PEOPLE OF MI V O'NIEL A ELLINGTON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 24, 1998
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 200308
Recorder’s Court
LC No. 95-010277
O’NIEL A. ELLINGTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and White and J. W. Fitzgerald,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his bench trial convictions of two counts of armed robbery,
MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL
750.227b, MSA 28.424(2). Defendant was sentenced to two to twenty years in prison for each of the
armed robbery convictions, and two years in prison for the felony-firearm conviction, the armed
robbery sentences to run concurrently with each other but consecutively to the felony-firearm sentence.
Defendant’s first issue on appeal is that his jury waiver was invalid because the trial court failed
to establish on the record the voluntary and intelligent nature of the waiver. A trial court’s determination
that a defendant validly waived the right to a jury trial is reviewed for clear error. People v Leonard,
224 Mich App 569, 595; 569 NW2d 663 (1997), lv pending.
MCR 6.402(B) provides:
Before accepting a waiver, the court must advise the defendant in open
court of the constitutional right to trial by jury. The court must also
ascertain, by addressing the defendant personally, that the defendant
understands the right and that the defendant voluntarily chooses to give
up that right and to be tried by the court. A verbatim record must be
made of the waiver proceeding.
* Former Supreme Court justice, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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The record shows that the trial court’s questioning of defendant was sufficient to establish that
defendant voluntarily waived his constitutional right to a jury trial. The court advised defendant that he
had a constitutional right to a jury trial, and asked defendant whether he wished to waive his
constitutional right to a jury trial. Defendant replied that he did. The court determined that defendant
understood that by giving up his right to a jury trial, defendant agreed that the court, rather than twelve
citizens, would be listening to the testimony and determining defendant’s guilt or innocence. The court
further determined that defendant, who was seventeen years old, had an opportunity to discuss his jury
waiver with his mother. Finally, defendant acknowledged that he signed a waiver of trial by jury form.
Because it would be unreasonable to believe that defendant did not voluntarily waive his right to a jury
trial, we conclude that there is no error requiring reversal. People v Reddick, 187 Mich App 547, 550;
468 NW2d 278 (1991).
Defendant also claims that the trial court erred in failing to ascertain whether defendant was
promised anything or threatened. However, defendant does not claim that he was coerced into waiving
his right to trial by jury. Therefore, because the record shows that the trial court’s questioning of
defendant was sufficient, neither a remand nor a reversal of defendant’s convictions is warranted.
Leonard, supra at 596.
Defendant’s second argument is that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed
verdict. We disagree. When reviewing a denial of a motion for a directed verdict, this Court must
consider the evidence presented by the prosecution up to the time the motion was made in a light most
favorable to the prosecution and determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential
elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Peebles, 216 Mich App
661, 664; 550 NW2d 589 (1996).
The essential elements of an armed robbery are (1) an assault, and (2) a felonious taking of
property from the victim’s person or presence, while (3) the defendant is armed with a weapon
described in the statute. People v Allen, 201 Mich App 98, 100; 505 NW2d 869 (1993).
Defendant only disputes the sufficiency of the evidence with regard to element three. Both
victims testified at trial that defendant flashed a chrome automatic gun at them and demanded that each
turn over anything of value. Because this evidence was sufficient to prove that defendant was armed
with a dangerous weapon, we conclude that the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for a
directed verdict.
Affirmed.
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ John W. Fitzgerald
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