PEOPLE OF MI V BRUCE DELANO KENNEBREW
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 9, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 198675
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 96-002415 FH
BRUCE DELANO KENNEBREW,
a/k/a BRUCE DELANA KENNEBREW,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Smolenski, P.J., and MacKenzie and Neff, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of second-degree home invasion, MCL
750.110a(3); MSA 28.305(a)(3). He was subsequently sentenced as a fourth habitual offender, MCL
769.12; MSA 28.1084, to fifteen to thirty-five years’ imprisonment. Defendant appeals as of right.
We affirm.
Trial testimony established that defendant, Romell Parker, and his brother Arnold Parker were
in a car that stopped in front of the victim’s house. Defendant got out of the car, kicked down the front
door of the house, went in, came out carrying a television, and got back in the car. The men then sold
the television for $20. Defendant, an acquaintance of the victim’s son, admitted that he had been in the
victim’s house earlier in the day, but denied returning and burglarizing the residence.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecutor to call Romell
Parker, who asserted the Fifth Amendment privilege in the jury’s presence, where the prosecution had
prior knowledge that the witness planned to assert the privilege. Defendant did not object at trial to the
decision to call the witness or to the court requiring him to testify. The issue is therefore not properly
preserved for appellate review. People v Grant, 445 Mich 535, 546; 520 NW2d 123 (1994). In any
event, the claim is without merit. It is inherently prejudicial to place a witness on the stand who is
intimately related to the criminal episode, when the judge and the prosecutor know that he will assert the
Fifth Amendment privilege. People v Poma, 96 Mich App 726, 733; 294 NW2d 221 (1980). Here,
however, the record does not support defendant’s argument that the prosecutor knew Parker would
-1
assert the privilege, especially in light of the fact that Parker’s reluctance to testify was based on concern
for his personal safety rather than self-incrimination. Moreover, defendant has no standing to dispute
the court’s ruling on the validity of Parker’s privilege. Poma, supra, p 730. Because the jury was not
left to erroneously infer defendant’s guilt from Parker’s assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege –
Parker’s eventual testimony directly implicated defendant – we find no error requiring reversal.
Next, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting defendant to be
impeached with his prior convictions. Specifically, defendant argues that the probative value of his prior
convictions for attempted unarmed robbery and larceny in a building did not outweigh their potential for
undue prejudice because of their remoteness in time and similarity to the charged offense. MRE
609(a)(2); People v Allen, 429 Mich 558, 595-596, 606; 420 NW2d 499 (1988). We find no abuse
of discretion. Defendant’s 1987 conviction for attempted unarmed robbery includes an element of theft
and is sufficiently dissimilar from the charged offense of home invasion. While the vintage of the
conviction minimizes its probative value, it nevertheless occurred within the ten-year period set forth at
MRE 609(c). Likewise, defendant’s 1988 conviction for larceny in a building is not so similar to the
crime of home invasion to preclude its use for impeachment purposes, and, while the conviction was
relatively old, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that its probative value
outweighed its prejudicial effect. This is especially true given the overwhelming evidence of guilt in this
case. See People v Bartlett, 197 Mich App 15, 19; 494 NW2d 776 (1992). We cannot say that
there was no justification or excuse for the court’s ruling to allow defendant to be impeached with his
prior convictions and therefore find no abuse of discretion.
Defendant next argues that the court erred by not suppressing his confession. According to
defendant, his waiver of his Miranda rights [Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed
2d 694 (1966)] before he gave his statement was not voluntary because he was intoxicated and
because he was promised leniency by the interviewing officer in the form of a personal recognizance
bond.
When reviewing a trial court’s determination of the voluntariness of a statement, the trial court’s
findings will not be reversed unless they are clearly erroneous. People v Haywood, 209 Mich App
217, 225-226; 530 NW2d 497 (1995). A finding is clearly erroneous if it leaves this Court with a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. People v Kvam, 160 Mich App 189, 196;
408 NW2d 71 (1987). Here, in finding the statement voluntary at defendant’s Walker hearing [People
v Walker, 374 Mich 331; 132 NW2d 87 (1965)], the trial court obviously believed the interviewing
officer’s testimony that defendant did not appear intoxicated and that the officer did not promise
defendant a personal recognizance bond. This Court ordinarily defers to a trial court’s assessment of
the credibility of witnesses or the weight of the evidence. People v Cheatham, 453 Mich 1, 29-30;
551 NW2d 355 (1996). Under the totality of the circumstances in this case, we are not left with a
definite and firm conviction that the court clearly erred in admitting defendant’s statement.
Affirmed.
-2
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Barbara B. MacKenzie
/s/ Janet T. Neff
-3
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.