JEFFREY CLEMENTS V WOLVERINE TRACTOR & EQUIPMENT CO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JEFFREY CLEMENTS and CAROL CLEMENTS,
UNPUBLISHED
October 2, 1998
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 204664
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 96-004031 NO
WOLVERINE TRACTOR & EQUIPMENT
COMPANY, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Bandstra, P.J., and Griffin and Young, Jr., JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff Jeffrey Clements filed a two-count complaint against defendant Wolverine Tractor &
Equipment Company, Inc. for retaliatory discharge and wrongful termination, and his wife Carol joined
as a plaintiff in the retaliatory discharge count, claiming loss of consortium.1 Defendant filed a motion for
summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), (8), and (10). Plaintiffs conceded to the trial court
that their claim for retaliatory discharge was barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court granted
defendant’s motion for summary disposition as to the wrongful termination count on the ground that §
301 of the federal Labor Management Relations Act, 29 USC 185 (hereinafter § 301), preempted
plaintiff’s state law claim. Plaintiffs appeal as of right. We affirm.
Plaintiff argues that § 301 does not preempt his oral employment contract with defendant
because his contract is independent of the collective bargaining agreement. We disagree. Whether a
state claim is preempted by a federal statute is a question of federal law. Betty v Brooks & Perkins,
446 Mich 270, 276; 521 NW2d 518 (1994). Where federal questions are involved, Michigan courts
are bound to follow the prevailing opinions of the United States Supreme Court. Id. In Allis-Chalmers
Corp v Lueck, 471 US 202, 213; 105 S Ct 1904; 85 L Ed 2d 206 (1985), the United States
Supreme Court held that preemption under § 301 occurs when a decision on a state claim is
“inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract.” In Caterpillar, Inc v
Williams, 482 US 386, 394; 107 S Ct 2425; 96 L Ed 2d 318 (1987), the Court stated that § 301
governs claims dealing directly with rights created by a collective bargaining agreement and claims that
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are substantially dependent on an examination of a collective bargaining agreement. However, § 301
preemption does not apply to a state law claim that is independent of the collective bargaining
agreement, such as a claim for discrimination or retaliatory discharge. Lingle v Norge Div of Magic
Chef, Inc, 486 US 399, 409-410, 413; 108 S Ct 1877; 100 L Ed 2d 410 (1988).
Under the reasoning in Lingle, our Supreme Court held that a plaintiff’s state law claim of
employer race and sex discrimination based upon the Michigan Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq.;
MSA 3.548(101) et seq., is independent and not preempted by federal law because resolution of the
claim does not require interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. Betty, supra at 272, 290.
However, this Court has held that employment contract theories articulated in Toussaint v Blue Cross
& Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich 579; 292 NW2d 880 (1980), do not apply when the conduct
of the parties is governed by a collective bargaining agreement. Reisman v Regents of Wayne State
Univ, 188 Mich App 526, 530; 470 NW2d 678 (1991); Sankar v Detroit Bd of Education, 160
Mich App 470, 478-479; 409 NW2d 213 (1987). “Toussaint was not addressed to the collective
bargaining context and . . . to hold otherwise would exert a disruptive influence on both the
administration and negotiation of collective bargaining agreements.” Sankar, supra at 478-479, citing
Fifield v International Union, UAW Local 137, 570 F Supp 562, 566 (WD Mich, 1983).
Plaintiff’s state law claim is preempted by § 301 because his employment situation from May
1987 to September 1988 was inextricably intertwined with the collective bargaining agreements
between defendant and both unions. Defendant could not hire plaintiff to work in the service
department without the approval of the Operating Engineers. Plaintiff, as a member of the Operating
Engineers, was subject to the collective bargaining agreement between the Operating Engineers and
defendant when he worked in the service department. Defendant could not transfer plaintiff to the parts
department without a special agreement with the Teamsters. Furthermore, the Teamsters and Operating
Engineers met to determine whether plaintiff could work in the parts department and agreed that plaintiff
could use his time in the parts department to vest his Operating Engineers’ pension. The collective
bargaining process prohibited plaintiff from engaging in separate negotiations with defendant and
precludes any action to enforce such an agreement. Maushund v Earl C Smith, Inc, 795 F2d 589,
590 (CA 6, 1986).
Plaintiff incorrectly relies on Caterpillar, supra, to support his claim. Caterpillar involved
salaried employees and managers, positions outside the coverage of the collective bargaining agreement,
who were allegedly assured that Caterpillar would provide employment opportunities if their facility
closed. Id. at 388-389. The employees and managers were downgraded to hourly positions covered
by the collective bargaining agreement and notified that they would be laid off without regard to the
assurances of continued employment. Id. at 388-390. Caterpillar is distinguishable from the present
case, because unlike the salaried employees and managers in Caterpillar who received assurances
while they were not covered by a collective bargaining agreement, plaintiff was hired as a union member
to work in a facility subject to the union’s collective bargaining agreement. Similarly, in McDaniel v
GMC, 765 F Supp 407 (WD Mich, 1991), upon which plaintiff also relies, the trial court’s finding that
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the plaintiff’s Toussaint claim was not preempted was based on the fact that the circumstances that
gave rise to the claim arose before she became a union employee and subject to the collective
bargaining agreement.
The trial court correctly ruled that § 301 preempts plaintiff’s state law claim.
We affirm.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Robert P. Young, Jr.
1
Because Carol Clements’ claim is derivative of her husband’s claim, the term “plaintiff” will hereinafter
refer to Jeffrey Clements.
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