PEOPLE OF MI V JEROME D HAIRSTON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 19, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 196378
Recorder’s Court
LC No. 95-011429
JEROME D. HAIRSTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and Young and J.M. Batzer*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his bench trial convictions of second-degree murder, MCL
750.317; MSA 28.549, assault with intent to commit murder, MCL 750.83; MSA 28.278, and
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). He was
sentenced to concurrent prison terms of seventeen to thirty years for the second-degree murder
conviction and six to twenty years for the assault with intent to commit murder conviction, to be served
consecutively to a two-year term for the felony-firearm conviction. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that the trial court should have considered whether defendant was guilty
of voluntary manslaughter on the basis of either adequate provocation or the doctrine of imperfect self
defense, and that defense counsel was ineffective because his requests that the trial court consider
options other than second-degree murder were inadequate. We do not find either claim persuasive.
A trial court sitting without a jury must, in making its findings, address those theories argued by
the defendant and which are supported by the facts. People v Maghzal, 170 Mich App 340, 347; 427
NW2d 552 (1988). The defense theory in this case was self-defense, and defense counsel requested
that the trial court also consider convicting defendant of manslaughter. However, defendant never
raised the doctrine of imperfect self-defense and, moreover, the evidence did not support it. As
defendant concedes, in Michigan, the doctrine of imperfect self-defense only applies where the
defendant would have had a right to self-defense but for his actions as the initial agressor. See People v
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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Deason, 148 Mich App 27, 32; 348 NW2d 72 (1985). It was defendant’s position at trial, however,
that he was not the initial agressor.
In convicting defendant of second-degree murder, the trial court found that “the killing was not
justified, excused or done under circumstances that reduce it to a lesser crime.” This finding indicates
that the court was aware of the relevant issues and correctly applied the law in making its findings.
People v Smith, 211 Mich App 233, 235; 535 NW2d 248 (1995). Therefore, the trial court’s
findings were sufficient under MCR 2.517(A). Id.
We also reject defendant’s connected assertion that he was denied the effective assistance of
counsel because counsel did not adequately request the trial court to consider either manslaughter based
on provocation or the doctrine of imperfect self-defense. In order to prove a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness. People v Barclay, 208 Mich App 670, 672; 528 NW2d 842 (1995).
The defendant must also show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the deficient
performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different and that the result of the
proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable. People v Johnson, 451 Mich 115, 124; 545
NW2d 637 (1996); People v Messenger, 221 Mich App 171, 181; 561 NW2d 463 (1997). Since
defendant failed to preserve this issue for appeal by moving for a new trial or an evidentiary hearing
before the trial court, our review is limited to the record before us. Barclay, supra at 672.
In the case at bar, defense counsel informed the trial court at the beginning of trial that the
defense theory was that defendant “acted in self-defense and the defense of others, and that he acted
reasonably given the situation he saw.” During trial, counsel elicited testimony consistent with that
theory, and he requested during closing argument that the trial court consider self-defense and the lesser
offense of manslaughter in making its findings. Finally, while defendant contends that counsel should
also have requested the trial court to consider the doctrine of imperfect self-defense, as stated
previously, it would have been inconsistent with defense claims that defendant was not the initial
aggressor. See People v Amos, 163 Mich App 50, 56-57; 414 NW2d 147 (1987). On this record,
defendant has failed to establish that he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in accepting defendant’s waiver of his right to a
jury trial because the waiver was not intelligently and understandingly made. We disagree. We review
the trial court’s finding that defendant’s waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily for clear error.
People v James (After Remand), 192 Mich App 568, 571; 481 NW2d 715 (1992).
Before accepting a defendant’s waiver of his right to a jury trial, the trial court must advise the
defendant in open court of his constitutional right to trial by jury. People v Shields, 200 Mich App
554, 560; 504 NW2d 711 (1993); MCR 6.402(B). The court must also ascertain that the defendant
understands his right to a jury trial and that he voluntarily chooses to give up that right. Shields, supra.
We conclude, on review of the record made at defendant’s waiver hearing, that the trial court properly
ascertained that defendant understood his right to have a jury trial and that he voluntarily waived that
right. See id. at 560-561.
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Defendant’s last claim on appeal is that his seventeen- to thirty-year prison sentence for the
second-degree murder conviction is disproportionate. We review the trial court’s sentencing decision
for an abuse of discretion. People v Oldendahl, 200 Mich App 539, 540-541; 505 NW2d 16
(1993). A sentencing court abuses its discretion when it violates the principle of proportionality.
People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 636; 461 NW2d 1 (1990). Because defendant’s seventeen-year
minimum sentence for the conviction of second-degree murder is within the sentencing guidelines range
of 120 to 300 months, it is presumed to be proportionate. People v Kennebrew, 220 Mich App 601,
609; 560 NW2d 354 (1996). Defendant has presented no unusual circumstances which would
overcome the presumption of proportionality. People v Daniel, 207 Mich App 47, 54; 523 NW2d
830 (1994). Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant.1
Affirmed.
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook
/s/ Robert P. Young, Jr.
/s/ James M. Batzer
1
To the extent defendant also argues that the total effect of his consecutive sentences (seventeen to
thirty years for the second-degree murder conviction plus two years for the felony-firearm conviction) is
disproportionate, we reject such a claim. “[W]e evaluate the proportionality of the individual sentences
in the abstract and not the cumulative effect of the sentences.” Kennebrew, supra.
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