BARBARA J REED V DETROIT BOARD OF EDUCATION
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
BARBARA J. REED,
UNPUBLISHED
October 17, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
v
No. 192677
Wayne Circuit
LC No. 95-525058
DETROIT BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Defendant,
and
MICHIGAN MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
Before: Wahls, P.J., and Gage and W.J. Nykamp,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Michigan Mutual Insurance Company appeals by leave granted from an order
denying its motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). Plaintiff cross-appeals
from the same order denying her motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). We
affirm in part and reverse in part.
Plaintiff was employed with the Detroit Board of Education as a school bus driver. As she was
driving an empty bus on her way to pick up children at the end of a school day, a vehicle tried to pass
the bus on the right side but was blocked by cars parked in the right lane. The vehicle then pulled along
the left side of the bus. An occupant of the vehicle fired a shot at the bus, shattering the driver’s side
window. Plaintiff was not struck by the bullet. As a result of this incident, plaintiff suffered post
traumatic stress syndrome, which rendered her totally disabled from any employment.
Plaintiff filed a complaint, claiming entitlement to personal insurance benefits under the No-Fault
Act, MCL 500.3101 et seq.; MSA 24.13101 et seq. Defendant Michigan Mutual Insurance
________________________
*Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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Company, her employer’s insurer, moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10),
arguing that plaintiff was not entitled to benefits because her injuries did not arise out of the ownership,
operation, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle. Plaintiff filed a cross motion for summary disposition,
also pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that she was entitled to benefits under the undisputed facts
and the law. The trial court denied both motions for summary disposition because it found that genuine
issues of material fact existed and that discovery was incomplete.
On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary
disposition because there was no relationship between plaintiff’s injury and her use of a motor vehicle,
and defendant was therefore entitled to summary disposition as a matter of law. On cross-appeal,
plaintiff argues that she is entitled to insurance benefits because she sustained an accidental bodily injury
while operating the school bus as a motor vehicle, and her injury was a foreseeable risk of driving.
We review the trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary disposition de novo to determine
whether the pleadings or the uncontroverted documentary evidence established that a party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. MCR 2.116(I)(1); Kennedy v Auto Club of Michigan, 215 Mich App
264, 266; 544 NW2d 750 (1996). The court must give the benefit of any reasonable doubt to the
nonmovant and determine whether a record might be developed that would leave open an issue upon
which reasonable minds might differ. Osman v Summer Green Lawn Care, Inc, 209 Mich App 703,
706; 532 NW2d 186 (1995).
The No-Fault Act is remedial in nature. McKenney v Crum & Forster, 218 Mich App 619,
623; 554 NW2d 600 (1996). No-fault benefits are payable for accidental bodily injuries arising out of
the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle. MCL
500.3105(1); MSA 24.13105(1). The Legislature chose to provide coverage under the Act “only
where the causal connection between the injury and the use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle is
more than incidental, fortuitous, or ‘but for.’ The involvement of the [vehicle] in the injury should be
directly related to its character as a motor vehicle.” Thornton v Allstate Ins Co, 425 Mich 643, 659;
391 NW2d 320 (1986).
In Kennedy, supra at 265, the plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle traveling on a highway
when he was struck in the right temple by an unknown object. The source of the projectile was never
determined, and physicians diagnosed the plaintiff’s injury as a possible gunshot wound. The circuit
court granted summary disposition in plaintiff’s favor. This Court reversed, noting that the “plaintiff’s
injury was the result of an intentional, reckless, or negligent act where an unknown assailant either shot
or threw an object through the rear window of the automobile in which plaintiff was traveling. Injuries
resulting from this kind of conduct are not ‘within the ordinary risks of driving a motor vehicle.’” Id. at
267. Furthermore, “the intent of the unknown assailant is irrelevant. In regard to the no-fault coverage
issue, it makes no difference whether the assailant was targeting the vehicle, plaintiff, something else, or
nothing at all.” Id. at 268. Our Supreme Court has also recognized that assaults are not part of the
normal risk of operating a vehicle. Bourne v Farmers Ins Exchange, 449 Mich 193, 200, n 3; 534
NW2d 491 (1995).
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We recognize that previous opinions of this Court have held that personal injury coverage under
the no-fault act applies when an assailant targeted the vehicle rather than its occupants. However, we
rejected that analysis in Kennedy, supra, and therefore reject plaintiff’s argument that her injury arose
out of her operation of the school bus. Her injury “was the result of an intentional, reckless, or negligent
act” of “an unknown assailant.” Id. at 267. “Injuries resulting from this kind of conduct are not within
the ordinary risks of driving a motor vehicle.” Id. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in
denying summary disposition to defendant because plaintiff could not succeed on her claim as a matter
of law. Having reached this conclusion, we do not need to review defendant’s argument that the trial
court erred in denying defendant summary disposition on the alternative ground that discovery was
incomplete.
We affirm the trial court’s denial of summary disposition to plaintiff. We reverse the trial court’s
denial of summary disposition to defendant and remand for entry of judgment in favor of defendant.
Defendant being the prevailing party, it may tax costs pursuant to MCR 7.219. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
/s/ Myron H. Wahls
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Wesley J. Nykamp
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