MARGARET MORRISON V FORD MOTOR COMPANY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MARGARET MORRISON,
UNPUBLISHED
December 23, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 199079
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 95-523103-CZ
FORD MOTOR COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Michael J. Kelly, P.J., and Cavanagh and N. J. Lambros*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court order granting defendant’s motion for summary
disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) in this employment discrimination case. We affirm.
Plaintiff and her husband, Vance Morrison (Morrison), were both employed by defendant at its
Sheldon Road plant. In late 1993 and early 1994, the couple experienced marital problems, and
plaintiff began a relationship with Sam Scott, a supervisor at the Sheldon Road plant. In January 1995,
three Ford employees were killed at the Sheldon Road plant after one member of a lovers’ triangle
killed the other two and then turned the gun on himself. After other employees expressed concern that
the relationship between plaintiff, Morrison, and Scott might prove similarly volatile, plaintiff and Scott
were both transferred. Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit, claiming that she was given an unfavorable
transfer because of her sex and marital status in violation of the Civil Rights Act (CRA), MCL 37.2101
et seq.; MSA 3.548 (101) et seq.
On appeal, an order granting or denying summary disposition is reviewed de novo. A motion
for summary disposition may be granted pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) when, except as to the amount
of damages, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the nonmovant, the trial court must determine
whether a record might be developed that would leave open an i sue upon which reasonable minds
s
might differ. Moore v First Security Casualty Co, 224 Mich App 370, 375; 568 NW2d 841 (1997).
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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I
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in finding that she failed to create a genuine factual
dispute with respect to a prima facie claim of disparate treatment under the CRA. We disagree.
To prove disparate treatment, a plaintiff must show that she was a member of the class entitled to
protection under the act and that she was treated differently than persons of a different class for the same or similar
conduct. Meagher v Wayne State Univ , 222 Mich App 700, 709; 565 NW2d 401 (1997). After a prima facie case is made
out by the plaintiff, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, non
discriminatory reason for its actions. If the defendant meets this burden of production, the plaintiff must prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reason offered by the defendant was a mere pretext. Id . at 711.
In this case, plaintiff has not demonstrated that she was treated differently than similarly situated
male or single coemployees. First, plaintiff attempts to compare herself to three other supervisors who
received death threats but were not transferred or demoted; instead, defendant discharged or
suspended the employees who made the threats. Plaintiff contends that, like these three individuals, she
should have been allowed to retain her position. We find, however, that plaintiff was not similarly
situated to these three supervisors. Morrison, unlike the other employees, did not make any overt
threats, and defendant therefore had no basis to take any action against him.
Plaintiff next contends that she was treated differently than Morrison because he was allowed to
remain in his position at the Sheldon Road Plant. However, plaintiff and Morrison were not similarly
situated. Unlike plaintiff, Morrison was a member of the UAW. Defendant’s ability to transfer him or
take any other action was governed by the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement. The
uncontested evidence was that defendant had to obtain the approval of the union prior to transferring
Morrison, and the union indicated that it would resist any attempt to transfer Morrison.
Finally, plaintiff contends that defendant treated her differently than Scott. Scott was
transferred from his supervisory position at the Plant to a position as a liaison between the Plant and one
of its vendors. Plaintiff contends that this transfer was in name only and Scott was still employed by the
plant. However, the record does not support this contention. Although Scott’s new position required
intermittent visits to the Sheldon Road plant, he spent most of his time at other facilities.
Plaintiff also notes that Scott’s transfer was not as financially detrimental to him as plaintiff’s was
to her and attributes the disparity to her gender and marital status. This contention is unsupported by
the record. Jerry Pompa, defendant’s employee relations manager, attested in an affidavit that he did
not know whether plaintiff was still married, divorced, or separated at the time of her transfer. Plaintiff
has presented no contradictory evidence. Moreover, there is no evidence that defendant offered Scott
the liaison position because of his gender or marital status. Finally, plaintiff and Scott were not similarly
situated in that Scott had thirty years of service and was eligible to take early retirement, whereas
plaintiff had worked for defendant less than twenty years and was not eligible for early retirement.
Even if plaintiff could establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment, her claim would still fail
because defendant presented a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Specifically,
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defendant asserted that it transferred plaintiff and Scott because of safety concerns regarding the
potentially violent situation created by the relationship between the three employees. Moreover,
defendant maintained the decision to reassign plaintiff and Scott, rather than Morrison, was based on the
fact that the latter was a member of the UAW and could not be transferred without its consent. Plaintiff
has not established that these reasons for defendant’s actions were pretextual. In fact, plaintiff admitted
in her deposition that because she was not protected by the union, it was easier for defendant to transfer
her than her husband. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly granted defendant’s
motion for summary disposition on her CRA claim.
II
Next, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion for summary
disposition on her claim for violation of public policy. Plaintiff contends that Michigan has a policy of
protecting women, and defendant’s action of transferring her violates this policy.
The Supreme Court has recognized various causes of action when an at-will employee is
discharged in violation of public policy. See Suchodolski v Michigan Consolidated Gas Co, 412
Mich 692, 695 & n 2; 316 NW2d 710 (1982). We decline to extend this theory of liability to cases
where the action taken by the employer falls short of an actual termination of employment, particularly
where plaintiff has failed to establish that the employer’s actions were motivated by any improper
factors.
III
Finally, plaintiff argues that she was entitled to partial summary disposition on her claim of
unlawful retaliation. Plaintiff contends that because she is no longer seeing Scott, and she and Morrison
have reconciled, she should be returned to her prior position at the Sheldon Road Plant. Plaintiff asserts
that defendant’s failure to reassign her indicates that defendant is retaliating against her for pursuing a
civil rights claim.
In order to establish a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation under the CRA, a plaintiff must
show (1) she engaged in a protected activity, (2) this was known by the defendant, (3) the defendant
took an employment decision that was adverse to the plaintiff, and (4) there was a causal connection
between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. DeFlaviis v Lord & Taylor, Inc,
223 Mich App 432, 436; 566 NW2d 661 (1997).
Plaintiff has presented no evidence that defendant failed to reassign her to the Sheldon Road
plant in retaliation for pursuing a civil rights claim. Defendant, on the other hand, has presented evidence
that the situation continues to warrant the separation of the parties, as another murder-suicide has
occurred at the plant, and defendant was concerned that allowing plaintiff to return to the plant would
have an adverse effect on employee morale. The soundness of defendant’s management decisions is
not a matter for court review in the absence of any illegal discrimination. See Meagher, supra at 715.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition.
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Affirmed. Defendant being the prevailing party, it may tax costs pursuant to MCR 7.219.
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Nicholas J. Lambros
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