PEOPLE OF MI V MELVIN GALAHAN LONG
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 7, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 193404
Recorder’s Court
LC No. 95-007466
MELVIN GALAHAN LONG,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Markey and J.B. Sullivan*, JJ
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his jury trial convictions of second-degree murder, MCL
750.317; MSA 28.549, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL
750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). Defendant was sentenced to twenty to forty years in prison for his
second-degree murder conviction, and two years in prison for his felony-firearm conviction, with the
former sentence to be served consecutively to the latter. We affirm.
Defendant raises seven issues on appeal. In his first issue, defendant claims that the decisions
made by his trial attorney concerning the witnesses she called at trial deprived him of effective assistance
of counsel. We disagree, finding that all of counsel’s decisions were sound exercises of trial strategy.
People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 338; 521 NW2d 797 (1994); People v Kvam, 160 Mich App
189, 200; 408 NW2d 71 (1987).
I
First, defendant argues that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance when she waived the
testimony of defendant’s alibi witness. We disagree. The alibi witness failed to appear for trial, despite
acknowledging receipt of a subpoena and having been repeatedly reminded by counsel to appear for
trial. Counsel also testified at the Ginther hearing, People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922
(1973), that each time she spoke to the witness over the phone he seemed “reticent” to testify. Counsel
testified that she waived the witness’ testimony because she believed he would not support
* Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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defendantand only waived the testimony with defendant’s permission. Further, the trial court correctly
found at the Ginther hearing that the witness’ testimony would not have provided defendant with an
alibi. The witness testified at the Ginther hearing that defendant left his house at 6:00 p.m. on May 26,
1995, the day of the murder. An eyewitness to the murder testified at trial that the murder occurred
near 8:00 p.m. We conclude that defendant has failed to show that trial counsel’s waiver of the alibi
witness was prejudicial to defendant’s right to a fair trial. People v Tommolino, 187 Mich App 14,
17, 19-20; 466 NW2d 315 (1991).
Next, defendant argues that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance when she agreed to
exclude the testimony of an eyewitness to the murder who could not make a courtroom identification of
defendant as the murderer. We disagree. Trial counsel agreed to exclude the witness’ testimony after
she interviewed him and found that he was not only equivocal about identifying defendant but also angry
over having been detained as a material witness. The witness’ ability to identify defendant was called
into question by his anger over his detainer and by the fact that he had been shown an illegally
constituted photo lineup and pressured by Detroit police officers into selecting defendant. Counsel also
agreed to the exclusion because she feared that the witness would testify about a fight between
defendant and the victim that occurred approximately two weeks before the murder, even though
another witness testified regarding the same alleged altercation. We conclude that trial counsel’s failure
to call the eyewitness did not deprive defendant of a substantial defense and so did not prejudice the
outcome of his trial. Cf. People v Johnson, 451 Mich 115, 123-125; 545 NW2d 637 (1996); see
also People v Hoyt, 185 Mich App 531, 537-538; 462 NW2d 793 (1990).
Finally, defendant argues that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance when she failed to
seek and call any of the forty to fifty people supposedly near the murder scene around the time the
murder took place. We disagree. Trial counsel had no obligation to subpoena any such “res gestae”
witnesses when neither she nor the prosecutor knew their identities. See People v Burwick, 450 Mich
281, 287-289; 537 NW2d 813 (1995). Further, counsel’s decision not to call any of these potential
witnesses was well-considered. See People v Lawson, 124 Mich App 371, 374-376; 335 NW2d 43
(1983). Counsel testified at the Ginther hearing that she knew the area in which the murder occurred
and believed, based on her knowledge, that few of the people supposedly on the scene could be found
and that fewer still would agree to testify. Counsel’s belief was supported by the suspect nature of the
testimony of the “res gestae” witness that appellate counsel subpoenaed for the Ginther hearing. The
witness’ testimony did not corroborate the testimony of the eyewitnesses who testified at trial; further,
although the person who brought the witness forward could have brought the witness to the attention of
defense counsel during trial, she failed to do so. We conclude that none of trial counsel’s contested
decisions prejudiced defendant’s right to a fair trial or deprived him of a substantial defense that would
have affected the outcome of the proceedings. People v Daniel, 207 Mich App 47, 58; 523 NW2d
830 (1994). Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for a
new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel. See People v Hubbard (After Remand), 217
Mich App 459, 472; 552 NW2d 593 (1996);
II
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Defendant’s second issue on appeal is that the trial court abandoned its impartiality by its
involvement in the trial attorneys’ decision to exclude the testimony of the hostile eyewitness. We
disagree. The trial court showed no partiality; it merely exercised its discretion in conducting
defendant’s trial by asking the trial attorneys whether either planned to call the eyewitness to testify.
People v Collier, 168 Mich App 687, 698; 425 NW2d 118 (1988). Indeed, the court’s comments
were not of the nature to unduly influence the jury or deprive defendant of his right to a fair and impartial
trial. Id. The court’s questions to the attorneys were only meant to ascertain whether there was any
point in continuing a pretrial hearing into the admissibility of the eyewitness’testimony, not to force the
attorneys into abandoning the eyewitness’ testimony. Further, the court’s remark to the jury that it
“prodded” the attorneys into agreeing to forgo the testimony could not have affected the partiality of the
jury because the court made the comment after the jury returned its verdict. Id. at 698-701. We
conclude that the trial court’s conduct regarding the hostile eyewitness did not deprive defendant of a
fair and impartial trial. People v Paquette, 214 Mich App 336, 341; 543 NW2d 342 (1995).
III
For his third issue on appeal, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
allowing the prosecutor to present testimony that defendant and the victim had been involved in a fight
over a gun a few weeks before the victim’s murder. We disagree. The testimony was not prior bad
acts evidence barred by MRE 404(b)(1), as defendant contends; rather, the testimony was relevant to
and probative of defendant’s motive for the murder and intent to commit it. People v VanderVliet,
444 Mich 52, 74-75; 508 NW2d 114 (1993); People v Ullah, 216 Mich App 669, 674-675; 550
NW2d 568 (1996). After the fight, in which defendant was matched against the victim and two other
men, a witness saw defendant run away and heard him yell, “You can’t disrespect me like that. I’ll be
back.” Thus, the fight is properly seen as an event so closely linked in time to the murder that they
blended into one event such that proof of the fight explained the circumstances of the murder. People v
Sholl, 453 Mich 730, 742; 556 NW2d 851 (1996); People v Delgado, 404 Mich 76, 83-84; 273
NW2d 395 (1978).
Further, defendant failed to ask for a limiting instruction regarding use of the testimony. The jury
instructions nevertheless fully apprised the jurors of their duties, how to weigh the evidence, the elements
of the offenses, and the criteria for evaluating witnesses. See, generally, People v Mitchell, 223 Mich
App 395, 397-399; 566NW2d 312 (1997). Reversal is not required as a result of the trial court’s
failure to give a limiting instruction in light of defendant’s failure to request one. Id. We therefore
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the prosecutor to present testimony
regarding the fight involving defendant and the victim that occurred before the murder. See People v
McElhaney, 215 Mich App 269, 280; 545 NW2d 18 (1996).
IV
Defendant’s fourth issue on appeal is that the trial court deprived him of a fair trial by improperly
limiting trial counsel’s ability to cross-examine the witness who testified regarding the fight between
defendant and the victim that occurred before the murder. We disagree. In ruling that the prosecutor
could call a previously unendorsed witness as a rebuttal witness if defense counsel, on cross
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examination, materially challenged the credibility of the witness testifying about the fight, the trial court
was simply exercising its discretion to control the scope of cross-examination. People v Canter, 197
Mich App 550, 564; 496 NW2d 336 (1992). How defense counsel chose to handle her cross
examination after that was purely a matter of trial strategy. People v Alderete, 132 Mich App 351,
359-360; 347 NW2d 229 (1984).
Second, defense counsel managed to cross-examine the witness effectively. Counsel
established that the witness did not get a clear look at defendant at the time of the fight, that the witness
gave the police a different nickname than defendant’s in identifying defendant as a participant in the fight,
and that the witness was using heroin at the time of the fight. Defense counsel apparently felt
comfortable enough with this evidence to argue that the jury should “dump” the witness’ testimony
because it was not “worthy of anything.” We conclude that defendant’s constitutional right to confront
and cross-examine this witness was not violated by the trial court’s provisional grant to the prosecution
of the right to call the rebuttal witness. See People v Bushard, 444 Mich 384, 391; 508 NW2d 745
(1993).
V
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict
because the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to send the issues of premeditation and
deliberation to the jury. Defendant also argues that the lack of evidence supporting premeditation and
deliberation triggered a “compromise verdict” of second-degree murder when all the evidence was sent
to the jury. We disagree.
Our review of the evidence leads us to conclude that the trial court did not err in denying
defendant’s motion for a directed verdict. The evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the
prosecution, was sufficient to allow the jury to find that the prosecutor had established the elements of
first-degree murder, including premeditation and deliberation. People v Jolly, 442 Mich 458, 466; 502
NW2d 177 (1993); People v Anderson, 209 Mich App 527, 537; 531 NW2d 780 (1995). The
testimony about the fight involving defendant and the victim described a prior relationship between the
victim and defendant and defendant’s actions before the murder. Anderson, supra. After the fight,
defendant fled the area and a witness heard him yell, “You can’t disrespect me like that. I’ll be back.”
Further, the testimony of two eyewitnesses who testified at trial established that defendant’s acts toward
the victim on May 26, 1995, appeared deliberate. Both testified that defendant came out of a building
near the murder scene, approached the victim, fired five or six shots at him, and then ran away. One
witness testified that defendant fired a few shots at the victim, then stepped closer to the victim and fired
a few more shots. Moreover, because sufficient evidence was adduced at trial to support an inference
of first-degree murder, defendant’s argument that the jury’s verdict of second-degree murder was a
compromise verdict will not stand. People v Melvin, 70 Mich App 138, 147-148; 245 NW2d 178
(1976).
VI
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Defendant’s sixth issue on appeal is that the prosecutor deprived him of a fair and impartial trial
by making improper remarks during her rebuttal argument. We disagree. The remarks were
permissible because they were supported by the evidence adduced at trial and
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responded to comments made during defense counsel’s closing argument. People v Hart, 161 Mich
App 630, 638; 411 NW2d 803 (1987); People v Flanagan, 129 Mich App 786, 795-796; 342
NW2d 609 (1983). First, the prosecutor did not denigrate defense counsel by remarking that counsel
was “scared” by the testimony of one of the eyewitnesses. The remarks were made in response to
defense counsel’s strenuous efforts during her closing argument to discredit this witness. Cf. People v
Moore, 189 Mich App 315, 322; 472 NW2d 1 (1991) (concurring opinion by Wahls, P.J.); see also
Hart, supra. Second, the prosecutor did not impermissibly vouch for the witness’ credibility. The
witness’ testimony was well supported by the other evidence at trial. People v Rosales, 160 Mich App
304, 309; 408 NW2d 140 (1987); Flanagan, supra at 795-796. We conclude that the prosecutor’s
remarks thus did not deprive defendant of a fair and impartial trial. McElhaney, supra at 283.
Finally, defendant argues that the cumulative weight of all the errors committed during his trial
requires us to reverse his convictions and order a new trial. Having found that no error occurred during
defendant’s trial, we must disagree. People v Miller (After Remand), 211 Mich App 30, 43-44; 535
NW2d 515 (1995).
Affirmed.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Joseph B. Sullivan
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