DONALD WILBER V STATE EMP RETIREMENT BD
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DONALD WILBER,
UNPUBLISHED
August 4, 1998
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
STATE EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM,
No. 199206
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 96-082455 AA
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Bandstra, P.J., and Griffin and Young, Jr., JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals by leave granted an order of the Ingham Circuit Court reversing an order
of the State Employees’ Retirement Board (SERB), denying duty disability retirement benefits to
petitioner. We reverse the circuit court and reinstate the order of the State Employees’ Retirement
Board.
Respondent argues that the SERB’s decision was authorized by law and supported by
competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record. Respondent maintains that the
circuit judge erred in substituting his judgment that petitioner was totally and permanently disabled for
that of the board, which found, based on the hearing referee’s proposal for decision, that petitioner was
only partially disabled. We agree. Section 21 of the State Employees’ Retirement Act, MCL 38.21;
MSA 3.981(21), provides:
Subject to the provisions of sections 33 and 34, upon the application of a
member, or his department head, or the state personnel director, a member who
becomes totally incapacitated for duty in the service of the state of Michigan
without willful negligence on his part, by reason of a personal injury or disease,
which the retirement board finds to have occurred as the natural and proximate
result of the said member’s actual performance of duty in the service of the state,
shall be retired: Provided, The medical advisor after a medical examination of
said member shall certify in writing that said member is mentally or physically
totally incapacitated for the further performance of duty in the service of the
-1
state, and that such incapacity will probably be permanent, and that said member
should be retired: And provided further, That the retirement board concurs in the
recommendation of the medical advisor.
When reviewing a lower court’s review of agency action,
[T]his Court must determine whether the lower court applied correct legal
principles and whether it misapprehended or grossly misapplied the substantial evidence
test to the agency’s factual findings. This latter standard is indistinguishable from the
clearly erroneous standard of review that has been widely adopted in Michigan
jurisprudence. As defined in numerous other contexts, a finding is clearly erroneous
when, on review of the whole record, this Court is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made. [Boyd v Civil Service Comm, 220 Mich
App 226, 234-235; 559 NW2d 342 (1996) (emphasis added).]
“Substantial evidence” has been defined as evidence “which a reasonable mind would accept as
adequate to support a decision, being more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance of the
evidence.” St Clair Intermediate School Dist v Intermediate Ed Ass’n/Michigan Ed Ass’n, 218
Mich App 734, 736; 555 NW2d 267 (1996); lv gtd 456 Mich 899 (1997). In a different context, the
Supreme Court quoted the dictionary definitions of the terms “competent,” “material,” and “substantial”
and came to the following conclusion:
What can be gleaned from these definitions is that if the magistrate m
akes a
finding or draws a conclusion on the basis of competent, material, and substantial
evidence, which is solid, true, reliable, authoritative, capable, and can articulate this
evidence from the record, then the decision of the magistrate may not be reversed.
[Goff v Bil-Mar Foods, Inc (After Remand), 454 Mich 507, 514, n 5; 563 NW2d
214 (1997).]
In the present case, the hearing officer determined that petitioner was only partially disabled.
On petitioner’s appeal, the circuit court misapplied the substantial evidence test to the agency’s factual
findings when it found that the hearing officer’s decision was not supported by competent, material, and
substantial evidence on the whole record. The evidence was substantial in the sense that a reasonable
mind would accept it as adequate to support the hearing officer’s observations that petitioner’s treating
physicians and the medical advisor to the State Employees’ Retirement System, Dr. William S. Gonte,
had found petitioner to be only partially disabled, and its conclusion that petitioner had not met his
burden of proof. St Clair Intermediate School Dist, supra at 736. Evidence that supports a finding
that petitioner did not satisfy his burden to prove total disability, in addition to the testimony of Dr.
Michael, was the testimony of orthopedic surgeon Perry W. Greene, Jr., M.D., that petitioner could
work with restrictions if his symptoms could be controlled and the conclusion of Dr. Gonte that
petitioner was not totally and permanently disabled. We disagree with the circuit court’s opinion that
the hearing officer made an improper inference in arriving at its interpretation of Dr. Greene’s testimony.
This testimony appears to have suggested a way to control petitioner’s symptoms that would have made
-2
it possible for him to work with restrictions. Moreover, Dr. Gonte concluded that petitioner’s prognosis
for return to employment was good.
Although case law suggests that a hearing officer is not bound by the decision of the State
Medical Advisor, there is nothing to prevent a hearing officer from making a determination in
accordance with the recommendation of the medical advisor. Gersbacher v State Employees’
Retirement System, 145 Mich App 36, 45; 377 NW2d 334 (1985). Moreover, a hearing officer has
the authority to conclude that a petitioner failed to sustain his burden of proof. Stoneburg v State
Employees’ Retirement System, 139 Mich App 794, 801; 362 NW2d 878 (1984). In light of all the
evidence, we hold that the circuit court misapprehended t e substantial evidence test, because the
h
evidence, particularly the testimony of Dr. Gonte and Dr. Greene, was such that the hearing officer
could reasonably conclude that petitioner had not sustained his burden of proving that he was totally
disabled from engaging in employment reasonably related to his past experience and training.
We reverse the circuit court and reinstate the order of the State Employees’ Retirement Board.
/s/ Richard A. Banstra
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Robert P. Young, Jr.
-3
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.