RANDIE K BLACK V SUCECEIDIA GREGORY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
RANDIE K. BLACK,
UNPUBLISHED
March 10, 1998
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 193539
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 95-080524-CZ
SUCECEIDIA GREGORY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: MacKenzie, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr. and Saad, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right an order granting plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). We affirm.
In July, 1993, plaintiff agreed to represent defendant in a civil service arbitration proceeding and
a circuit court employment discrimination case. Defendant signed a fee agreement providing that the
arbitration case would be billed at $125 per hour. Plaintiff represented defendant in the arbitration
which resulted in defendant being reinstated to her previous employment with back pay, benefits, and
restored seniority. At the conclusion of the arbitration proceeding, plaintiff billed defendant for fees and
costs exceeding $33,000 and defendant refused to pay plaintiff’s bill. Consequently, plaintiff filed suit to
collect her fees and costs, and plaintiff then moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(10). Plaintiff provided a copy of the fee argument in support of the motion. The trial court
granted plaintiff’s motion.
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(10) because there were genuine issues of material fact. We disagree. A trial court’s
determination of a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo on appeal. Pickney Comm
Schools v Continental Cas’lty Co, 213 Mich App 521, 525; 540 NW2d 728 (1995).
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition because the fee
agreement was ambiguous as to the meaning of the word “arbitration.” We disagree. The fee
agreement provided detailed information regarding the incident for which plaintiff’s services were being
retained, so the word “arbitration” is not ambiguous in this context. Because the agreement was not
-1
ambiguous, defendant was informed of what was being billed at the hourly rate as evidenced by her
signature on the contract.
Further, defendant failed to timely present evidence to support her contention that she did not
have capacity to enter into a contract. On October 17, 1995, one day before the hearing on the motion
for summary disposition, defendant attempted to produce evidence of her incapacity through a letter
from her physician dated December 14, 1993. However, the trial court ruled that the evidence was
inadmissible because it had not been filed in a timely fashion. Considering defendant’s history of
noncompliance with the court rules, and her failure to properly support her defense of incapacity within
the time proscribed by court rule MCR 2.116(G)(1)(a)(ii), the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
not considering defendant’s untimely documentary evidence. See Prussing v General Motors Corp,
403 Mich 366, 370; 269 NW2d 181 (1978). Without admissible evidence to support defendant’s
theory of incapacity, the contract’s validity was uncontroverted. Cox v Dearborn Hts, 210 Mich App
389, 398; 534 NW2d 135 (1995).
Finally, defendant failed to present evidence to support her argument that plaintiff’s fee was per
se unreasonable. Pursuant to MCR 2.116(G)(4), defendant may not rest upon mere allegation in the
face of a motion for summary disposition, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial. Because defendant failed to present evidence to support her position, a genuine issue of
material fact does not exist. The trial court did not err in refusing to permit defendant to amend her
complaint.
Affirmed.
/s/ Barbara B. MacKenzie
/s/ Donald L. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Henry William Saad
-2
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
