PEOPLE OF MI V FRANK SAPHINE BOOKER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 25, 1998
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 196660
Muskegon Circuit Court
LC No. 95-138294
FRANK SAPHINE BOOKER, a/k/a STAFNIE
FRANK BOOKER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Doctoroff, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his jury trial convictions for first-degree murder, MCL
750.316; MSA 28.548, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b;
MSA 28.424(2), and carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227; MSA 28.424. Defendant was
sentenced to life in prison for his murder conviction, to two years’ imprisonment for his felony-firearm
conviction, and to three to five years’ imprisonment for his concealed weapon conviction. We affirm.
Defendant fatally shot the victim from the passenger seat of a parked minivan while the victim
was sitting in the driver’s seat. At trial, a county medical examiner testified that the victim suffered a
contact gunshot wound to the back of his head.1 Two or three weeks before the shooting, defendant
and the victim had been involved in an altercation in which the victim hit defendant in the face with a
handgun. Defendant testified that he only intended to speak to the victim, but was forced to shoot the
victim in self defense when the victim retrieved a handgun from under the driver’s seat.
On appeal, defendant argues that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel
as a result of several “failures” by defense counsel at trial. We disagree. To properly advance a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must make a testimonial record at the trial court level in
an evidentiary hearing or in connection with a motion for a new trial. People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436,
442-444; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). Because there is no such testimonial record in this case, our review
is limited to mistakes apparent on the record. People v Barclay, 208 Mich App 670, 672; 528 NW2d
842 (1995).
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A criminal defendant attempting to prove that trial counsel was ineffective bears a heavy burden.
E.g. People v Leonard, 224 Mich App 569, 592; 569 NW2d 663 (1997). To justify reversal on a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both that counsel’s performance was
deficient and that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v Washington,
466 US 668, 687; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984); People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 302
303; 521 NW2d 797 (1994). In order to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient, the
defendant must show that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms. In so doing, the defendant must overcome a strong presumption that counsel’s
performance constituted sound trial strategy. Strickland, supra at 690-691; People v Stanaway, 446
Mich 643, 687; 521 NW2d 557 (1994). To demonstrate prejudice, the defendant must show that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceeding would have
been different. Strickland, supra at 694; Stanaway, supra at 687-688. A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Strickland, supra at 694.
Defendant contends that defense counsel was deficient in failing to question Gwendolyn Shelton
about whether the victim was a drug dealer, failing to impeach Shelton’s testimony that she did not
know where the victim got his money, failing to elicit police testimony that drug dealers frequently carry
guns, and failing to question certain unspecified prosecution witnesses regarding the victim’s alleged drug
dealing. However, nothing contained in the record indicates that Shelton would have testified that the
victim was a drug dealer, that defense counsel had any basis to impeach Shelton,2 that a police officer
would have testified that drug dealers frequently carry guns, or that the unspecified prosecution
witnesses would have testified that the victim was a drug dealer. See MCR 7.210(A)(1). Accordingly,
defendant cannot show that defense counsel’s performance was deficient or that counsel’s performance
prejudiced the defense. Strickland, supra at 687.
In any event, even if defendant could show that defense counsel might have b able to
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establish at trial that the victim was a drug dealer and that drug dealer’s frequently carry guns, this
showing would be insufficient to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding
would have been different. Strickland, supra at 694. The central issue at trial was whether defendant
shot the victim in self defense. Although evidence that the victim was a drug dealer may have been
tangentially relevant to this central issue, its probative value would have been too slight to overcome the
impact of the evidence that the victim was killed by a contact wound to the back of his head.
Defendant next contends that defense counsel was deficient in failing to question Kunta
Braylock regarding his opportunity to discard the handgun allegedly “used” by the victim. Braylock
testified that he never saw a gun in the minivan before or after the shooting. Accordingly, it is unclear
what defense counsel would have accomplished by questioning Braylock regarding his opportunity to
discard the handgun allegedly “used” by the victim. Nothing in the record indicates that Braylock would
have admitted to discarding a gun. Accordingly, defendant cannot show that defense counsel’s
performance was deficient or that counsel’s performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland, supra at
687.
Defendant also contends that defense counsel was deficient in failing to argue to the jury that
Braylock had an opportunity to discard the handgun allegedly “used” by the victim, that none of the trial
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testimony directly contradicted defendant’s claim of self defense, and that there were numerous
inconsistencies in the testimony of the prosecution’s witnesses. In our view, the substance of defense
counsel’s closing argument, which stressed several appropriate points, was a matter of trial strategy, and
thus cannot provide the basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Strickland, supra at 690
691; In re Rogers, 160 Mich App 500, 505; 409 NW2d 486 (1987).
Finally, defendant contends that defense counsel was deficient in failing to request a curative
instruction after the prosecutor improperly asked defendant whether he had talked to defense counsel
about self defense. Because the primary effect of such a curative instruction might have been to highlight
the prosecutor’s damaging insinuation, we conclude that defendant has failed to overcome the
presumption that defendant’s decision not to request a curative instruction constituted sound trial
strategy.
For the reasons stated, defendant is not entitled to relief on appeal.
Affirmed.
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
1
The medical examiner testified that if it was not a true contact wound, then it was a “near contact”
wound, meaning that the barrel of the gun was not more than a quarter inch from the back of the
victim’s skull.
2
The newspaper article attached to defendant’s brief on appeal was not contained in the lower court
record.
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