MO'EEN MOHAMAD AL KABRA V AKRAM NAJI MAROUF
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MO’EEN MOHAMAD AL KABRA,
UNPUBLISHED
March 27, 1998
Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
v
AKRAM NAJI MAROUF, individually and d/b/a
EDITH’S MARKET,
No. 187073
Washtenaw Circuit
LC No. 92-042615-CH
Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Before: Markey, P.J., and Michael J. Kelly and Whitbeck, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff filed a two-count complaint against defendant, alleging first that he had been induced to
invest in a party store because of defendant’s fraudulent misrepresentation that plaintiff would have a
fifty-percent interest in the profits of the store. In Count II, plaintiff alleged that he was the rightful
owner of the real property on which the store is located and that the trial court should quiet title in him
and grant him possession. After a six-day bench trial, the trial court issued an opinion and judgment in
plaintiff’s favor on Count I and in defendant’s favor on Count II. Plaintiff appealed the decision to this
Court and defendant cross-appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment as to count II, but reverse
the trial court’s judgment as to Count I.
Plaintiff raises two issues for review, only one of which was raised before the trial court and
therefore preserved for appeal. Haworth v Wickes Mfg Co, 210 Mich App 222, 229-230; 532
NW2d 903 (1995). Plaintiff argues that that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s
finding that defendant owned the real property on which the store is located. Actions to quiet title are
equitable in nature, and a court acting in equity “looks at the whole situation and grants or withholds
relief as good conscience dictates.” Michigan Nat’l Bank & Trust Co v Morren, 194 Mich App
407, 410; 487 NW2d 784 (1992). We review this issue de novo, h
owever, we accept the factual
findings of the trial court unless they are clearly erroneous. Id.
We are not persuaded that the trial court clearly erred in finding that defendant was the true
owner of the real property on which Edith’s Market was located. Defendant testified that after
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acquiring the property in 1982, he put the real property and gas license under his brother’s name to
avoid any potential conflict in holding both a gas license for the adjacent gas station and a liquor license
for the party store, both being located on the real property. Similarly, defendant testified that after a
subsequent conflict with his brother, he put the property and gas license in plaintiff’s name. Moreover,
defendant obtained a power of attorney from plaintiff to exercise control of the property. Defendant
testified to several subsequent acts of ownership, including his application for a loan, remodeling the gas
station building, shutting down the gas station, and moving the store into the gas station building. Both
plaintiff and defendant testified that defendant did not pay plaintiff rent either to operate the store or
occupy the apartment above the store, as defendant had to the previous owner of the real property.
Both plaintiff and defendant also testified that defendant paid the property taxes and all other expenses
of the property. In light of this evidence, the trial court committed no error in concluding that defendant
was the owner of the real property on which the store was located.
Although plaintiff argues that his testimony on this issue was more persuasive than defendant’s
testimony, both parties supplied this Court with a list of the inconsistencies in the other’s testimony.
Thus, there is testimony that supports both versions of the business transactions in this case. Indeed, the
trial court noted that the evidence presented by each of the parties was at times improbable and that
both parties changed their testimony at various times during the trial and in depositions. The trial court
was present throughout the six days of testimony and was in the best position to judge the witnesses’
credibility. Simply put, the trial court believed defendant’s side of the story; we defer to the trial court’s
credibility determination. MCR 2.613(C).
Plaintiff raises additional arguments regarding the applicability of the statute of frauds and the
equitable “clean hands” doctrine. However, because these arguments were not raised in the trial court,
we refuse to address them. See Royce v Citizens Ins Co, 219 Mich App 537, 545; 557 NW2d 144
(1996); see also Stephenson v Golden (On Rehearing), 279 Mich 710, 732-733; 276 NW 849
(1937) (“Those who try equity cases must make the appropriate record to raise properly the questions
sought to be determined judicially.”). We also decline to review plaintiff’s argument that defendant’s
use of plaintiff’s power of attorney to deed the property to himself in 1991 exceeded the scope of the
document. The trial court found that defendant had been the true owner of the property at issue since
approximately 1982, notwithstanding the deed to plaintiff. Because defendant was the actual owner
when he used plaintiff’s power of attorney to transfer the property, whether his act exceeded the scope
of the power of attorney is, as the trial court stated, irrelevant. Thus, we affirm the portion of the trial
court’s judgment determining that plaintiff is the owner of the real property at issue in this case.
Defendant argues in his cross-appeal that the trial court’s factual finding that plaintiff is a one
half owner of the Edith’s Market business was clearly erroneous. We agree. We review factual
findings by the trial court for clear error. MCR 2.613(C), Ghidotti v Barber (On Remand), 222 Mich
App 373, 377; 564 NW2d 141 (1997). A finding is clearly erroneous if an appellate court is left with a
firm and definite conviction that a mistake was made. Id.
Here, defendant denied that plaintiff provided any money to be invested in the business. In
contrast, plaintiff testified that he provided defendant with about $10,000 for the store’s inventory and
an additional $35,000. A letter that plaintiff asserted was written to him by defendant referenced a
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“$35,000 debt” from defendant to plaintiff, while other letters also referenced plaintiff having provided
money to defendant in connection with “the store.” However, defendant denied having written these
letters. A handwriting expert, appointed by the trial court, testified that defendant was attempting to
disguise his handwriting in samples that defendant provided to the expert. The trial court found that
defendant had written the letters and, accordingly, implicitly found that plaintiff had provided defendant
with money for the business. We consider these findings to be well supported by the evidence.
However, the trial court then concluded that the parties intended for plaintiff to have a one-half
interest in the business with defendant to have the other one-half interest. Accordingly, the trial court
awarded each party a one-half ownership interest in the business with each party to be entitled to one
half of the profits from the business and to be responsible for one-half of its losses.1 There was
testimony from plaintiff and defendant’s brother indicating that plaintiff was to receive one-half of the
profits of the business. Plaintiff also testified at one point that the parties agreed that defendant would
run the store and be entitled to one-half of the profits, while plaintiff would own the store and receive the
other one-half of the profits. There was no testimony that plaintiff and defendant were each to be one
half owners of the business. Thus, we conclude that the trial court’s finding that the parties each had a
one-half ownership interest in the business was clearly erroneous because we have a firm and definite
conviction that this finding was mistaken. Ghidotti, supra at 377. Accordingly, we reverse the portion
of the trial court’s judgment regarding the parties’ ownership interest in the business known as Edith’s
Market.
As discussed above, we accept the trial court’s finding that plaintiff actually provided money for
the business. However, a legally valid contract requires a meeting of the minds on the essential terms or
all material facts of the agreement. West Bloomfield Hospital v Certificate of Need Bd, 223 Mich
App 507, 519; 567 NW2d 1 (1997); Kamalnath v Mercy Memorial Hospital Corp, 194 Mich App
543, 548; 487 NW2d 499 (1992); Stanton v Dachile, 186 Mich App 247, 256; 463 NW2d 479
(1990). Further, whether there has been a meeting of the minds and the content of such is determined
objectively by the acts and express words of the parties, not by their subjective intent. Kamalnath,
supra at 548; Stanton, supra at 256.
From the record before us, we do not believe that the parties reached a specific enough
agreement regarding the business to have established a legally enforceable contract. There simply was
too much left open regarding the parties’ respective rights. From plaintiff’s version of the events, the
parties essentially agreed that they would split the profits of the business, but they did not provide any
limit on the length of time that this profit sharing would continue, any provision for allocating the burden
of potential losses by the business or any delineation of the parties’ respective rights if the business were
to close. If this “agreement” were to be applied without elaboration, defendant could close the business
at any time and simply keep plaintiff’s investment. It would be objectively unreasonable to conclude
that plaintiff agreed to this. Conversely, plaintiff based on his finite investment would apparently be
entitled to profits from the business forever, without assuming the risk of losses or having any further
obligation to the business. We consider it objectively unreasonable to conclude that defendant agreed
to that possibility. Accordingly, we conclude that the parties failed to enter a legally enforceable
contract regarding the Edith’s Market business.
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Even though a contract may not exist between two interconnected parties, a person who has
been unjustly enriched at the expense of another person is required to make restitution under the
equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment. Kammer Asphalt Paving Co, Inc v East China Twp
Schools, 443 Mich 176, 185; 504 NW2d 635 (1993). The elements of unjust enrichment are (1)
receipt of a benefit by a defendant from a plaintiff and (2) resulting inequity to the plaintiff because of
retention of the benefit by the defendant. Barber v SMH(US), Inc, 202 Mich App 366, 375; 509
NW2d 791 (1993). Here, defendant received money from plaintiff for investment in the Edith’s Market
business, and it would be inequitable for defendant to retain that money when the parties failed to reach
an agreement about their respective rights in the business. The trial court has not determined the total
amount of money that plaintiff provided to defendant in connection with Edith’s Market. Accordingly,
we remand with instructions that the trial court determine the amount of money that defendant received
from plaintiff in connection with the business and enter an order requiring defendant to pay that amount,
plus interest, if appropriate, to plaintiff under such terms as the court shall determine.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Jane Markey
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
1
The trial court qualified this holding by providing that plaintiff would not be entitled to a share of profits
earned prior to January 1, 1994 based on the doctrine of laches because plaintiff did not request an
accounting for those profits at an earlier time. The trial court also provided that plaintiff would not be
responsible for any losses incurred by the business in 1994 or earlier because plaintiff “had nothing to
do with operating the store” at that time.
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