SHIAWASSEE CNTY COMM MENTAL HLTH SERVICES BD V LOCAL 1059 AFSCME
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
SHIAWASSEE COUNTY COMMUNITY
MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES BOARD,
UNPUBLISHED
July 28, 1998
Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellant,
v
LOCAL 1059, MICHIGAN COUNCIL 25,
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE COUNTY
AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES (AFSCME),
AFL-CIO,
No. 202549
Shiawassee Circuit Court
LC No. 96-006588 CZ
Defendant-Counter-Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Markey and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court’s order confirming and enforcing a labor
arbitration award and granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition. We affirm.
Plaintiff is a public entity that provides mental health services in Shiawassee County. Defendant
is a labor organization that represents plaintiff’s bargaining unit employees. Defendant and plaintiff are
parties to a collective bargaining agreement (“agreement”) that contains a grievance procedure that
culminated in final and binding arbitration.
Judy Butcher, an 18-year employee of plaintiff and a member of defendant, did not timely finish
an assigned project. At her supervisor’s request, she went to his office to discuss her performance. It
was undisputed that as she stood at her supervisor’s office door, she loudly and angrily stated that he
was “driving her crazy,” that she could no longer take a “beating,” and that “you will hear from my
lawyer.” Butcher’s supervisor and another employee, who occupied the adjoining office, testified that
Butcher’s outburst included the declaration that “I quit.” Butcher denied saying she quit. Rather, after
the confrontation, she merely left to go to lunch and call her attorney. Before she departed, however,
her supervisor twice requested her resignation in writing. In response to both requests, Butcher told him
to “drop dead.” Butcher left the building without taking her personal belongings.
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On the following day, plaintiff sent a letter to Butcher that stated it was formally accepting
Butcher’s verbal voluntary resignation. After Butcher received the letter, defendant filed a grievance on
her behalf claiming that plaintiff discharged Butcher without just cause or notice and without adherence
to the warning procedures contained in the collective bargaining agreement.
The arbitrator ruled that because this case was a discharge claim pursuant to Article 9 of the
agreement, it was arbitrable. In addition, the arbitrator found that although Butcher stated that she
“quit,” plaintiff could not justifiably, reasonably, and immediately reduce her to a former employee and
demand that she confirm her new resignation in writing. The arbitrator considered Butcher’s length of
employment with plaintiff, the inevitable sacrifice of significant and vital employment benefits ensuing
from resignation, the employment induced stress she was experiencing, and her personal and financial
difficulties of which plaintiff was aware in determining how reasonably plaintiff acted. The arbitrator
concluded that plaintiff could only reasonably treat Butcher’s actions as an emotional outburst to be
dealt with reflectively and objectively. By their own actions, however, plaintiff’s management officials
appear to have seized an opportunity to rid themselves of an employee because of a momentary
confrontation that incurred their displeasure.
Thus, the arbitrator found that Butcher’s supervisor’s letter “was in substance an immediate
termination” of Butcher. The arbitrator then quoted from Article 9 of the agreement, governing
notification of discipline or discharge, and found that “the evidence falls far short of showing that
[Butcher]’s momentary outburst was within ‘instances when the seriousness of the employee’s action or
failure to act requires immediate suspension or discharge.’” Consequently, the arbitrator awarded
Butcher’s reinstatement with back pay and other benefits retroactively restored, except for a 30-day
period immediately following Butcher’s outburst.
Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking to vacate the arbitration award; defendant counter-sued for
enforcement of the award. Defendant then filed a motion for summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(10), and the trial court agreed to hear it with plaintiff’s petition because heard together, they
would resolve the case. The trial court ordered that the arbitration award be enforced. On appeal,
plaintiff argues that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by imposing on plaintiff additional requirements
and limitations not provided for under the bargaining agreement. We disagree.
This Court held in Michigan State Employees Ass’n v Dep’t of Mental Health, 178 Mich
App 581, 583-584; 444 NW2d 207 (1989), quoting Ferndale Ed Ass’n v Ferndale School Dist No
1, 67 Mich App 637, 642-643; 242 NW2d 478 (1976), that proper judicial review of an arbitration
award is as follows:
“Judicial review is limited to whether the award ‘draws its essence’ from the contract,
whether the award was within the authority conferred upon the arbitrator by the
collective bargaining agreement. Once substantive arbitrability is determined (as it was
in the court below), judicial review effectively ceases. The fact that an arbitrator’s
interpretation of a contract is wrong is irrelevant. This position of limited review has
been adopted by the Michigan Supreme Court. This Court follows the same policy.”
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The arbitrator’s authority to resolve a dispute concerning the interpretation of a collective bargaining
agreement is derived exclusively from the contractual agreement of the parties. Gibraltar School Dist
v Gibraltar MESPA-Transportation, 443 Mich 326, 341; 505 NW2d 214 (1993). Whenever an
arbitrator acts beyond the material terms of the contract from which he primarily draws his authority, a
reviewing court may find that the arbitrator has exceeded his power. The role of the court is to examine
whether the arbitrator has rendered an award that comports with the terms of the parties’ contract.
Gordon Sel-Way, Inc v Spence Bros, Inc, 438 Mich 488, 496; 475 NW2d 704 (1991). An
arbitrator is limited to interpretation and application of the collective bargaining agreement. Port Huron
Area School Dist v Port Huron Ed Ass’n, 426 Mich 143, 152; 393 NW2d 811 (1986). Thus, the
arbitrator may not dispense his own brand of industrial justice. Id.
The judicial policy favoring labor arbitration warrants a strong presumption in favor of upholding
an arbitral award: “an award will be presumed to be within the scope of the arbitrator’s authority absent
express language to the contrary.” Port Huron Area School Dist, supra at 152. An award is
properly vacated, however, when that award is dependent upon an arbitrator’s interpretation of
provisions expressly withheld from arbitral jurisdiction or upon an arbitrator’s disregard and
contravention of provisions expressly limiting arbitral authority. Id. A court cannot review an
arbitrator’s factual findings or decision on the merits. See Gordon Sel-Way, Inc, supra at 496-497.
The fact that an arbitrator’s interpretation of the party’s contract is wrong is irrelevant. Michigan State
Employees Ass’n, supra at 584. A court can only decide whether the arbitrator’s award “draws its
essence” from the contract. Gogebic Medical Care Facility v AFSCME Local 992, AFL-CIO, 209
Mich App 693, 697; 531 NW2d 728 (1995). If an arbitrator exceeded his authority, then the case
must be remanded for further arbitration proceedings. Michigan State Employees Ass’n, supra at
585.
In the case at bar, the only restrictions on the arbitrator’s authority were that he could not alter,
add to, or subtract from the terms of the contract and that the issue had to fall under Articles 8 or 9.1
Plaintiff argues that when Butcher told her supervisor, “I quit,” and began receiving pension checks, she
voluntarily quit pursuant to Section 7.8 of the agreement, which provides: “An employee’s seniority, by
classification, and his or her employment relationship with the employer shall automatically terminate for
any of the following reasons: (a) If he or she quits, retires, or receives a pension, including a disability
pension.” Defendant argues that Butcher was discharged improperly pursuant to Article 9, Section 9.0,
which, in relevant part, states:
It is hereby agreed that the employer has the right to discipline, including disciplinary
suspension resulting in loss of pay and time off, and to discharge employees covered by
this agreement for just cause. . . .
Given the language of the parties’ agreement, we find that the arbitrator had the authority to
determine whether Butcher’s and plaintiff’s actions fell under Articles 7 or 9. In other words, the
arbitrator’s ability to determine whether Butcher quit or was discharged was drawn from the essence of
the agreement and did not involve an interpretation of provisions withheld from the arbitrator’s
jurisdiction. Port Huron Area School District, supra. We believe that if the arbitrator found that
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Butcher was discharged under Article 9, he had the power to determine whether the discharge was
appropriate, and if he found it inappropriate, then he had the power to fashion a remedy. Also, if the
arbitrator found that Butcher quit pursuant to Section 7.8, then the arbitrator could affirm that Butcher
was not entitled to take advantage of the agreement’s progressive discipline or due process provisions
because those only apply to employees whom plaintiff has terminated.
The arbitrator stated in his opinion that he believed Butcher made the statement “I quit.” In light
of the fact that plaintiff knew of Butcher’s myriad difficulties, the arbitrator found it unreasonable for
plaintiff to believe that Butcher meant what she said. The arbitrator also remarked that plaintiff’s desire
to have Butcher immediately sign a written document stating that she quit, and Butcher’s refusal to do
so, was further evidence that plaintiff did not take Butcher seriously. Instead, plaintiff saw Butcher’s
outburst as a golden opportunity to get rid of her.
We therefore believe that the arbitrator’s award draws its essence from the parties’ agreement
despite the fact that the arbitrator found that Butcher did indeed utter the words, “I quit.” Michigan
State Employees Ass’n, supra. The issue of whether Butcher actually quit or was discharged via the
letter her supervisor drafted after the confrontation was properly arbitrable. No one disputes this. The
mere fact the arbitrator found that Butcher said the words “I quit” did not require him to blindly and
literally accept them or deprive him of continuing his analysis of the situation in its entire context. That is,
the agreement allows the arbitrator to consider all relevant facts before determining whether a bargaining
unit employee was discharged or quit. Cf. Port Huron Area School District, supra. Whether we
agree with the arbitrator’s conclusion that the circumstances surrounding Butcher’s statement should
have caused plaintiff to reasonably treat Butcher’s actions as an emotional outburst and not as an intent
to voluntarily quit is irrelevant. Michigan State Employees Ass’n, supra at 584. The arbitrator may
consider all relevant facts in making his determination. Thus, in finding that in this particular case plaintiff
had to look beyond Butcher’s actual, literal words spoken in the heat of the moment and determine her
intent, the arbitrator did not add additional requirements to the agreement between the parties as plaintiff
argues.
Therefore, we find that the arbitrator’s opinion comports with the terms of the parties’
agreement and must be affirmed because the arbitrator did not exceed his authority under the
agreement.
We affirm.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
1
Section 6.10 of the agreement, in relevant part, states:
The arbitrator shall have no power to amend, add to, alter, ignore, change, or modify
any provision of this Agreement or the written rules and regulations of the Employer. . . .
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Further, the arbitrator shall not be empowered to consider any question or matter
outside of Article 8 or Article 9 of this Agreement. . . .
***
The arbitrator’s decision shall be final and binding upon the Union, the Employer, and
the employees in the bargaining unit covered by this Agreement, provided that the
arbitrator’s decision has been rendered in conformity with the jurisdiction accorded to
him under this Agreement.
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