IN RE EST OF ARTHUR GRAY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
GARY ALBERTS,
UNPUBLISHED
February 27, 1998
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 196666
Manistee Probate Court
LC No. 96-000039-IE
ESTATE OF ARTHUR GRAY, Deceased,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Gribbs, P.J., and Murphy and Gage, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from a probate court order denying his petition to set aside the will of
his brother, Arthur Gray. The probate court found that plaintiff’s procedural due process rights were
not violated even though the will was admitted to probate without notice to plaintiff, that the will was
properly executed, that the intended personal representative was appointed, that the intended
disposition of the residuary estate was sufficiently clear, that plaintiff failed to establish that the decedent
was mentally incompetent at the time of execution, and that the will was properly validated with
testimony from the decedent’s attorney. We affirm.
Plaintiff first argues that he was not notified of the proceeding at which the decedent’s will was
admitted to probate, thereby denying him his procedural due process rights as guaranteed by the United
States Constitution. After reviewing plaintiff’s constitutional claim de novo, we disagree. People v
Pitts, 222 Mich App 260, 263; 564 NW2d 93 (1997). The fundamental requirement of procedural
due process is "the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." In re KB,
221 Mich App 414, 419; 562 NW2d 208 (1997), quoting Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319, 333;
96 S Ct 893; 47 L Ed 2d 18 (1976). Here, although plaintiff was not afforded actual notice, he had a
meaningful opportunity to be heard. Plaintiff filed a petition to set aside the will and a hearing was held
on his petition, with all interested parties represented. The fundamental requirement of procedural due
process was accomplished in that plaintiff was given “an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner.” This proceeding allowed him to raise the same objections to the will that
he would have been able to raise at the initial proceeding. Moreover, plaintiff’s argument that he was
prejudiced by the procedures of the latter proceeding is totally without merit. At this proceeding, as
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well as the initial proceeding, the proponents of the will had the burden of establishing proper execution,
at which point the burden shifted to plaintiff, as the will contestant, to establish by a preponderance of
the evidence that the will should not have been admitted to probate. In re McIntyre Estate, 355 Mich
238, 247-248; 94 NW2d 208 (1959).
Plaintiff next argues that the probate court erred in denying his petition because the will was not
properly witnessed. We disagree. In order to prove proper execution, the Revised Probate Code
requires only the testimony of one of the subscribing witnesses. MCL 700.147; MSA 27.5147. In the
present case, both attesting witnesses testified as to the decedent’s signature. Plaintiff argues that one of
the witness’ testimony, suggesting that she may have left the room momentarily during the execution,
invalidated the will. However, the will was signed in three places and the witness did testify to the
attestation of two of the three signatures. Valid execution requires no more than one witnessed
signature. MCL 700.122(1); MSA 27.5122(1).
Plaintiff also argues that the execution was improper because the decedent did not state to one
of the witnesses that the document he was signing was indeed his will. In short, plaintiff claims that the
failure of the decedent to publish his will invalidated it. However, publication of a will is not a
requirement under Michigan law. In re Fowle's Estate, 292 Mich 500, 504-505; 290 NW 883
(1940). Therefore, plaintiff’s claim of error in this regard is meritless.
Plaintiff also argues that the probate court erred in denying his petition because he introduced
evidence to establish that the signature on the will was not that of the decedent. During the proceedings,
plaintiff testified that he did not believe the signature was authentic based on his personal opinion after
comparing it to handwriting contained on various holiday greeting cards and an affidavit. Plaintiff,
however, failed to rebut the prima facie evidence of due execution provided by the proponents of the
will, which consisted of the sworn testimony of the two attesting witnesses who stated that it was his
signature. Therefore, we find no error.
Plaintiff next argues that the probate court erred when it appointed Myrtle Gernentz to be the
personal representative because the will designated “Myrtle Gerbnentz” as the intended personal
representative Again, we disagree. In the interpretation of wills, it is paramount to ascertain and give
effect to the intent of the testator. In re Kremlick Estate, 417 Mich 237, 240; 331 NW2d 228
(1983). This intent should be discovered from the will itself unless an ambiguity exists, in which case the
court looks outside the four corners of the will and may consider parol evidence and rules of
construction. Id. Parol evidence introduced at the proceeding clarified the latent ambiguity created by
the spelling of the designated personal representative’s name. First, plaintiff testified that the decedent
had only three surviving siblings, one of whom was Myrtle Gernentz. Clause four of the will, which
appoints the personal representative, designates “my sister, Myrtle Gerbnentz.” Second, the
decedent’s attorney testified that the ambiguity was the result of a typographical error. Finally, as
correctly observed by the probate court, no other person came forward and claimed to be Myrtle
Gerbnentz so as to call into question whether two reasonable interpretations of the clause in fact existed.
Therefore, the court correctly appointed Myrtle Gernentz to be the personal representative even though
the will designated “Myrtle Gerbnentz.”
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Plaintiff next argues that the probate court erred in admitting the will to probate because the
clause that attempts to dispose of the residuary estate does not contain words of disposition and
therefore, plaintiff maintains, the residuary estate should pass to the decedent’s heirs by intestacy. We
disagree. Again, the cardinal rule in will cases is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the testator.
In re Bair Estate, 128 Mich App 713, 716; 341 NW2d 188 (1983). Moreover, where the will is
reasonably susceptible of more than one construction, there is a presumption in favor of testacy over
intestate succession. In re Charlton Estate, 9 Mich App 625, 630; 157 NW2d 821 (1967). In the
present case, plaintiff’s position appears to contradict the clear intention of the testator. First, all the
language in the residuary clause suggests that the testator intended to divide this portion of the estate
between his sisters. The omission of the word “to” was an apparent typographical error that did not
create any genuine confusion regarding the testator’s intent. Second, even if there was an ambiguity as
to the disposition of the residual estate to the testator’s sisters, the next statement in the residuary clause
clarifies any ambiguity vis-à-vis plaintiff because it expressly disinherits him. Finally, plaintiff offers no
evidence, except the error in the text of the will, to overcome the presumption of testacy. Therefore, the
probate court correctly interpreted the residuary clause as a valid transfer clause.
Next, plaintiff argues that the probate court erred in finding that the testator possessed
testamentary capacity. Again, we disagree. The Revised Probate Code requires that in order to
execute a valid will a person must be “of sound mind.” MCL 700.121; MSA 27.5121. This standard
has been held to require that at the time of the making of the will, the testator must have sufficient mental
capacity to (1) comprehend the nature and extent of his property; (2) recall the natural objects of his
bounty; and (3) determine and understand the disposition of his property. In re Vollbrecht Estate, 26
Mich App 430, 434; 182 NW2d 609 (1970). The burden of establishing lack of testamentary capacity
rests upon the will contestants. Id. Plaintiff attempted to meet his burden of proof by offering the death
certificate, which indicated that the testator suffered from various physical conditions, and by offering his
own testimony, which suggested that the testator suffered from an inability to control his bowels,
memory loss, and episodes of confusion. Plaintiff offered no evidence to suggest that the decedent did
not comprehend the nature of his property or the objects of his bounty. The evidence he did bring forth
was insufficient to establish a lack of testamentary capacity on the part of the decedent. First, it should
be evident that physical illness alone does not affect the validity of a will unless symptoms of that illness
cause mental incompetency. In re Aylward's Estate, 243 Mich 9, 17; 219 NW 697 (1928). Second,
the Michigan Supreme Court has held that “instances of forgetfulness [and] habits of untidiness
increasing with advancing years . . . afford no evidence of lack of testamentary capacity.” In re Grow's
Estate, 299 Mich 133, 138; 299 NW 836 (1941). Finally, the proponents of the will offered evidence
that the decedent was aware of his monthly expenses, comprehended the nature of his property to the
extent that he obtained a judgment against plaintiff, and recognized the objects of his bounty as
evidenced by his specific devises to his sisters and more importantly to this dispute, his express
disinheritance of plaintiff. In light of this evidence, the probate court was correct in finding that the
testator was mentally competent when he executed his will.
Finally, plaintiff argues that the probate court erred in allowing the decedent’s attorney to testify
as to the intentions of the decedent because his testimony violated the “Dead Man Statute,” MCL
600.2166; MSA 27A.2166, and also breached the attorney-client privilege by divulging conversations
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without the decedent’s consent. As plaintiff did not present this specific objection at the probate court
proceeding, we need not address it because this issue is unpreserved for
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appeal. Tringali v Lal, 164 Mich App 299, 306; 416 NW2d 117 (1987). In any case, we find
plaintiff’s claim in this regard meritless.
Affirmed.
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
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