PROPERTY OWNERS RIGHTS V CENTERLINE OF CALHOUN CO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
THE PROPERTY OWNERS’ RIGHTS
ASSOCIATION (PORA),
UNPUBLISHED
February 6, 1998
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
CENTERLINE OF CALHOUN COUNTY, INC.,
No. 198305
Calhoun Circuit Court
LC No. 96-000645 CZ
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: White, P.J., and Cavanagh and Reilly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff Property Owners’ Rights Association (PORA) appeals as of right the dismissal of its
complaint brought under the Michigan Environmental Protection Act (“MEPA”), MCL 324.1701 et
seq.; MSA 13A.1701 et seq.,1 and the award of taxable costs to defendant. We affirm.
Defendant, formerly known as the Battle Creek Gun Club, purchased a 154-acre parcel in
Convis Township, Calhoun County and planned to construct a shooting complex called “Centerline.”
Before the complex was completed, plaintiff filed a complaint for injunctive relief and motion for
temporary restraining order, alleging that defendant’s operation of the shooting range would violate
MEPA, because the lead (Pb) found in gun shot would pollute and/or impair the environment.2
Shooting began at Centerline in June 1996, including trap, skeet, and sporting clay shooting, as well as
archery. Defendant’s plans also provided for a rifle and pistol range. Following a bench trial held over
two days in June and July 1996, the court found that plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that Centerline’s operation was likely to pollute or impair the environment. The trial court
entered orders dismissing plaintiff’s case on the merits and awarding defendant taxable costs in the
amount of $5,474.50. This appeal ensued.
I
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred in finding that dispersal of tons of lead on
defendant’s shooting complex was not likely to pollute or impair the environment in violation of
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MEPA. This Court reviews actions brought under MEPA de novo. Trout Unlimited, MuskegonWhite River Chapter v City of White Cloud (After Remand), 209 Mich App 452, 456; 532 NW2d
192 (1995). However, a trial court’s findings of facts should not be overturned unless they are clearly
erroneous or unless this Court is convinced that it would have reached a different result. Id.
Under MEPA, the attorney general or any person or entity may seek equitable or declaratory
relief to protect the air, water, and other natural resources from pollution, impairment or destruction.
MCL 324.1701(1); MSA 13A.1701(1). To sustain a MEPA claim, the plaintiff must make a prima
facie showing that the conduct of the defendant has polluted, impaired or destroyed, or is likely to
pollute, impair or destroy, the air, water, or other natural resources. MCL 324.1703(1); MSA
13A.1703(1). Wortelboer v Benzie Co, 212 Mich App 208, 220; 537 NW2d 603 (1995). In order
to determine whether a plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the court must consider whether the
effect of the activity on the environment has risen or will rise to the level of an impairment or destruction
of a natural resource so as to constitute an environmental risk and justify the court’s injunction. Id.;
Dafter Sanitary Landfill v Superior Sanitation Service, Inc, 198 Mich App 499, 504; 499 NW2d
383 (1993). Once a prima facie case has been established, the defendant may rebut the prima facie
showing by submission of evidence to the contrary. MCL 324.1703(1); MSA 13A.1703(1).
Plaintiff’s case relied largely on the testimony of its expert, William Henderson, a geologist with
expertise in environmental contamination and site assessment. Henderson testified that lead is a
pollutant whose levels in air, water and food are regulated by the state and federal government. He
testified that if lead is introduced into the environment and reacts with the soil or water, causing lead
levels to exceed Michigan Department of Environmental Quality criteria, the site would be considered
polluted. Henderson testified that he visited the shooting stations and shot fall areas of the shooting
complex and concluded that lead shot was going to collect in certain low lying areas of the site.
Henderson believed that water would also collect in those low lying areas, which would increase the
potential for oxidation and leaching. However, Henderson testified that lead oxidizing in the
environment is dependent on a few major conditions, like the pH of the soil, reactions with other
chemicals present in the soil, and the water saturation within the soil, and that he did not take any soil
samples at Centerline to determine whether such conditions existed, because he did not realize he had
authority to do so.
Henderson also inspected one shot-fall area located on the side of a hill, which he believed was
near a wetland area. He testified that when a shot fall area is located on a slope, surface erosion or
runoff could also cause movement of lead-contaminated sediment into a nearby wetland area. Based on
the water log from one of the properties adjacent to Centerline, Henderson had a general concern that
the water table was fairly high and, thus, the lead was more likely to leach into the water supply.
Henderson testified that lead could also get into a powder form that could be transported by the wind.
At the conclusion of the first day of trial, plaintiff’s counsel stated that he understood that
defendant had taken soil samples the previous weekend, that he had not seen the data, and that it may
be necessary to continue his examination of Henderson. When trial resumed about six weeks later,
plaintiff’s counsel did not further examine Henderson, other than on re-direct.
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Henderson testified on cross-examination:
Q: Mr. Henderson, is it your testimony that lead shot collected in certain areas on the
site could pollute the environment?
A: They have the possibility to do that.
Q: What do you base that conclusion on?
A: There would certainly have to be some environmental conditions to be present. If
lead is introduced into the environment and reacts with the soil or water in the
environment, and those levels exceed the state criteria, then they would pollute the
environment.
Q: Is it your testimony that that will be the situation at Centerline?
A: I think that you would need further information to make a statement such as you
have where you said it will be. I think it’s a possibility or a likelihood that it could
occur.
***
Q: Mr. Henderson, you are a geologist, you have been qualified as an expert in
geology. Will in your opinion lead leach at Centerline?
A: I will state again, I gave you specific parameters or tests that can be conducted that
will assist you in determining whether lead will leach, or if the potential is there, and I
have not conducted any testing or evaluation of that to tell you specifically whether it will
leach at this particular site or if it will be more favorable to leach at a specific location on
this particular site . . .
Following Henderson’s testimony, plaintiff rested and defendant moved for involuntary dismissal
of plaintiff’s claim for failure to present a prima facie case of a MEPA violation. The trial court denied
defendant’s motion and permitted plaintiff to reopen its proofs. Plaintiff then read into evidence various
responses of defendant to discovery.
Defendant presented testimony that Centerline was built pursuant to nineteen local, state and
federal permits and that the Department of Natural Resources had assisted defendant in determining that
the site was viable and determined that none of the shot fall zones were located in wetlands. The
township issued defendant a special use permit that restricted hours of operation to three days a week
and precluded the use of fully automatic weapons. Defendant’s president testified that, assuming that
Centerline reaches a membership of 400, sixteen tons of shot would be dropped a year. He testified
that the lead on the site would be reclaimed after sixty tons of shot had been dropped, and that twenty
percent of it would not be recoverable.
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Defendant’s expert in soil chemistry, Dr. Stephen Boyd, testified that lead is considered to be
the least mobile heavy metal in soils, is very unlikely to leach in soils, and that lead shot, owing to its high
density, is unlikely to erode substantially. Dr. Boyd opined that lead shot is unlikely to impair the
environment, including ground water and drinking water, because lead shot, being big particles, would
“stay put” because there are not big channels or holes within the soil for them to migrate. Dr. Boyd
further testified that lead compounds are very immobile because they bind tenaciously to soil
components such as clays, oxides, and soil organic matter, and also because they form very insoluble
precipitates, which means they do not dissolve in water. Dr. Boyd testified that lead could, to the extent
that the lead metal weathers or oxidizes into lead compounds, become mixed with the soil and be
present in dust, but that the level of vegetation on the site would diminish greatly the likelihood of such
dust migrating. Dr. Boyd testified that the reclamation process described above was a good idea and
would minimize the likelihood of environmental threat.
Plaintiff argues that pollution occurs when the substance enters the environment, i.e., when the
lead shot falls on the land, and that in determining whether a prima facie case has been established under
MEPA, there is no threshold requirement for the amount or degree of pollution or impairment caused by
a toxic substance. Plaintiff argues that it need not show certain harm, but only need show probable
harm.3
Assuming that plaintiff need only establish probable harm to the environment, we nonetheless
conclude that the trial court did not err in concluding that plaintiff failed to make such a showing.
Henderson did not conduct site-specific tests and testified that there was only a possibility that the lead
contamination of the soil and water resources in and around the complex could reach unacceptable
levels. Assuming plaintiff presented a prima facie case, the contrary testimony of defendant’s expert,
Dr. Boyd, was sufficient to rebut plaintiff’s showing.
We conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that plaintiff failed to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that defendant was likely to pollute or impair the environment.4
II
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in taxing costs against plaintiff in the
amount of $5,474.50,5 fifty dollars of which were awarded as “nominal attorney fees.” Plaintiff argues
that the award of costs to defendant is contrary to public policy because plaintiff raised a novel public
issue and the award will have a severe chilling effect on future citizen actions to protect the environment.
This Court reviews the trial court’s award of costs under MEPA for abuse of discretion.
Dafter Twp v Reid, 131 Mich App 283, 289; 345 NW2d 689 (1983). MEPA provides that “costs
may be apportioned to the parties if the interest of justice requires.” MCL 324.1703(3); MSA
13A.1701(3). Although this Court frequently refuses to award costs in cases involving public questions,
a trial court’s award of such costs is not per se an abuse of discretion. Village Green v Board of
Water, 145 Mich App 379, 395; 377 NW2d 401 (1985). In Taxpayers v Highway Dep’t, 70 Mich
App 385, 389; 245 NW2d 761 (1976), this Court noted that all suits under MEPA inevitably involve
public questions and that the policy of Michigan’s appellate courts to deny costs in public question cases
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is superseded by MEPA’s provision allowing costs to be apportioned if justice requires. We are unable
to conclude, and plaintiff has cited no authority which supports, that the trial court abused its discretion
in awarding defendant costs under the circumstances presented here.6
Affirmed.
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Maureen Pulte Reilly
1
The prior MEPA statute, MCL 691.1201 et seq; MSA 14.528(201) et seq., was repealed by the
Legislature and recodified in 1994 in the same, or substantially the same form, within the larger
framework of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act (“NREPA”), MCL 324.1701
et seq.; MSA 13A.1701 et seq.
2
Plaintiff’s complaint also alleged that the range would be in violation of the Wetland Protection Act
(“WPA”), MCL 324.30301 et seq.; MSA 13A.30301 et seq., because lead would be disseminated
directly or indirectly onto adjacent wetland areas. Plaintiff’s WPA claim was dismissed at the beginning
of the bench trial, with plaintiff’s counsel noting that he had no objection to the dismissal of the count
provided that “it’s clearly understood that the scope of this [order of dismissal] is to the wetlands count
and the application of the Wetlands Protection Act and that it in no way limits our ability to argue under
MEPA that wetlands are an element of the environment that require protection.”
3
Plaintiff’s argument is supported by Ray v Mason Cty Drain Comm’r, 393 Mich 294, 309; 224
NW2d 883 (1975) (noting that in order to find a prima facie case of pollution, the trial judge must find
that the defendant’s conduct has, or is likely to pollute, impair or destroy the air, water or other natural
resources, and that such a showing is not restricted to actual environmental degradation but also
encompasses probable damage to the environment); Michigan United Conservation Clubs v
Anthony, 90 Mich App 99, 105, 109; 280 NW2d 883 (1979) (probable impairment of Great Lakes
trout population establishes prima facie case); and see also ICLE, Michigan Environmental Law
Deskbook, §§ 2.17 - 2.24, pp 2-12 to 2-19.
4
Plaintiff also argues that defendant was in violation of certain provisions of the environmental
remediation and hazardous waste portions of the Natural Resources Environmental Protection Act,
MCL 324.101 et seq.; MSA 13A.101 et seq., and that those violations constitute “per se” violations
of MEPA. Plaintiff did not litigate this claim below, therefore it is not preserved. Adam v Sylvan
Glynn Golf Course, 197 Mich App 95, 98; 494 NW2d 791 (1992).
5
Defendant submitted a bill of costs for $10,287.78. Plaintiff objected and the trial court ultimately
entered an order taxing costs in the amount of $5,474.50, which included attorney fees of $50, a trial
fee of $30, a lay witness fee of $27.40, an expert witness fee for Dr. Boyd of $3,712.50, and an expert
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witness fee for Richard Moore of $1,655. Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration on the issue of
costs, which the trial court denied.
6
Plaintiff failed to cite any authority, and we are aware of none, for its argument that costs should be
denied defendant because the Michigan United Conservation Clubs paid the defense costs in this case.
We thus decline to address this argument, Davenport v Grosse Pointe Farms Bd of Zoning Appeals,
210 Mich App 400, 405; 534 NW2d 143 (1995), beyond noting that plaintiff did not rebut that
defendant pays dues to MUCC in return for services such as those provided in this litigation.
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