PATRICIA A CROSS V JOSEPH H GORODENSKI
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICIA A. CROSS,
UNPUBLISHED
December 9, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 194929
Barry Circuit Court
LC No. 95-000357-CH
JOSEPH H. GORODENSKI,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Smolenski, P.J., and MacKenzie and Neff, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant in pro se appeals as of right from a default judgment entered against him. We
reverse and remand.
In February, 1994, plaintiff and defendant, as buyers, entered into a land contract for the
purchase of real property located in Barry County. In June, 1995, plaintiff filed a complaint for
partition, requesting that she be awarded the property or the proceeds from the sale of the property.
The complaint alleged that plaintiff and defendant had agreed to equally share the acquisition cost of the
property. The complaint further alleged in paragraph ten that plaintiff had “made all of the land contract
payments, including the down payment, required under the terms of the land contract, without any
contribution whatsoever from” defendant. The complaint alleged that defendant was currently
incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections. The summons accompanying the complaint
listed defendant’s address as “48401 Five Mile Road, Plymouth, MI 48170.”
On July 18, 1995, defendant in pro se filed a document entitled “Motion In Opposition To
Plaintiff’s Complaint For Partition.” (We note that defendant has represented himself throughout these
entire proceedings). This motion listed the Plymouth Road address as defendant’s address and further
indicated that this address was the Western Wayne Correctional Facility. In the motion, defendant
denied the allegations contained in paragraph ten of the complaint and further alleged that he had
refurbished the property at a cost of over $10,000 which was paid exclusively by him,
and that he has continued to make regular monthly payments as indicated by the
enclosed ‘Mortgage Payment Statement(s).’1
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On November 14, 1995, plaintiff filed a demand that a pretrial conference be scheduled. On
November 15, 1995, a copy of plaintiff’s demand was mailed to defendant at the Western Wayne
Correctional Facility. On November 27, 1995, an order directing defendant to appear at a December
15, 1995, scheduling conference was mailed to defendant at the same address. Defendant did not
appear at this conference.
On January 2, 1996, defendant wrote a letter to the trial court stating that he had just that day
received the order to appear at the scheduling conference. Defendant asserted that the order had been
postmarked twice, November 28 and December 13, 1995, and that he had had a corrections officer
make a log of the January 2, 1996, date that he actually received the order. Defendant’s January 2,
1996, letter to the court listed defendant’s address as the Adrian Correctional Facility in Adrian,
Michigan.
On February 1, 1996, and pursuant to plaintiff’s request, the court clerk entered a default
against defendant premised on defendant’s “failure to appear, plead, or otherwise defend . . . .”2 On
February 2, 1996, plaintiff served defendant with a copy of the default, a notice of a February 8, 1996,
hearing on plaintiff’s request for the entry of a default judgment, and a proposed judgment. Service was
accomplished by first-class mail sent to the Adrian Correctional Facility.
Defendant did not appear at the February 8, 1996, hearing. At that hearing, plaintiff’s counsel
informed the court that counsel had received from defendant that day a motion to set aside the default.
(Defendant’s motion to set aside the default was dated February 5, 1996, and was filed with the court
February 8, 1996.). Counsel informed the court, who had not seen the motion, that the motion
requested the court set aside the default, in part, because defendant did not have control over his ability
to be at the scheduling conference and because defendant had not received notice of the December 15,
1995, pretrial conference until January 2, 1996. The court replied that “the notice was given in
accordance with the court rules.” After briefly perusing defendant’s motion to set aside the default, the
court further stated that defendant had not “shown me anything yet that shows he has a meritorious
defense.” The court also perused defendant’s July, 18, 1995, motion in opposition to defendant’s
complaint for partition and concluded that this motion, likewise, failed to set forth a meritorious defense.
The court then stated that plaintiff could proceed with her proofs. Following plaintiff’s testimony, which
included testimony that defendant had not contributed to the downpayment or regular monthly payments
on the property, the court ordered that a default judgment be entered. The trial court subsequently
denied defendant’s motion for relief from the default judgment.
In his first issue on appeal, defendant raises a host of issues. However, it is clear that defendant
is challenging the entry of both the default and the default judgment.
As explained in Park v American Casualty Ins Co, 219 Mich App 62; 555 NW2d 720
(1996):
The question whether a default or a default judgment should be set aside is
within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on appeal absent a
clear abuse of that discretion. . . . Except when grounded on lack of jurisdiction over
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the defendant, a motion to set aside a default or a default judgment generally may be
granted only if good cause is shown and an affidavit of facts showing a meritorious
defense is filed. . . . Good cause sufficient to warrant setting aside a default or a default
judgment includes: (1) a substantial defect or irregularity in the proceeding on which the
default was based, (2) a reasonable excuse for the failure to comply with requirements
that created the default, or (3) some other reason showing that manifest injustice would
result if the default or default judgment were allowed to stand. . . . An attorney’s
negligence is attributable to the client and normally does not constitute grounds for
setting aside a default judgment. [Id. at 66-67 (citations omitted).]
In this case, defendant strenuously argues that the fact that he was not timely notified of the
scheduling conference until approximately eighteen days after the conference was held establishes a
substantial defect in the proceedings, a reasonable excuse and manifest injustice. It is true, as
contended by defendant by analogy, that the “failure to notify a party entitled to notice of the impending
entry of a default judgment constitutes a substantial defect in the proceedings and, accordingly, good
cause.” Gavulic v Boyer, 195 Mich App 20, 25; 489 NW2d 124 (1992). However, in this case, the
trial court found that defendant was given notice of the scheduling conference in accordance with the
court rules. Defendant does not contest that notice was not given in accordance with the court rules.
Defendant, instead, relies on the fact that he did not timely receive notice of the conference. Thus, it
appears that the issue is raised whether properly given, although untimely received, notice constitutes
good cause to set aside a default. However, we need not address this issue because we find persuasive
another argument raised by defendant that addresses the ground on which the trial court refused to set
aside the default—defendant’s failure to present a meritorious defense.
Specifically, defendant notes that in his July, 1995, motion in opposition to plaintiff’s complaint
for partition he swore before a notary that he had
refurbished the property at a cost of over $10,000 which was paid exclusively by him,
and that he has continued to make regular monthly payments as indicated by the
enclosed ‘Mortgage Payment Statement(s).’
However, in order to grant a motion to set aside a default or default judgment, the meritorious
defense must be shown by affidavit. MCR 2.603(D)(1). In this case, defendant’s July, 1995, motion,
although sworn before a notary, does not appear in affidavit form, but rather appears to simply be
verified. See MCR 2.114; MCR 2.119(B).
In Miller v Rondeau, 174 Mich App 483; 436 NW2d 393 (1988), the trial court denied the
defendants’ motion to set aside the entry of a default on the grounds that the defendants had failed both
to file an affidavit in support of their motion and to present a meritorious defense. Id. at 484-485. On
appeal, although conceding that they had not filed an affidavit in support of their motion as required by
MCR 2.603(D)(1), the defendants argued that the verified pleadings they had filed before the denial of
their motion were sufficient to satisfy the affidavit requirement. This Court rejected this argument:
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[T]he requirements regarding the form of verification for a pleading and the form
of an affidavit are significantly different. For example, a pleading may be verified merely
by the declaration that the statements in the pleading are true and accurate to the best of
the signer’s information, knowledge and belief, MCR 2.114(A)(1)(b), whereas an
affidavit filed in support of a motion must be made on personal knowledge, stating with
particularity facts admissible as evidence establishing the grounds stated in the motion
and showing affirmatively that the affiant, if sworn as a witness, can testify competently
to the facts stated in the affidavit, MCR 2.119(B)(1). The verified pleadings relied
upon by defendants in this case contain no statements sufficient to satisfy the
criteria applicable to affidavits filed in support of a motion. [Miller, supra at 487
(emphasis supplied).]
Even if we were to accept defendant’s argument that the verification of their
pleadings was sufficient to fulfill the affidavit requirement in MCR 2.603(D)(1), we
would not find it necessary to reverse the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to
set aside the entry of default because the court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that defendants were unsuccessful in presenting a meritorious defense . . . .
[Miller, supra at 487-488 (emphasis supplied).]
However, this Court has also held that the failure of an affidavit to comply with the court rules is
harmless absent a showing of prejudice resulting from the noncompliance with the court rules. Baker v
DEC International, 218 Mich App 248, 261-262; 553 NW2d 667 (1996). In Baker, this Court held
that the failure of several affidavits submitted in opposition to a motion for summary disposition to
comply with MCR 2.119(B)(1)(a) and (c) was harmless error where the contents of the purported
affidavits established “that the affiants had first-hand knowledge of the alleged facts and would be
competent to testify regarding those facts.” Id.
In this case, the trial court reviewed defendant’s July, 1995, motion at the February, 1996,
hearing on the entry of the default judgment. The court did not reject the July motion because it was not
in affidavit form, but rather found that the July motion did not establish a meritorious defense. However,
in the July motion, defendant alleged that he had contributed to the acquisition of the property. This
fact, if proven at trial, would negate the basis for plaintiff’s complaint for partition, i.e., that defendant
did not contribute to the acquisition of the property. Thus, we conclude that defendant’s July motion
established a meritorious defense. Cf. Gavulic, supra at 26; Miller, supra at 488. The trial court
erred in concluding otherwise.
The July motion states “with particularity facts admissible as evidence establishing or denying the
grounds stated in the motion.” MCR 2.119(B)(1)(b). Moreover, unlike Miller, the contents of the July
motion, including the verification, show that defendant “had first-hand knowledge of the alleged facts
and would be competent to testify regarding those facts.” Baker, supra. Accordingly, where the trial
court specifically considered the July motion when considering defendant’s February, 1996, motion to
set aside the default, we conclude that any error in the failure of the July motion to comply with the
affidavit requirements of MCR 2.119(B) was harmless. Id.
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Finally, we conclude that good cause to set aside the default was established below. See,
generally, Komejan v Suburban Softball, Inc, 179 Mich App 41, 51; 445 NW2d 186 (1989).
Specifically, defendant raised below a meritorious defense and factual issues for trial. Id. The “showing
of a meritorious defense and factual issues for trial may, under certain circumstances, fulfill the good
cause requirement by way of constituting a reason evidencing that manifest injustice would result from
permitting a default to stand.” Park, supra (citing Komejan, supra). We discern no evidence in the
record indicating that defendant intentionally refused to attend the pretrial conference or otherwise delay
adjudication in this case. Although the showing of a meritorious defense by itself may not be sufficient in
all cases to warrant setting aside a default, we conclude that in light of the facts presented in this case the
trial court should have granted defendant’s motion to set aside the entry of the default. Komejan,
supra at 53. Accordingly, we set aside the default and default judgment entered in this case. In light of
this disposition, we decline to consider defendant’s constitutional challenges and his second issue on
appeal. We remand the case for the assessment of costs against defendant pursuant to MCR
2.603(D)(4) and for further proceedings. Komejan, supra.
Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction. Defendant, being the prevailing party,
may tax costs pursuant to MCR 7.219.
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Barbara B. MacKenzie
/s/ Janet T. Neff
1
We note that the record contains no “Mortgage Payment Statement(s).”
2
MCR 2.401(G)(1) provides that the “[f]ailure of a party . . . to attend a scheduled conference, as
directed by the court, constitutes a default to which MCR 2.603 is applicable . . . .”
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