PEOPLE OF MI V ROBERT JAMES HILL
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 16, 1998
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 203974
St. Clair Circuit Court
LC No.89-000987 FH
ROBERT JAMES HILL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and Markey and Whitbeck, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In 1989, defendant pled guilty to the crime of delivery of less than 50 grams of cocaine, MCL
333.7401(2)(a)(iv); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(iv), for which defendant was sentenced to lifetime
probation. On April 30, 1997, defendant was convicted of violating the conditions of his probation by
using the illegal substance cocaine. Defendant was sentenced to five days’ imprisonment, to be
suspended upon payment of a $100 fine within thirty days of entry of the judgment. Defendant appeals
by right, and we affirm.
Defendant first argues that it was error for the trial court to admit the evidence of a drug test
given to defendant by his probation officer, because the prosecution failed to lay the proper foundation.
People v Young, 418 Mich 1, 17-18; 340 NW2d 805 (1983); People v Vettese, 195 Mich App 235,
238; 489 NW2d 514 (1992). We disagree. A trial court’s discretionary authority regarding the
admission of evidence in a probation revocation hearing is broad. MCR 6.445(E)(1); MRE
1101(b)(3). While the court must only consider “evidence that is relevant to the violation alleged, . . . it
need not apply the rules of evidence except those pertaining to privileges.” MCR 6.445(E)(1). Accord
People v Belanger, 227 Mich App 637, 643; 576 NW2d 703 (1998) (observing that “[p]robation
revocation proceedings are summary and informal and are not subject to the rules of evidence”).
Furthermore, the defendant in a probation revocation hearing “‘is not entitled to a full range of due
process rights associated with a criminal trial. Due process requires only that the revocation
proceedings be conducted in a fundamentally fair manner.’” Id. at 645, quoting People v Ritter,
186 Mich App 701, 706; 464 NW2d 919 (1991) (emphasis added by Belanger Court).
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After reviewing the record, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting into evidence the results of the disputed drug test. The prosecution presented evidence that
this drug test is routinely administered in probation offices throughout the state, and that defendant’s
probation officer had experience in administering the test. Regarding this experience, the officer testified
that he had been using the test for approximately one month before administering the test in question to
defendant, and that he had continued to use it since that time. Defendant was permitted to question the
officer about the procedure actually used to test defendant. Defendant was also given the opportunity
to explore the training of the officer in the giving of the tests, his familiarity with the testing methods in
general, and his knowledge of the reliability of the tests. Additionally, a test kit exactly like the one
administered to defendant was shown to the trial court. The trial court was able to both read the
directions that came with the test kit, and to ask the probation officer questions concerning his
administration of the test. Given these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when admitting the test results into evidence. The record shows that the trial court acted in a
fundamentally fair manner.
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in refusing to admit the results of defendant's
independent drug tests taken after the drug test administered by the probation officer. Given that
defendant could produce no evidence of the independent test’s relevancy at the time of the probation
hearing, we cannot conclude that the trial court committed an abuse of discretion in refusing to admit
these test results into evidence.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in finding that probable cause existed to show
that defendant had violated his probation by using cocaine. We again disagree. The drug test at issue
detected the presence of cocaine in defendant’s system. As previously noted, the prosecution
presented evidence that defendant’s probation officer had experience in administering the test. Indeed,
the officer testified that he had administered the test to defendant both prior to and following the test at
issue, and in all of these other tests the results had been negative. The officer testified that he knew of
no problems associated with using the test. Conversely, defendant produced no evidence to show that
this test was unreliable. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we believe
that a rational trier of fact could have concluded that defendant had ingested cocaine. Therefore, the
trial court did not err in finding by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant had violated the
terms of his probation. MCR 6.445(E)(1); People v Ison, 132 Mich App 61, 66; 346 NW2d 894
(1984).
Affirmed.
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
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