ALFRED REEVES V MUELLER BRASS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ALFRED REEVES and CINDY REEVES,
UNPUBLISHED
May 29, 1998
Plaintiffs-Appellants/
Cross-Appellees,
v
No. 197417
St. Clair Circuit Court
LC No. 94-00222 NO
MUELLER BRASS,
Defendant-Appellee/
Cross-Appellant.
Before: Whitbeck, P.J., and MacKenzie and Murphy, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right from the trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion for summary
disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), MCR 2.116(C)(8), and MCR 2.116(C)(10). Defendant
cross-appeals the trial court’s order denying its motion for sanctions pursuant to MCR 600.2591; MSA
27A.2591. We affirm.
Plaintiff Alfred Reeves (plaintiff) was injured in the course of his employment with defendant
when, while assisting in the loading of an open trailer, one of the bows used to support a tarpaulin
covering some loaded cargo snapped, striking him in the head. He sued defendant for negligence. The
trial court, in lieu of dismissing the case, allowed plaintiff to amend his complaint. Plaintiff’s amended
complaint alleged four alternative causes of action, and the trial court eventually granted summary
disposition as to each. The trial court subsequently awarded defendant post-mediation attorney fees,
see MCR 2.403(O), but denied defendant’s request for sanctions pursuant to MCL 600.2591; MSA
27A.2591.
On appeal, plaintiff challenges only the dismissal of his products liability claim. Specifically, he
contends that the trial court erred in concluding that the claim was barred by the exclusive remedy
provision of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act, MCL 418.131(1); MSA 17.237(131)(1), that
provides that the right to recover worker’s compensation benefits “shall be the employee’s exclusive
remedy against the employer for a personal injury.” According to plaintiff, his products liability claim
was viable under the dual capacity doctrine because the claim was brought against defendant in
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defendant’s capacity as manufacturer of the trailer or its bow-type tarpaulin support system, and not in
defendant’s capacity as plaintiff’s employer.
Although the dual capacity doctrine recognizes that an employer can, under certain
circumstances, occupy a status other than that of an employer with respect to an employee, e.g., as a
product manufacturer or designer, the doctrine is applicable only in situations where the employer has a
second identity that is completely distinct and removed from the employer status. See Wells v
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co, 421 Mich 641, 653; 364 NW2d 670 (1984), Isom v Limitorque
Corp, 193 Mich App 518, 523; 484 NW2d 716 (1992), Bourassa v ATO Corp, 113 Mich App 517;
317 NW2d 669 (1982), Peoples v Chrysler Corp, 98 Mich App 277, 284; 296 NW2d 237 (1980).
Here, assuming that defendant was the manufacturer of the trailer or its tarpaulin support system,
plaintiff’s exposure to the trailer and support system arose out of his employment relationship with
defendant, making the dual capacity doctrine inapplicable. The trial court therefore properly found that
plaintiff’s claim was barred by the exclusive remedy provision. Wells, supra. We also reject plaintiff’s
reliance on MCL 600.2945; MSA 27A.2945. That statute does not create a substantive cause of
action for products liability; it provides a definition of “products liability action” to be applied in other
sections of the Revised Judicature Act. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not err in granting
defendant’s motion for summary disposition.
We note that plaintiff Cindy Reeves brought a derivative claim for loss of consortium. Because
we conclude that the husband’s claim is barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Worker’s
Disability Compensation Act, the wife’s derivative claim is also barred. Bowden v McAndrew, 173
Mich App 591, 595-596; 434 NW2d 195 (1988).
We next turn to defendant’s claim that it was entitled to sanctions under MCL 600.2591; MSA
27A.2591. MCR 2.625(A)(2) states that a court shall award costs, as provided by MCL 600.2591;
MSA 27A.2591, to reimburse a prevailing party for its costs incurred during the course of frivolous
litigation. Cvengros v Farm Bureau Ins, 216 Mich App 261, 266; 548 NW2d 698 (1996).
Sanctions are permitted under MCL 600.2591(3)(a)(iii); MSA 27A.2591(3)(a)(iii), where a party’s
legal position is “devoid of arguable legal merit.” A trial court’s finding with regard to whether a claim
was frivolous will not be disturbed on appeal unless the finding is clearly erroneous. State Farm Fire
& Casualty Co v Johnson, 187 Mich App 264, 268-269; 466 NW2d 287 (1990).
We find no clear error in the trial court’s decision not to award sanctions in this case. As noted
by the trial court, there were complex issues presented, some of which were part of the developing case
law of this State. The scope of the intentional tort exception, for example, was in flux when the
amended complaint was filed; the Supreme Court had granted leave to appeal in two cases cited by
plaintiff in the trial court and that eventually resulted in a decision in Travis v Dreis & Krump Mfg Co,
453 Mich 149; 551 NW2d 132 (1996). Although it is now clear that, under Travis, plaintiff’s
intentional tort claim is without merit, there was sufficient uncertainty in this area of the law that the trial
court’s finding that plaintiff’s claim was not frivolous in this respect is not clearly erroneous. Bourne v
Farmers Ins Exchange, 449 Mich 193, 203; 534 NW2d 491 (1995). Additionally, courts should be
reluctant to impose sanctions for arguments even where the intermediate appellate court decisions are all
consistent with one another (which was not the case here) until the Michigan Supreme Court has spoken
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on the issue; a good faith argument can always be made that the decisions of this Court ought to be
reexamined. See McKnight v General Motors Corp, 511 US 659; 114 S Ct 1826; 128 L Ed 2d
655 (1994).
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Accordingly, the trial court did not clearly err in this respect in denying additional sanctions beyond
mediation sanctions.
Affirmed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Barbara B. MacKenzie
/s/ William B. Murphy
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