PEOPLE OF MI V ROBERT LINDSEY EUBANKS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 30, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 196299
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 93-061468-FH
ROBERT LINDSEY EUBANKS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Corrigan, C.J., and Doctoroff and Fitzgerald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right his convictions of delivery of less than fifty grams cocaine, MCL
333.7401(2)(a)(iv); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(iv), and conspiracy to deliver the same, MCL 750.157a;
MSA 28.354(1). The trial court sentenced defendant to consecutive terms of five to twenty years’
imprisonment. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charges on
the ground that he was denied due process and a speedy trial by the twenty eight month delay between
the offenses and his arrest. The threshold question in deciding whether a delay constitutes a denial of
due process is whether the defendant suffered prejudice. People v Reddish, 181 Mich App 625, 627;
450 NW2d 16 (1989). Once the defendant shows prejudice, the prosecution must demonstrate
sufficient reasons to justify the delay. Id. This Court gives considerable deference to the trial court’s
determination whether the police exercised diligence in arresting the defendant. See Doggett v United
States, 505 US 647, 652; 112 S Ct 2686; 120 L Ed 2d 520 (1992).
In this case, the trial court correctly noted that the twenty-eight month delay was presumptively
prejudicial. See People v Simpson, 207 Mich App 560, 563; 526 NW2d 33 (1994); Doggett, supra
at 652 n 1. The court also correctly concluded that defendant met the threshold requirement of
demonstrating prejudice because a material witness died shortly before defendant’s arrest. Reddish,
supra at 627. The court then thoroughly reviewed the evidence and determined that the police made
diligent efforts to locate defendant. The court stated:
-1
I’m satisfied in this case that the government did in fact make diligent inquiry as
Doggett defines it. Mr. Eubanks’ residence was visited three times in the period of a
month, soon after the warrant was issued. He wasn’t there.
The house where he lived was watched by various police officers over the next
year, plus. He was not found to be there.
Search warrants were actually used in an effort to locate him elsewhere. They
were unsuccessful.
Thereafter, more inquiries were made and more surveillance was conducted.
The truth of the matter is that for the entire time that this warrant was outstanding, efforts
of varying degrees were being made by the police to locate Mr. Eubanks.
The court further found that defendant was responsible for the delay because he hid from the police
after learning that the police were looking for him. Therefore, the court concluded that the delay was
attributable to defendant’s actions in avoiding capture.
We agree with the trial court that the police diligently sought to arrest defendant, but were
hindered by defendant’s efforts to avoid capture, including changing his appearance by losing 80 to 100
lbs. Narcotics officers justifiably delayed in arresting defendant after the offense because they could not
compromise their ongoing investigation. That other officers arrested defendant on an unrelated
misdemeanor charge five days after the court issued a warrant for the instant offenses is of no
consequence. Those officers were not aware of the instant warrant because the narcotics officers
appropriately delayed entering it in the LEIN until after they closed their investigation a month later.
Defendant’s girlfriend thwarted the officers’ subsequent attempts to locate defendant at his residence by
informing defendant that the police were looking for him. Thereafter, the narcotics officers referred the
matter to the “fugitive team,” who did not begin searching for defendant in earnest until more than
eighteen months later. During the interim, however, the narcotics officers themselves continued to
search for defendant.
The trial court properly assessed the corporate efforts of the police department, not just the
internal divisions, in determining whether the police exercised diligence in arresting defendant. Members
of the department continuously searched for defendant from the close of the investigation until
defendant’s arrest over two years later. In the end, patrol officers arrested defendant during a routine
traffic stop. Defendant supplied a false name, and the officers had to confirm defendant’s identity
through thumbprint analysis because he had lost so much weight that they could not identify him solely
on the basis of a prior mug shot. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion
because the police diligently searched for defendant but defendant hindered their efforts by altering his
appearance in an effort to avoid capture.
Defendant next contends that his consecutive sentences for conspiracy and the substantive drug
offense violate double jeopardy. Our Supreme Court recently answered this question in the negative.
-2
People v Denio, 454 Mich 691, 705-706; 564 NW2d 13 (1997). Accordingly, we affirm the
sentences.
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred in scoring Offense Variables 8 and 9.
Defendant does not state a cognizable claim on appeal because he merely attacks the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the trial court’s scoring decision. People v Mitchell, 454 Mich 145, 177-178;
560 NW2d 600 (1997).
Affirmed.
/s/ Maura D. Corrigan
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
-3
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.