PEOPLE OF MI V CHARLES WILLIAM LINDELL
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 23, 1998
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 179471
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 94-067351-FH
CHARLES WILLIAM LINDELL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: MacKenzie, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr., and Saad, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of two counts of uttering and publishing, MCL 750.249;
MSA 28.446, and subsequently pleaded guilty as an habitual offender, fourth offense, MCL 769.12;
MSA 28.1084. He was sentenced to serve an enhanced prison term of five to twenty-five years. He
appeals by right and we affirm.
Defendant first argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial. To establish
such a claim, the defendant has the burden of showing that counsel’s performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a reasonable probability that but for the
unprofessional errors the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. People v Mitchell,
454 Mich 145, 157-158; 560 NW2d 600 (1997); People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 312; 521
NW2d 797 (1994). In applying this test, we indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Mitchell, supra at 156.
Here, defendant has failed to establish that trial counsel committed any errors so objectively
unreasonable that they deprived defendant of a fair trial. Defendant first submits that counsel’s failure to
call witnesses proposed by defendant constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Ineffective
assistance of counsel can take the form of failure to call witnesses only if the failure deprives the
defendant of a substantial defense. People v Hyland, 212 Mich App 701, 710; 538 NW2d 465
(1995), vacated in part on other grounds 453 Mich 902 (1996). Counsel’s failure to call witnesses is
presumed to be trial strategy. Mitchell, supra at 163. At a hearing on defendant’s first motion for a
new trial, counsel testified that defendant did not provide him with addresses of the proposed witnesses,
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only sketchy information regarding where they lived or spent their time. Nonetheless, counsel stated
that he searched for the witnesses and left notes at the various locations mentioned by defendant, but
still could not secure any of the witnesses to testify. Counsel further testified that he did not believe any
of defendant’s witnesses could offer testimony helpful to defendant because none of the testimony
defendant alleged these witnesses would provide would establish that defendant never had an
opportunity to steal Smith’s checks, and some of the testimony related to events occurring after the date
of defendant’s charged offenses and therefore was irrelevant. Defendant testified to the contrary, but
the trial court specifically found that defendant lacked credibility. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial
court correctly determined that counsel’s failure to call the proposed witnesses did not deprive
defendant of a substantial defense, and thus did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
Defendant also failed to establish that counsel’s failure to call defendant to testify constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel. Counsel testified that he did not want defendant to take the witness
stand because he believed, based on Smith’s inconsistent testimony, that reasonable doubt existed
regarding whether defendant intended to defraud Smith, and he also believed that impeachment of
defendant with his prior convictions would damage his case. Counsel thus reached the strategic
conclusion that defendant should not testify. Accordingly, because defendant has not overcome the
presumption that counsel’s strategic decisions were sound, Mitchell, supra at 145, we conclude that
the trial court properly found that defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel on this basis.
Defendant also failed to show that counsel’s failure to object to leading questions by the
prosecutor, hearsay statements, and unresponsive answers constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
Counsel testified that his failure to object at every opportunity was based on his belief that numerous
objections might have prevented the jury from properly hearing and understanding the case or created
hostility toward defendant if the jurors began to feel that counsel was misleading them or preventing
them from hearing particular information, and that raising an objection sometimes has the effect of
highlighting certain objectionable evidence. Counsel thus refrained from objecting as a matter of trial
strategy. Mitchell, supra. Accordingly, the trial court correctly held that counsel was not ineffective on
this basis.
Defendant also failed to establish that counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the
prosecutor’s introduction of evidence regarding defendant’s January 31, 1994, presentation of another
of Smith’s checks that defendant had filled out to cash. Counsel testified that, as a matter of trial
strategy, he refrained from objecting to this testimony because he believed that the specific testimony
regarding this uncharged other act would help defendant in casting doubt on the prosecution’s case. At
the same time defendant was confronted about this check, two other people in the bank also possessed
checks drawn on Smith’s account, and defendant had told bank officials when they confronted him that
Smith had authorized him to write the January 31, 1994, check. Counsel thought that some of this
testimony would support the defense theory that Smith often authorized defendant to write checks
drawn on Smith’s account. Accordingly, the trial court correctly ruled that counsel’s decision not to
object to the testimony constituted reasonable trial strategy, and therefore counsel was not ineffective on
this basis.
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Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to permit counsel to
withdraw and to appoint new counsel after the attorney-client relationship between counsel and
defendant had broken down. We disagree. An indigent defendant is not entitled to the counsel of his
choice. Rather, he is entitled only to representation by counsel who performs at least as well as a
lawyer with ordinary training and skill in the criminal law. People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212
NW2d 922 (1973); People v Bradley, 54 Mich App 89, 95; 220 NW2d 305 (1974). The decision
to order substitution of counsel is within the sound discretion of the trial court, upon a showing of good
cause and that the substitution will not disrupt the judicial process. See People v Mack, 190 Mich App
7, 14; 475 NW2d 830 (1991). Here, defendant’s arguments in support of substitute counsel were
found by the trial court to be inadequate, and, as discussed above, we have found no error in that
determination. Thus, defendant has not established prejudice because of the trial court’s refusal to
order substitute counsel. See People v Gendron, 144 Mich App 509, 523; 376 NW2d 143 (1985).
In addition, substitution of counsel on the day of trial would have significantly disrupted the judicial
process by requiring an adjournment in order to permit new counsel to become familiar with the case.
People v Johnson, 144 Mich App 125, 135; 373 NW2d 263 (1985). Accordingly, we find no abuse
of discretion by the trial court in refusing to order substitution of counsel.
Finally, defendant alleges that the trial court failed to follow the proper sentencing procedure as
established by the 1994 amendment to the habitual offender statute. Defendant’s appeal brief states:
“The statute has been procedurally amended relative to convictions occurring after May 1, 1994, to
eliminate the conviction process.” This is inaccurate; 1994 PA 110 expressly provides that the
amendment “shall apply to prosecutions for criminal offenses committed on or after [May 1, 1994].”
Thus, because defendant committed these offenses in January 1994, the trial court properly imposed a
single, enhanced sentence, in accordance with the pre-amendment statute.
Affirmed.
/s/ Barbara B. MacKenzie
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Henry William Saad
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