosecution supported the
elements of MCL 750.520b(1)(b)(i); MSA 28.788(2)(1)(b)(i).
There was also sufficient evidence, in the alternative, of coercion. Coercion includes, but is not
limited to, physical force or violence, threats of force, threats of retaliation, inappropriate medical
treatment, or concealment or surprise. MCL 750.520b(1)(f); MSA 28.788(2)(1)(f) (emphasis added);
People v Malkowsi, 198 Mich App 610, 613; 499 NW2d 450 (1993). The existence of coercion is
determined in light of all of the circumstances; it is not limited to acts of physical violence. Id.; People v
Brown, 197 Mich App 448, 450; 495 NW2d 812 (1992). In this case, defendant got the fifteen year
old victim drunk. When the victim told defendant that he did not wish to drink anymore, defendant
informed the victim that he would have to repay defendant if he did not consume the last shot of alcohol.
The victim testified that he thought defendant was referring to his doing "something sexual" for
defendant. Defendant then told the victim to come over, on his knees, to the chair where defendant was
sitting. We find that defendant's conduct amounted to coercion. Although we are mindful that the victim
appeared to actually have initiated the sexual contact after first refusing to crawl to defendant on his
knees, we do not find that this fact negates defendant's coercion of the victim. The trial court properly
denied the directed verdict.
-3
Defendant finally argues numerous instances of conduct, which he alleges amount to ineffective
assistance of counsel. In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
show that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for
defense counsel’s error, there was a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have
been different. People v Mitchell, 454 Mich 145, 157-158; 560 NW2d 600 (1997); People v
Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687-688; 521 NW2d 557 (1994). A defendant "must affirmatively
demonstrate that counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable and so prejudicial as to deprive
him of a fair trial." Mitchell, supra. A motion for new trial or an evidentiary hearing is a prerequisite to
appellate review unless the record contains sufficient details relating to the alleged deficiencies in
representation to allow this Court to adequately analyze the issue. People v Laidlaw, 169 Mich App
84, 95; 425 NW2d 738 (1988). Where defendant fails to move for a new trial or evidentiary hearing,
our review is limited to errors that are apparent from the trial court record. People v Nantelle, 215
Mich App 77, 87; 544 NW2d 667 (1996).
In this case, defendant failed to move for an evidentiary hearing or new trial on grounds of
ineffective assistance of counsel. The record before us lacks sufficient detail to evaluate defendant's
claims that: 1) his counsel should have addressed concerns to the court that two jurors had observed
defendant in shackles; 2) his counsel should have moved to require the prosecution to honor an offered
plea bargain; 3) his counsel should have objected to testimony about statements defendant made during
interrogation; and 4) if his counsel did not request CJI 2d 4.5, he should have done so and if he did
request it, he should have pursued the trial court's decision not to give it. Because the record is
insufficient to review any of these allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, appellate review is
precluded. We also decline to accept defendant's request to remand for an evidentiary hearing on these
issues. Defendant never moved this Court for such a remand pursuant to MCR 7.211. Moreover,
defendant has failed to provide this Court with any idea as to what information may be revealed during
an evidentiary hearing, which would provide a basis for relief.
We find, however, that the record is sufficient to review defendant's claim that his counsel was
ineffective for questioning the victim's mother in such a manner as to "open the door" to allegations that
defendant molested their mutual daughter. Defense counsel questioned the victim's mother about threats
she had made to defendant to file "child molestation charges against" him. Based on the record, it is
clear that this questioning was part of defense counsel's trial strategy to discredit the witness and cast
doubt over whether the victim and defendant had ever engaged in sexual acts together. Counsel
attempted to make it clear that defendant was accused of the sexual misconduct with the victim after he
and the victim's mother argued over their mutual daughter. We will not second guess defense counsel's
trial strategy. People v Barnett, 163 Mich App 331, 338; 414 NW2d 378 (1987). Moreover, we
note that, when introduced as a trial tactic, even intentional references to damaging evidence fail to
support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. People v Armstrong, 100 Mich App 423, 426;
298 NW2d 752 (1980). We also note that defense counsel elicited further testimony from the victim's
mother that defendant was not charged with any crimes as a result of her allegations of abuse toward
their mutual daughter and that there was never any physical evidence that the daughter had been
assaulted. Thus, we find that defendant has failed to prove that he was prejudiced in anyway by his
counsel's strategy. Mitchell, supra.
-4
Defendant also argues with regard to his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that his
counsel was generally ineffective because he used leading questions, made improper objections or failed
to object, and generally appeared to be unfamiliar with the rules of evidence, including an instance
where the court had to explain to defense counsel the proper procedure for impeaching a witness with
preliminary examination testimony. Defendant's claim appears to be a catch-all, general claim. He
basically argues that in he was prejudiced by his counsel's general conduct. In making this argument,
however, defendant has failed to affirmatively demonstrate that his "counsel's performance was
objectively unreasonable and so prejudicial as to deprive him of a fair trial." Mitchell, supra.
Therefore, this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel does not require reversal.
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
1
In making our ruling, we note that defendant is correct that he would have been entitled to severance if
the offenses were unrelated. Daughenbaugh, supra at 510. Joinder of unrelated offenses is not
proper simply because evidence of the unrelated offenses may be admissible as other bad-acts evidence
under MRE 404(b). Id.
-5
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.