IN RE LOUIS ALEX TOKIE IV MINORAnnotate this Case
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of LOUIS ALEX TOKIE, IV, Minor
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY
June 9, 1998
Nos. 202332 & 202499
Oakland Juvenile Court
LC No. 94-057610 NA
DENISE BENN and LOUIS TOKIE, III,
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Kelly and Markey, JJ.
Respondents appeal as of right from an order of the juvenile court terminating their parental
rights to the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g) and (j); MSA 27.3178 (598.19b)(3)(c)(i),
(g) and (j). We affirm.
The juvenile court did not clearly err in finding that petitioner made reasonable efforts to provide
services to both respondents. MCR 5.974(I); In re Ballard, 219 Mich App 329, 331; 556 NW2d
Next, the juvenile court did not clearly err in finding that grounds for termination of respondent
Benn’s parental rights were established under §§ 19b(3)(g) and (j), by clear and convincing evidence.
MCR 5.974(I); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). Further, Benn failed to
demonstrate that termination of her parental rights was clearly not in the child’s best interests. MCL
712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5); In re Hall-Smith, 222 Mich App 470, 472-473; 564
NW2d 156 (1997). Thus, the juvenile court did err in terminating respondent Benn’s parental rights.
In re Hall-Smith, supra.
Respondent Benn’s argument that, if we were to reverse the order terminating respondent
Tokie’s parental rights, then we should likewise reverse the order terminating her parental rights, is
without merit. Clear and convincing evidence to terminate respondent Benn’s parental rights exists
under §§ 19b(3)(g) and (j), regardless of the plan provided by Benn. In any event, we conclude that
reversal as to respondent Tokie is not warranted.
Although respondent Tokie contends that the juvenile court was required to consider only
legally admissible evidence in deciding whether to terminate his parental rights, MCR 5.974(D)(3), he
does not identify any evidence that allegedly was improperly admitted. Accordingly, we find no basis
for concluding that the juvenile court applied the wrong evidentiary standard in determining whether
termination was warranted.
Finally, we conclude that respondent Tokie’s due process rights were not violated where he
was given notice of the nature of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard at many hearings. In
re Kirkwood, 187 Mich App 542, 546; 468 NW2d 280 (1991). Also, because the provision
requiring visitation every seven days contains no sanction, MCL 712A.18f(3)(e); MSA
27.3178(598.19f)(3)(e), we conclude that any alleged violation of this provision does not provide Tokie
with a basis for obtaining reversal of the order terminating his parental rights. See In re Kirkwood,
supra at 545-546.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Jane E. Markey