PEOPLE OF MI V MICHAEL ANDREW ROESCH
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 31, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 193784
Grand Traverse Circuit Court
LC No. 95-006796-FH
MICHAEL ANDREW ROESCH,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Hood and Bandstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of perjury, MCL 750.423; MSA 28.665. He
was sentenced to forty-five days’ imprisonment and two years’ probation. Defendant now appeals as
of right. We affirm.
I
Defendant first argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him because, in order to
prove falsity, it was not enough simply to present defendant’s prior inconsistent statements and there
was not strong corroborative evidence. One of the three elements of perjury is willful false statements
or testimony by the defendant regarding facts sworn to. MCL 750.423; MSA 28.665; People v
Forbush, 170 Mich App 294; 427 NW2d 622 (1989). It was stated in People v McClintic, 193
Mich 589, 601; 160 NW 461 (1916), that, in order to sustain a conviction for perjury, the prosecution
cannot merely present contradictory statements of the defendant but must prove which of the statements
is false and must show that statement to be false by evidence other than the contradictory statement.
Strong corroborating circumstances are required. See People v Kennedy, 221 Mich 1, 4; 190 NW
749 (1922).
Here, there was sufficient evidence to allow a jury to convict defendant. Defendant designated
Slick in his statements to the police as a possible source of the marijuana. Although defendant
contradicted these statements at trial, the making of the initial statements was corroborated by police
officers, who also indicated that the substance of various statements was consistent. Moreover, the
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various police officers corroborated each other. In addition, facts consistent with defendant’s original
statements were established. Defendant possessed marijuana and showed such intimate knowledge of
drug dealings in the area at that time that an inference can be drawn that he would have had knowledge
of Slick being a distributor if Slick in fact was one. Finally, defendant had a motive to protect Slick.
While this motive did not conclusively show that Slick was the source of the 1992 marijuana, it was
some evidence of a reason that defendant would perjure himself. Based on the evidence taken as a
whole, a rational trier of fact could have found that the elements of perjury were established beyond a
reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient.
II
Defendant next argues that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he lied when he testified
that he had never obtained marijuana from Slick. He argues that the prosecution relied exclusively on
the testimony of one witness, Tammy Kiel, who denied ever seeing a sale or presentation of marijuana
from Slick to defendant. He further argues that, even if Kiel’s attenuated testimony tended to establish
the falsity of defendant’s grand jury testimony, the prosecution offered no evidence to corroborate the
witness.
Although Kiel’s testimony was somewhat equivocal, she testified that Slick was a drug seller
and that she saw Slick give marijuana to defendant. Since the ambiguities in Kiel’s testimony could be
explained in terms of her close and long-standing friendship with defendant and Slick, and her possible
desire to protect defendant, the jury could have concluded that the portions of her testimony that tended
to implicate defendant were true. The real issue therefore is whether Kiel’s testimony had to be
corroborated.
As previously indicated, to sustain a conviction for perjury, the falsity of a statement made by a
defendant must be proven, and strong corroboration is needed. McClintic, supra; Kennedy, supra.
The corroboration must take the form of evidence other than the defendant’s contradictory statements.
McClintic, supra..
Applied to the present case, it is evident that Kiel’s testimony alone could not be sufficient to
prove the falsity of defendant’s statement before the grand jury. However, Kiel’s testimony provided
corroboration for Lieutenant John C. Conn’s testimony that defendant had told him that he obtained
marijuana in the past from Chris Slick., and Kiel’s testimony is corroborated by evidence of a
circumstantial character such as defendant’s intimate knowledge of drug dealing in the area and his
motive to protect Slick. Accordingly, we find that there was sufficient evidence to establish that
defendant testified falsely when he stated that he had never obtained marijuana from Slick.
III
Last, defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of perjury with regard
to the proposition that he “never obtained” marijuana from Slick. Defendant contends that he did not
deny ever obtaining marijuana from Slick, but he did deny ever purchasing it. In considering all the
evidence as a whole, the rational inference that defendant made false statements willfully in front of the
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grand jury was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Testimony before the grand jury showed that
defendant did not consistently draw a fine distinction between terms such as “buy” and “get.” While he
denied buying any drugs from Slick and admitted lying to police officers with regard to buying drugs
from Slick, h also stated that he did not “get” any drugs from Slick. Questioning the distinction
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between “buy” and “obtain,” the trial court found that if defendant bought the marijuana, it meant that
he obtained it. From defendant’s own use of the term “get,” a synonym of the word “obtained,” the
charge in the indictment alleging that defendant falsely testified before the grand jury that he “never
obtained” marijuana from Slick appears to be justified.
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
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