PEOPLE OF MI V MICHAEL ANTHONY DOSS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 7, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 189214
Eaton Circuit Court
LC No. 95-000055 FC
MICHAEL ANTHONY DOSS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Doctoroff, P.J., and Kelly and Young, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions for assault with intent to do great bodily
harm less than murder, MCL 750.84; MSA 28.279, carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227;
MSA 28.424, and first-degree retail fraud, MCL 750.356c; MSA 28.588(3). Defendant was
sentenced to concurrent prison terms of six years and eight months to ten years on the assault with intent
to do great bodily harm conviction, three years and four months to five years on the carrying a
concealed weapon conviction, and one year and four months to two years on the first-degree retail
fraud conviction. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that he was denied a fair trial because the lower court gave an erroneous
instruction regarding the testimony of one of the defense witnesses. Since defendant failed to object,
appellate review is precluded unless failure to review the issue would result in manifest injustice. People
v Van Dorsten, 441 Mich 540, 544-545; 494 NW2d 737 (1993).
Having r
eviewed the record, we find no manifest injustice. In instructing the jury, the court
attempted to adapt the standard jury instruction regarding accomplice witnesses called by the
prosecution (who might be motivated to testify by a promise of more lenient treatment)1 to an
accomplice witness called by the defense. The court instructed the jury to consider the accomplice’s
testimony carefully, and suggested that the jury could acquit defendant based on that testimony if it
“proves the defendant is not guilty.” However, the court immediately recognized that the purported
modification shifted the burden of proof to defendant, corrected itself, and advised the jury that
defendant did not have to prove his innocence and that the credibility of the accomplice witness should
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be evaluated like that of any other witness. We conclude that the trial court’s instructions fairly
presented the issues to be tried and sufficiently protected defendant’s rights. People v Bell, 209 Mich
App 273, 276; 530 NW2d 167 (1995). There was no error requiring reversal.
Next, defendant argues that the trial court should have granted his motion for a directed verdict
on the charge of assault with intent to commit murder, of which defendant was eventually acquitted,
because there was insufficient evidence of the specific intent to murder. When reviewing a challenge
based on the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to
the prosecution and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that the essential
elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 513
514; 489 NW2d 748, amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992).
“The elements of assault with intent to commit murder are: (1) an assault, (2) with the specific
intent to commit murder, (3) which, if successful, would make the killing murder.” People v Rockwell,
188 Mich App 405, 411; 470 NW2d 673 (1991). In this case, the prosecution’s evidence established
that defendant stabbed the victim with an instrument resembling an ice pick, and that defendant
threatened to kill him. Intent to murder may be proven by circumstantial evidence, including, but not
limited to, the nature of the assaultive act, whether the weapon is “naturally adapted to produce death,”
and defendant’s conduct and declarations. People v Guy Taylor, 422 Mich 554, 567-568; 375
NW2d 1 (1985) (citation omitted). Based on the evidence presented, the trial court did not err in
sending the case to the jury on the charge of assault with intent to commit murder.
Defendant also contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction for assault
with intent to do great bodily harm. We disagree. Again, the testimony established that defendant used
the ice pick-like instrument to stab the security guard and also threatened to kill him. Viewing this
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational juror could infer that defendant acted
with an intent to inflict great bodily harm. Wolfe, supra at 515.
Defendant next argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial.
Specifically, defendant claims that defense counsel failed to impeach the victim’s trial testimony with
prior inconsistent statements made during the preliminary examination. Defendant also contends that
counsel failed to produce photographs of his post-arrest injuries that would have been relevant in
establishing that he acted in self-defense. To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must show that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
under prevailing professional norms and that the representation so prejudiced the defendant as to
deprive him of a fair trial. People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 338; 521 NW2d 797 (1994). Since
defendant did not file a motion for a new trial nor request an evidentiary hearing on this basis, our review
is limited to errors apparent on the record before us. People v Hedelsky, 162 Mich App 382, 387;
412 NW2d 746 (1987).
Our review of the record indicates that counsel did in fact use the victim’s preliminary
examination testimony in an effort to impeach his trial testimony. Thus, defendant’s first claim lacks
factual support. With respect to the photographs, we are unable to conclude on the record before us
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that counsel’s failure to produce them at trial substantially limited defendant’s claim of self-defense.
Consequently, defendant has failed to establish that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel on
this basis.
Defendant next raises two issues regarding his right to testify. Defendant first argues that the
trial court should have ascertained on the record whether he intelligently and knowingly waived his
constitutional right to testify. As defendant acknowledges, there is no such duty. See Bell, supra at
277; People v Harris, 190 Mich App 652, 661-662; 476 NW2d 767 (1991); People v Simmons,
140 Mich App 681, 684-685; 364 NW2d 783 (1985). We also reject defendant’s related claim that
he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel advised him not to take the stand.
This was a matter of trial strategy that we will not second guess on appeal. Simmons, supra at 685
686.
In his last claim of error, defendant challenges his sentence on several grounds. Defendant first
argues that he should be resentenced because offense variable six (OV 6) (multiple victims) was
incorrectly scored. We reject defendant’s argument because it is directed at the trial court’s
“calculation of the sentencing variable on the basis of [its] discretionary interpretation of the
unchallenged facts,” rather than the accuracy of the factual basis for the sentence. People v Mitchell,
454 Mich 145, 176; 560 NW2d 600 (1997). Since the sentencing guidelines do not have the force of
law, “[t]here is no juridicial basis for claims of error based on alleged misinterpretation of the guidelines,
instructions regarding how the guidelines should be applied, or misapplication of guidelines variables.”
Id. at 176-177.
Defendant also contends that the trial court improperly based its sentencing decision on its belief
that defendant suborned perjury. However, the record simply does not support defendant’s claim of
error. We also reject defendant’s claim that the trial court made an independent finding that defendant
was guilty of assault with intent to commit murder, contrary to the jury’s verdict, as a reason for
justifying the sentence imposed. We are unable to conclude on this record that the trial court improperly
sentenced defendant on this basis. While the trial court was apparently dissatisfied with the jury’s
verdict, the court correctly stated that it had to respect that verdict, and noted that the “worst offense
here” for purposes of sentencing was assault with intent to do great bodily harm.
We also reject defendant’s claim that his six-year and eight-month minimum sentence was
disproportionate. We note initially that defendant’s sentence falls within the guidelines range and is
therefore presumptively proportionate. People v Broden, 428 Mich 343, 354-355; 408 NW2d 789
(1987). Defendant has failed to cite any “unusual circumstances” rendering his presumptively
proportionate sentence disproportionate. See People v Daniel, 207 Mich App 47, 54; 523 NW2d
830 (1994). Also, considering that this was a serious, assaultive crime, that defendant has refused to
take responsibility for his actions, and that defendant had six prior convictions, including one felony, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to the maximum minimum sentence
recommended by the guidelines. In sum, the sentence was proportionate considering the circumstances
of this offense and this offender. People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 636; 461 NW2d 1 (1990).
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Finally, in a supplemental brief, defendant maintains that he is entitled to resentencing on the
basis that the trial court incorrectly scored prior record variable two (PRV 2) (prior low severity felony
convictions). Defendant argues that the scoring error is based on a factual inaccuracy, and, therefore, is
subject to appellate review despite the Supreme Court’s decision in Mitchell, supra. However,
because defendant failed to raise this issue at sentencing, it has not been preserved for appeal. MCR
6.429(C). Accordingly, we decline to review it.
Affirmed.
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Robert P. Young, Jr.
1
See CJI2d 5.6.
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