MATTHEW W MANCZAK V CITY OF BAY CITY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MATTHEW W. MANCZAK,
UNPUBLISHED
March 27, 1998
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 199395
Bay Circuit Court
LC No. 94-003071-CZ
CITY OF BAY CITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: McDonald, P.J., and Sawyer and Hoekstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from an order granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), (8) and (10). We affirm.
We review a grant of summary disposition based upon a failure to state a claim,
MCR 2.116(C)(8), de novo. State Treasurer v Schuster, 215 Mich App 347, 350; 547 NW2d 332
(1996). A motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) should be granted only
where the claim is so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could
possibly justify a right to recovery. Wade v Dep’t of Corrections, 439 Mich 158, 163; 483 NW2d
26 (1992). Similarly, on appeal, a trial court’s grant or denial of summary disposition pursuant to
MCR 2.116(C)(10) will be reviewed de novo. Pinckney Community Schools v Continental
Casualty Co, 213 Mich App 521, 525; 540 NW2d 748 (1996). A court is required, pursuant to
MCR 2.116(C)(10), giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the nonmovant, to determine whether a
record might have been developed which would leave open an issue upon which reasonable minds
could differ, Bertrand v Alan Ford, Inc, 449 Mich 606, 617-618; 537 NW2d 185 (1995).
I
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it dismissed plaintiff’s
legislatively created public policy and retaliation claims on the basis that such claims are only applicable
to “at will” employment contracts. Since it was undisputed that plaintiff was a just-cause employee
under a collective-bargaining agreement, the trial court did not err in finding that plaintiff could not
maintain an action for violation of public policy, and in dismissing this cause of action for failure to state a
-1
claim upon which relief could be granted pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8). Suchodolski v Michigan
Consolidated Gas Co, 412 Mich 692, 694-695; 316 NW2d 710 (1982), indicates that a claim of a
violation of public policy is an exception to the at-will employment doctrine. Other cases have
recognized that this tort theory of liability for wrongful discharge arises only in the context of
employment at will, e.g., Clifford v Cactus Drilling Corp, 419 Mich 356, 360; 353 NW2d 469
(1984), citing Sventko v Kroger Co, 69 Mich App 644; 245 NW2d 151 (1976); Prysak v R L Polk
Co, 193 Mich App 1, 9; 483 NW2d 629 (1992); Phillips v Butterball Farms Co (After Second
Remand), 448 Mich 239; 531 NW2d 144 (1995). Since the principle has never been extended to a
just-cause employee and such an employee is afforded this protection by virtue of the fact that he
cannot be discharged but for cause, the trial court’s ruling was proper.
Second, plaintiff claims retaliatory discharge for seeking legal representation from his personal
attorney and the union, and for bringing a lawsuit in respect to a contravention of MCL 37.1602,
MSA 3.550(602), a provision of the Handicappers’ Civil Rights Act which provides as follows:
A person . . . shall not:
(a) Retaliate or discriminate against a person because the person has opposed
a violation of this act, or because the person has made a charge, filed a complaint,
testified, assisted, or participated in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this
act.
In Suchodolski, supra at 695 n2, the Court recognized this “explicit legislative statement prohibiting
the discharge, discipline, or other adverse treatment of employees who act in accordance with a
statutory right or duty” as a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. In Phillips,
supra at 246-247, the Court explained the source of the right against retaliatory discharge:
. . . the source of this right against retaliatory discharge does not stem from any
term agreed upon by the contracting parties, but from public policy now expressed in a
statute.
To present a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge, the plaintiff must prove that he engaged in
protected activity, that the employer knew about the activity, that the employer took action that was
adverse to the plaintiff, and that there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the
adverse employment action. DeFlaviis v Lord & Taylor, Inc, 223 Mich App 432, 436; 566 NW2d
661 (1997), citing Polk v Yellow Freight System, Inc, 876 F2d 527, 531 (CA 6, 1989). If the
plaintiff proves a prima facie case, the employer must advance a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
the adverse action. If the employer succeeds, the plaintiff must prove that the employer’s reason was a
pretext for retaliation. Dixon v WW Grainger, Inc, 168 Mich App 107, 116; 423 NW2d 580
(1987).
We find no evidence to support plaintiff’s contention that defendant discharged plaintiff because
he exercised his right to union representation. In addition, plaintiff failed to show that there was a causal
connection between the protected activity of seeking legal representation and the adverse employment
-2
action. The evidence demonstrated that plaintiff was suspended so that his medical condition and
capabilities could be evaluated. Defendant had requested plaintiff’s medical information before it was
advised of plaintiff’s lawsuit. In order to complete this evaluation, plaintiff had to provide a list of
medical care providers and medical releases. Plaintiff was expressly warned that failure to comply
would constitute insubordination and result in termination, and was terminated only after he had
repeatedly failed or refused to provide the information. Thus, we conclude that plaintiff did not establish
a prima facie case of retaliation.
II
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred when it misinterpreted the language of the statute to
create an “exception” to the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, MCL 15.361 et seq.; MSA 17.428(1) et
seq., when it found that an employer could retaliate against an employee who would otherwise be
protected by the WPA, as long as the employee is “participating in an investigation, hearing, or inquiry
held by that public body.” A careful reading of the relevant section of the WPA, MCL 15.362;
MSA 17.428(2), reveals that, contrary to the trial court’s holding, the WPA provides that an employee
is not only protected when the employee reports or is about to report a violation or suspected violation
of a federal or state statute or regulation to a public body, but also if a public body requests that the
employee participate in a court action or an investigation or hearing by the public body.
However, the central question is whether plaintiff could maintain a prima facie case of retaliation
under the WPA by proving that he “report[ed] or [was] about to report . . . a violation or a suspected
violation of a law . . . to a public body.” Dolan v Continental Airlines, 454 Mich 373, 379; 563
NW2d 23 (1997). In addition, to maintain a prima facie case, plaintiff had to prove that he was
“subsequently discharged, threatened, or otherwise discriminated against” and “that a causal connection
existed between the protected activity and the discharge, threat or discrimination.” Phinney v
Perlmutter, 222 Mich App 513, 553; 564 NW2d 532 (1997). We find that the evidence did not
support plaintiff’s contention that the discharge was predetermined, and that the filing of the lawsuit was
a factor in his discharge. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it found that
there was no causal connection between plaintiff’s alleged protected activity and the discharge.
III
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred when it dismissed plaintiff’s Handicappers’ Civil
Rights Act claims. It follows from the Court’s holding in Sanchez v Lagoudakis, 440 Mich 496, 497
498; 486 NW2d 657 (1992), that the HCRA, MCL 37.1101 et seq.; MSA 3.550(101) et seq.,
prohibits discriminatory treatment, even if such treatment is based on the employer’s erroneous
perception that the employee is handicapped. Like other cases alleging prohibited discrimination,
handicap discrimination cases require that, to establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that
he is handicapped (or perceived to be handicapped); (2) that the handicap is unrelated to his ability to
perform the duties of a particular job; and (3) that he has been discriminated against due to the
handicap. Crittenden v Chrysler Corp, 178 Mich App 324, 331; 443 NW2d 412 (1989).
-3
In considering whether a handicap is related to a plaintiff’s ability to perform the duties of a
particular job, a court is entitled to consider that a plaintiff’s condition in a job involving the safety of the
public may represent a danger to himself or to the public. Dauten v Muskegon Co, 128 Mich App
435, 438; 340 NW2d 117 (1983). We find that the trial court did not err in finding that the plaintiff
was unable to prove that his handicap or perceived handicap was unrelated to his ability to perform the
job. From the reports of field training officers who evaluated plaintiff, it appears that plaintiff’s
performance in written communication was very weak, and that plaintiff regressed a great deal during
the fourth week of his training. The overviews of two field training officers indicated that, although
plaintiff was performing at an average to above average level in most areas, certain areas of
performance were clearly marginal or not acceptable, and that plaintiff’s handicap was related to his
ability to perform his job duties.
Similarly, the medical reports gave no indication that plaintiff’s handicap had no relation to his
ability to perform the duties of a police officer. One medical report stated that plaintiff was “not
considered to be an appropriate candidate to pursue employment as a police officer.” Another report
expressed the opinion that “the residual cognitive deficits [were] of sufficient magnitude that . . . would
preclude his ability to function as a police officer.” Because these medical reports demonstrated that
plaintiff’s handicap was related to his ability to perform the duties of a police officer and plaintiff failed to
present evidence that his handicap was unrelated to his ability to perform the duties of the particular job,
the trial court did not err in finding that plaintiff could not demonstrate a prima facie case of handicap
discrimination under the HCRA, and in dismissing plaintiff’s HCRA claim as a matter of law pursuant to
MCR 2.116(C)(8) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. That plaintiff was
suspended on January 21, 1994, even though he had been promised that his evaluation period would
last until January 28, 1994, may indicate that the police chief acted somewhat prematurely, but it does
not in any way significantly affect the conclusion that plaintiff’s handicap was related to plaintiff’s ability
to perform the duties of a police officer.
Affirmed.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
-4
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.