PEOPLE OF MI V DOUGLAS MARVIN DESOTELL
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 20, 1998
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 192279
Delta Circuit Court
LC No. 95-005769 FH
DOUGLAS MARVIN DESOTELL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and Michael J. Kelly and Gribbs, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and sentenced as an
habitual offender, second offense. In this appeal of right, he contends that the trial court erred in ruling
that his confession was admissible at trial following a three-day evidentiary hearing, pursuant to People
v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331; 132 NW2d 87 (1965).
To the extent the testimony was in dispute, the trial court’s findings of historical fact are subject
to appellate review for clear error only, given the trial court’s superior ability to assess the credibility of
the witnesses. People v Mendez, 225 Mich App 381, 382; 571 NW2d 528 (1997). The ultimate
determination of both custodial status, id.; Thompson v Keohane, 516 US 99, 102; 116 S Ct 457;
133 L Ed 2d 383 (1995)—crucial to the determination of whether Miranda warnings were required,
People v Hill, 429 Mich 382; 415 NW2d 193 (1987)—and voluntariness, Miller v Fenton, 474 US
104, 115; 106 S Ct 445; 88 L Ed 2d 405 (1985), being mixed questions of law and fact, is subject to
de novo appellate review and determination.
Here, the historical facts are essentially undisputed in pertinent respects. Investigating a
complaint of criminal sexual conduct, a state police detective and a trooper approached defendant
outside his home, identified themselves, and stated the purpose of their visit, which was to interview him
concerning the complaint. After a spontaneous incriminating response, the admissibility of which
appears to be uncontested, the officers requested that defendant accompany them either to the nearest
state police post or the local police headquarters to be interviewed. Defendant instead requested that
he be interviewed in his home, and the officers agreed. At the Walker hearing, psychiatric testimony
was adduced that defendant suffers from mental retardation of a mild or moderate degree, dislikes and
fears the police, and would not have considered himself free to leave even though the objective, external
indicia were that defendant was not, in fact, in custody.
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The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, as well as Article 1, § 17, of the
Michigan Constitution of 1963, protects defendants from compelled self-incrimination. Thus, Miranda
warnings are not required to be given unless a defendant is interrogated while in police custody or
otherwise deprived of freedom of action. In evaluating a question of custodial interrogation, we look to
the totality of the circumstances, with the key question being whether the defendant reasonably believed
that he was not free to leave. Hill, supra at 399; Mendez, supra at 382-383. The objective
circumstances of the interrogation are considered, not the subjective views harbored by either the
interrogating officers or the person being questioned. Stansbury v California, 511 US 318; 114 S Ct
1526; 128 L Ed 2d 293 (1994). However, a defendant’s subjective beliefs or feelings that are
outwardly manifested may be relevant only to the extent they influenced the objective conditions
surrounding the interrogation. Id.
Here, defendant was permitted to decline to be interviewed at police headquarters or otherwise
to accompany the officers away from his home, he freely submitted to an interview in his home, and
when the interview was concluded the officers did not take him into custody, despite his confession, but
left his home and went to the prosecutor to present their case. Defendant’s subjective dislike and fear
of the police—which were not outwardly manifested—does not change these facts, and, given
defendant’s past criminal record, we find this attitude to be expected. Defendant was not in custody
and, therefore, Miranda warnings were not a prerequisite to the admissibility of his confession.
Defendant next argues that his mental retardation rendered any statements involuntary under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We disagree. Although a defendant’s mental
condition is certainly relevant to a determination of his susceptibility to police coercion, mere
examination of the defendant’s subjective state of mind can never conclude the due process inquiry.
Colorado v Connelly, 479 US 157, 163-165; 107 S Ct 515; 93 L Ed 2d 473 (1986). A showing of
police coercion must also be made before a confession will be suppressed as involuntary. Id. Here,
even defendant’s expert witness admitted that coercion was not present, and our review of the
interrogation transcript likewise reveals no such conduct on the part of the investigating officers. See
Purvis v Dugger, 932 F2d 1413, 1422 (CA 11, 1991) (confession was voluntary where the defendant
had a history of schizophrenia, was susceptible to authority figures, and had a childlike mentality, but
where no evidence of police coercion was shown); United States v Macklin, 900 F2d 948, 951-952
(CA 6, 1990) (the defendants’ confessions were voluntary where one defendant was “mildly mentally
retarded” and the other was “borderline mentally retarded,” but where no evidence of police coercion
was shown).
Defendant’s reliance on People v Garwood, 205 Mich App 553; 517 NW2d 843 (1994), is
misplaced, as Garwood simply recognized the distinction between the voluntariness of the statement
itself and whether the waiver of requisite Miranda rights was made voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently. Since it has already been determined that defendant was not in custody, and therefore
Miranda warnings were not required, the question whether his Miranda rights were voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently waived simply does not arise, and Garwood is inapposite. Accordingly, we
conclude that defendant’s confession was voluntary. People v Robinson, 386 Mich 551, 558; 194
NW2d 709 (1972).
Affirmed.
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/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
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