PEOPLE OF MI V KEITH HERMAN COATES
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 24, 1998
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 200658
Berrien Circuit Court
LC No. 96-003902-FC
KEITH HERMAN COATES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Markey, P.J., and Griffin and Whitbeck, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
A jury convicted defendant of two counts of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than
murder, MCL 750.84; MSA 28.279, kidnapping, MCL 750.349; MSA 28.581, and three counts of
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). The trial
court sentenced defendant as an habitual offender to 10 to 15 years’ imprisonment for each of the
assault convictions, life imprisonment on the kidnapping conviction, and two years preceding each of
those sentences on each of the felony-firearm convictions. He appeals as of right. We affirm.
I
The first issue is whether the trial court erroneously admitted certain evidence of defendant’s
prior bad acts because the prosecution failed to give notice to the trial court of its intention to do so.
We hold that no error occurred.
Defendant failed to object to this evidence in a timely manner. Absent manifest injustice, a
defendant waives appellate review of the admission of bad acts evidence by failing to timely object, by
stipulation to its admission, or by voluntary injection of the information by his own actions. See People
v Yarger, 193 Mich App 532, 538-539; 485 NW2d 119 (1992). Here, the prosecution offered the
evidence for a proper purpose, it was relevant, and its probative value was not substantially outweighed
by its potential for unfair prejudice. People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 74-75; 508 NW2d 114
(1993), modified 445 Mich 1205 (1994). Morris testified that she fearfully submitted to the sexual
intercourse, thus making the earlier choking incident relevant to vitiate the apparent consent. People v
-1
Ullah, 216 Mich App 669, 673; 550 NW2d 568 (1996). Accordingly, we find this issue waived on
appeal.
II
The second issue is whether the trial court erred by refusing to grant defendant’s motion for a
directed verdict with respect to the charges of criminal sexual conduct and assault with intent to murder.
The trial court, when ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, must consider the evidence presented by
the prosecutor up to the time of the motion in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine
whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the charged crime were proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Jolly, 442 Mich 458, 466; 502 NW2d 177 (1993); People v
Hampton, 407 Mich 354, 368; 285 NW2d 284 (1979) (Coleman, CJ). This Court applies the same
standard on review. People v Daniels, 192 Mich App 658, 665; 482 NW2d 176 (1992).
Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from it may be sufficient to prove the elements
of the crime. Jolly, supra.
First-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b(1)(e); MSA 28.788(2)(1)(e), is
committed when the actor “engages in sexual penetration with another person and if any of the following
circumstances exists: . . . (e) The actor is armed with a weapon or any article used or fashioned in a
manner to lead the victim to reasonably believe it to be a weapon.” The conduct satisfies the “armed
with a weapon” element of the statute when the actor has either actual or constructive possession of a
dangerous weapon. People v Proveaux, 157 Mich App 357, 361; 403 NW2d 135 (1987); People v
Davis, 101 Mich App 198, 201-202; 300 NW2d 497 (1980). “One has constructive possession if
one has proximity to the article together with indicia of control.” Davis, supra. This Court held that the
actor need not have the weapon in his hands while committing the offense charged, so long as he has
knowledge of the weapon’s location and it is reasonably accessible. Id. at 203.
Here, the evidence clearly established that defendant had a gun when this incident began.
Furthermore, defendant had the gun in his hand when he asked Morris to make love to him; he brought
the gun into the bedroom just before the sexual acts occurred. Defendant leaned the gun against the
dresser that she had described as right next to the bed, and the gun was within arm’s reach of defendant
during the sexual acts. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence that defendant had knowledge of the
gun’s location, and it was reasonably accessible during the sexual penetration.
The elements of assault with the intent to commit murder, MCL 750.83; MSA 28.278, are: (1)
an assault, (2) with an actual intent to kill, (3) which, if successful, would make the killing murder.
People v Lawton, 196 Mich App 341, 350; 492 NW2d 810 (1992). Circumstantial evidence and
reasonable inferences from the evidence may constitute proof of these elements. Id. The intentional
discharge of a firearm at someone within range is an assault. Id., citing People v Johnson, 54 Mich
App 303, 304; 220 NW2d 705 (1974). The prosecution may prove the intent to kill “[by] inference . .
. from any facts in evidence . . . .” Lawton, supra at 350, quoting People v Drayton, 168 Mich App
174, 176; 423 NW2d 606 (1988).
-2
Here, one police officer testified that when he confronted defendant in the house, defendant
pointed the gun at him and threatened him. Another officer testified that when he heard the first shot, he
looked out the window from his position at the bottom of the stairs and saw that the shots were coming
from the south wall and headed southwest toward the area where Hampton was standing. When
Lieutenant Singleton drove up to the scene, he immediately dropped to the ground to avoid gunfire.
Morris testified that defendant fired from the window that was facing Hampton’s house and that
defendant was looking out the windows from which he was shooting. Both Singleton and Hampton
testified that bullets hit them at some point during the shooting.
Detective Sergeant Joann Danneffel, the police negotiator, testified that when she spoke to
defendant on the telephone and explained that a man in the house next door needed medical attention
because he had been shot, defendant was unconcerned and said that there was no need because the
man was probably already dead. Danneffel further testified that defendant told her that if anyone came
toward the house, he would kill them. Officer Agay, who spoke to defendant several times that night,
testified that defendant repeatedly threatened to shoot and kill any officers who approached the house.
These facts are sufficient to support a rational trier of fact in inferring that from defendant’s firing the gun
at the police car and in the direction of where Hampton and Singleton were standing and defendant’s
threats to kill any police officers who attempted to get to the house, defendant intended to kill both
Singleton and Hampton.
Even if the evidence were insufficient to support an inference that defendant intended to kill
anyone other than Lieutenant Singleton (because of his status as a police officer approaching the house),
defendant’s intent may be transferred to the shot that hit Hampton. Lawton, supra at 350. Thus, even
if defendant were unaware that Hampton was in the vicinity of the officers at whom he was shooting,
defendant’s intent to kill the police officers may be transferred to the shot that hit Hampton.
The trial court therefore did not err in denying defendant’s motion for directed verdict with
respect to the first-degree criminal sexual conduct charge or assault with intent to commit murder as the
evidence, taken in a light most reasonable to the prosecution, supports a rational trier of fact’s
conclusion that the prosecution established the essential elements of these crimes.
III
The third issue is whether sufficient evidence existed as a matter of law to support the conviction
of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder. Due process requires the prosecution to
introduce sufficient evidence to justify a trier of fact in its conclusion that the defendant is guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. People v Fisher, 193 Mich App 284, 287; 483 NW2d 452 (1992). In reviewing
the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the
crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d
748, amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992).
We find that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction of
assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder. The elements of this crime are an attempt or
-3
offer with force or violence to do corporeal arm to another, coupled with intent to do great bodily harm
less than murder. People v Lugo, 214 Mich App 699, 710; 542 NW2d 921 (1995). This Court has
found sufficient evidence to support the specific intent element when a defendant made threats to the
victim and fired a gun at him, despite the fact that the victim sustained no actual injury. People v
Harrington, 194 Mich App 424, 430; 487 NW2d 479 (1992). Here, the victims suffered injuries as a
result of the gunshots directed against them. Additionally, this Court has held that a defendant who shot
at one party intending to hurt him can be convicted of two separate counts of assault with intent to do
great bodily harm less than murder where the bullet struck a second party. People v Lovett, 90 Mich
App 169, 171-175; 283 NW2d 357 (1979).
Here, defendant testified that he fired out one of the bedroom windows and admitted, when
speaking about the area into which he shot, that he “didn’t know nobody was there except the officer
who was there.” He testified that he was only trying to scare people but admitted that he saw the police
car and, not knowing whether people were in the car, he intentionally shot at the car. One officer who
spoke to defendant several times that night testified that defendant repeatedly threatened to shoot and
kill any officers who approached the house. Under the transferred intent doctrine, even if defendant
only intended to shoot at police officers, the fact that he struck Hampton and was convicted on a
separate count is permissible under Lovett, supra. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to support a
conviction for two counts of assault with intent to cause great bodily harm less than murder.
IV
The fourth issue is whether resentencing is required because the trial judge did not sufficiently
articulate the reasons for the sentence imposed. Despite defendant’s status as an habitual offender, this
Court must determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the sentence. People v
Cervantes, 448 Mich 620, 627; 532 NW2d 831 (1995); People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 635
636; 461 NW2d 1 (1990). A sentencing court must articulate on the record the criteria considered and
the reasons for the sentences it imposes in order to facilitate appellate review. People v Newcomb,
190 Mich App 424, 427; 476 NW2d 749 (1991). Because the trial court sufficiently articulated
numerous reasons for the sentences imposed, we find no error.1
V
The fifth and final issue is whether defendant’s sentences were disproportionate and so
disparate that they amount to cruel and unusual punishment violating the United States and Michigan
Constitutions. Notably, because defendant was sentenced a an habitual offender, the sentencing
s
guidelines do not apply to him. People v Hansford (After Remand), 454 Mich 320, 323; 562 NW2d
460 (1997); People v Gatewood, 450 Mich 1021 (1996). Defendant has cited several statistical
reports which, he alleges, show that his kidnapping and assault sentences are more severe than the
average sentences for those crimes. In addition to the fact that this Court has specifically disapproved
of the use of statistics to show that a parolable life sentence is more severe than another sentence,
People v Carson, 220 Mich App 662, 677; 560 NW2d 657 (1996), defendant’s statistics are not
meaningful. There is no information about the prior records of the criminals that make up the statistics,
-4
nor do they reflect information about the circumstances of those offenses. We also do not know
whether these statistics take into consideration habitual offenders.
Given the facts of the present case, in addition to defendant’s prior convictions and the nature of
those crimes, the trial court’s sentences were not disproportionate to the offense and the offender and,
therefore, do not constitute cruel or unusual punishment. People v Terry, 224 Mich App 447, 456;
569 NW2d 641 (1997); People v Williams (After Remand), 198 Mich App 537, 543; 499 NW2d
404 (1993).
We affirm.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
1
The trial court noted that defendant had nine juvenile convictions, four of which were for assaultive
crimes, and six prior adult convictions, four of which were for assaultive crimes. Defendant had served
the maximum sentence on his most recent felony, and had a “pattern of weapons possession.” The
court further noted that probation has not worked for defendant, as he was on probation for an
assaultive crime when he committed the instant offenses. The court also stated that neither the
community corrections system nor the prison system had caused defendant to change his assaultive
behavior. The trial court finally concluded that defendant was a serious threat to the community and
expressed its intent to protect the community and to deter others from similar conduct.
-5
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.